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“I’m a Muslim so of course I prefer Shari’ah.  Shari’ah is the best of all possible laws.  
It’s divine law.”  21 -year-old woman, Dakar 
 
 
 “Shari’ah comes from God and as Muslims we have to live by it.  But above all we’re a 
secular country.” 21 -year-old man, Dakar 
 
According to these two young men and women interviewed in 2005, citizens 
disagree about whether Senegal’s state family law should be based on Islamic law, or 
Shari’ah.  For both, deciding whether legislation should be based on Shari’ah entails 
political and religious judgments as they deliberate about the sources of authority that 
legitimize state law.  For this young woman, the divine authority of the Shari’ah makes it 
preferable to all other sources of law, and so she supports the idea of a state law that 
would conform to Shari’ah principles.  For this young man, the fact that Shari’ah comes 
from God gives it religious authority.  However he also values the fact that Senegal is a 
secular country and views a state law based on Shari’ah as incompatible with the state’s 
secular authority.  In this dissertation, I ask how and why citizens disagree about the role 
of Shari’ah as a source of state law.  I evaluate the ways that ordinary men and women 
make sense of competing and complementary religious and political values in Senegal, a 
secular, democratic, and predominantly Muslim country in West Africa.   
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As the response from the young man in Dakar above suggests, some men and 
women believe that the laws of a secular state cannot or should not be based on Islamic 
law.  Some scholars advance this position as well.  Abdullahi An-Na’im (2008), a 
prominent legal scholar who advocates for a secular state, argues that Islamic law simply 
becomes the political will of the state and no longer carries the same religious authority 
once it becomes state law.  By this reading, a secular state is precisely a state which does 
not claim to enforce laws based on Shari’ah.  From a legal perspective, Sherman Jackson 
(1996, xiv) defines an Islamic state as “…a nation-state ruled by Islamic law.”  Popular 
debates about the relationship between Islamic law and the state, then, often conjure 
images of two idealized states in a binary opposition—the Islamic state that enacts 
Islamic law as state law and the secular state that does not.  The other main objective of 
this dissertation, therefore, is to evaluate how citizens themselves understand the 
relationship between Islamic law and the state.  Do ordinary Muslims in a secular state 
believe that Shari’ah can and should be a source of legislation?   Do they see such 
preferences as mutually exclusive?  To address this question, I ask if Muslims who 
support a secular state are indeed less likely to support state legislation based on 
Shari’ah.1
Understanding how ordinary Muslims view the relationship between secularism 
and Shari’ah is important because it provides insight into the extent to which they hold 
the kind of popular political ideologies described in today’s public debates about Islam.  
For example, some scholars identify preferences for Shari’ah as state law as an indicator 
of an Islamist political ideology (e.g., Feldman 2008).  Moreover, they often describe 
Islamists as existing on an ideological continuum from “liberal” to “conservative” to 
       
                                                 
1 The idea of the secular state is discussed in Chapter 2. 
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“radical.”  For example, “liberal Islamists accept many of the goals of establishing 
Islamic law but advocate more liberal interpretations of the Shari’ah than do mainstream 
Islamists” (Feldman 2008, see Note 2 on 155-156).2
 In this dissertation, I argue that whether and how states incorporate Shari’ah 
principles in legislation represents an important site of contestation over the proper 
relationship between religion and state.  I focus on popular views toward family law 
because of its historical and contemporary relevance in comparative context.  Moreover, 
citizens’ views of the appropriate and authoritative sources of law are an important 
component of legitimate governance (Diamond and Morlino 2005).  My research seeks to 
contribute to interdisciplinary debates by examining how citizens in Senegal made sense 
of a major public debate about Shari’ah as a source of state family law and how they 
reconciled strongly held political and religious values.  Recent public opinion surveys 
completed in nearly every country in the Muslim world confirm that a majority of men 
and women desire some role for Shari’ah as a source of state law, yet levels of popular 
  In contrast, advocates for a secular 
state who oppose enacting Shari’ah as state law are described ideologically as secularists.  
As family law has been debated in Senegal, journalists and advocates have labeled their 
opponents in ideological terms as well.  But if scholars and pundits delineate between 
Islamist and secularist political ideologies as they debate the role of Shari’ah as state law, 
do citizens themselves actually view preferences for a secular state and for Islamic law as 
interconnected and mutually exclusive?   
                                                 
2 Islamist ideological orientations are thought to have important implications for democratic political 
attitudes and preferences (Tibi 2008; Masoud 2008; Hamzawy and Brown 2008).  For example, radical 
Islamists are said to advocate for non-democratic systems, while liberal Islamists for democratic political 
systems (Feldman 2008).  Others have found that ordinary Muslims who hold more liberal interpretations 




support differ dramatically across national borders (Esposito and Mogahed 2007, 66).3
To address the question of how and why men and women disagree about whether 
Shari’ah should be a source of state law, I turn to scholarship on public opinion formation 
and the formation of belief systems.  This analysis offers an empirical investigation of the 
ways that men and women make connections between their views on Shari’ah as state 
law and their views about the secularism of the state.  I turn to research on framing to 
argue that how elites frame debates over state family law and Shari’ah as a source of state 
law will shape citizens’ preferences (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson 1992; 
Gamson and Modigliani 1987).  I also turn to theories of public opinion formation that 
highlight the important role of predispositions, especially values, as well as awareness of 
elite discourse in shaping citizens’ preferences (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992; 
Alvarez and Brehm 2002).  I argue that awareness of elite discourse plays an important 
role in shaping what citizens come to see as important as they form preferences for state 
family law.  In particular, most citizens hold multiple complex, interacting 
predispositions, and elite framing helps to activate certain predispositions as citizens’ 
form their preferences.  Men and women with the most information about the family law 
debate—in which Shari’ah and secularism were framed as competing preferences—tend 
to adopt this secular interpretive package and view a state family law based on Shari’ah 
  
My dissertation also contributes to the larger question of why ordinary Muslims in some 
countries are more likely than Muslims in other countries to desire legislation that 
conforms to Shari’ah principles.   
                                                 
3 I use the term Shari’ah and Islamic law interchangeably in this dissertation rather than Islamic 
jurisprudence, or fiqh, because I focus on popular understandings of Islamic law and popular media 
debates.  Ordinary men and women, as well as journalists, tend to use the term Shari’ah when discussing 
Islamic law.   
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as incompatible with a secular state.  Despite the widespread use of ideological labels to 
characterize competing visions of the legitimate source of state law (e.g., secularists 
versus Islamists, extremists versus moderates), I argue for a more cautious approach to 
ascribing elite ideological labels to ordinary Muslims’ belief systems (Converse 1964).  
To begin to address these questions, I analyze original public opinion data I collected 
with 800 men and women in 2005 in Dakar, Senegal. 
 
Popular Support and Opposition to Shari’ah as a Source of State Family Law 
 Some describe family law is the “heart of the Shari’ah and the basis for a strong, 
Islamically-oriented family structure and society” (Esposito and Mogahed 2007, 23).  In 
his comparative study of family laws, An-Na’im (2002, xi) writes that many Muslims 
view family law as akin to religious identity with a sort of precolonial authenticity: 
Islamic family law has become for most Muslims the symbol of their Islamic 
identity, the hard irreducible core of what it means to be a Muslim today.  This is 
precisely because [it] is the main aspect of Shari’ah that is believed to have 
successfully resisted displacement by European codes during the colonial period, 
and survived various degrees or forms of secularization of the state and its 
institutions in many Islamic countries. 
 
An-Na’im argues against binding family law to Shari’ah simply because of its religious 
authority.  Specifically, family law—including marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child 
custody—is still state policy and its enforcement rests on the political will of the state  
( 3). 
 Anthropologist Talal Asad (2003, 227) describes how during the period of 
colonial rule, Shari’ah was restricted to matters of personal status and family law.  
However, he challenges the view that because it is family law, it deals with core religious 
beliefs and practices and is essentially part of the private sphere. 
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When the Shari’ah is structured essentially as a set of legal rules to define 
personal status, it is radically transformed.  This is not because the Shari’ah, by 
being confined to the private domain, is thereby deprived of political authority.  
...On the contrary, …it is rendered into a subdivision of legal norms (fiqh) that 
are authorized and maintained by a centralizing state.  
 
As “Islamic family law,” state family law became a subject of public policy in the 
modern state.  Moreover, as a category of state law, centralized governments claimed the 
right to legislate behavior within this so-called private sphere of the family ( 227).   
 In this dissertation, I demonstrate that some ordinary citizens understand family 
law to be the heart of the Shari’ah and believe that that state must simply enforce clearly 
identifiable Shari’ah principles.  Others view family law as the primary space where 
states must guarantee equal citizenship rights.  As state policy, the state must enact 
legislation that grants legal equality to all its citizens as guaranteed in many constitutions.   
 Debates about family law often center on discourses of rights, including the 
meaning of legal equality for all citizens, regardless of religion and gender.  Across the 
Muslim world, citizen activists as well as religious and political leaders have hotly 
debated the extent to which family law should be based on Shari’ah as well as which 
interpretations of Shari’ah are authoritative.  For example, in August 2009 Mali’s 
parliament debated a new family law that purportedly sought to grant women greater 
equality in marriage.  In response, Muslim religious leaders and large numbers of citizens 
staged public protests, claiming that the law violated Islamic principles (Vogl 2009).  In 
Morocco in 2004 and Algeria in 2005, parliaments passed reformed family laws.  
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Advocates for and against the reforms offered competing arguments and interpretations 
of Islamic jurisprudence to justify their positions.4
 Family law reform has been a contentious issue in Senegal as well.  After political 
independence from France, Senegal took steps to establish a unified judicial system and 
to abolish separate customary courts.  Part of these legal reforms included the 1972 
family law, the Code de la Famille or Family Code, which applied to all Senegalese 
citizens rather than continuing the French colonial policy of applying French, customary, 
and Islamic laws depending on the personal status of the individual.  Though it included 
different customary regimes and some aspects of Islamic law (primarily inheritance laws) 
legal reformers sought to draft a single code that would unify as many aspects of the law 
as possible, following the principle of one nation/one law (Camara 2007a).  Through 
these reforms, Senegal attempted to unify its legal system, strengthen the secular 
character of society, acknowledge the principles of individual rights, and guarantee the 
equality of all citizens under the law (Loimeier 1996).  The Family Code acknowledges 
religious difference but is seen by many as a secular law (Dieye 2008).  It attempted to 
grant women greater rights and has been described as a part of a process of 
“democratizing and modernizing” the law (Kane 1972; Sow Sidibé 1993-1994).
   
5
                                                 
4 Interviews with activists in the Moroccan family law reform debates, December 2007, at international 
conference organized by The Esprit de Fès Foundation & The Protection Project, “Family Laws in the 
Muslim World: Comparative Perspectives” in Fez, Morocco.  Interviews with drafters of the Algerian 
Family Code, February and March 2008 
5 Note that some Senegalese scholars point to the patriarchal and discriminatory bases of the law, arguing 
that the Family Code sought to privilege male rights over female rights (Camara 2007b, 458, 469).   
  As a 
predominantly Muslim country—estimated at 90-95%—and a secular democracy, 
Senegal is widely praised by scholars for its model of secularism that allows for a 
friendly accommodation between state and religion (Stepan 2008; An-Na'im 2006).  The 
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Family Code is often described as an example of that successful balance which respects 
religious faith and diversity yet seeks to treat all citizens equally before the law (Mbaye 
2007).   
 However, Muslim religious leaders and activists have challenged the secular 
character of the state since independence and have focused much of their opposition on 
the Family Code (Creevey 1996; Villalón 2004; Augis 2002; Dieye 2008; Loimeier 
1996).  Most recently in 2003, the Islamic Committee for the Reform of Family Law in 
Senegal (Comité Islamique pour la Réforme du Code de la Famille au Sénégal, hereafter 
known as CIRCOFS), a diverse coalition of religious activists, leaders, and associations, 
called for the National Assembly to adopt a Muslim personal status law in place of the 
Family Code.  They unveiled a draft law that would apply Shari’ah to Muslims and said 
that Christians and other non-Muslims should be governed by their own personal laws.  
CIRCOFS justified their demand for a Muslim personal law by arguing that the Family 
Code violated the principles of the Shari’ah, and as such, the religious beliefs of 
Muslims.  They invoked the religious authority of the Shari’ah, the freedom to practice 
religion freely, and the principle of legal pluralism that would allow each religious 
community to be governed by its own laws.6
 CIRCOFS claimed to speak for “public opinion,” arguing that Muslims rejected 
the Family Code because it contradicted their religious convictions and only represented 
  Through the act of drafting an alternative 
family law, CIRCOFS also claimed the authority to interpret Islamic law.   
                                                 
6 “Il serait donc faux et dangereux de se contenter de simples modifications de tels ou tels articles de 
l’actuel Code de la famille. Il s’impose en vérité d’adopter un autre Code totalement différent dans sa 
substance de l’actuel Code de la famille. Pour se faire, il convient de respecter la liberté de conscience de 
chacun inscrite dans notre Constitution en substituent au code de la famille un code de statut personnel qui 
soumet chacun à sa loi personnelle, c’est-à-dire qui soumet les musulmans à la charia, les chrétiens et le 
non-musulmans à leur loi personnelle.  Ce ne serait d’ailleurs qu’un retour à ce qui, à peu de choses, se 
pratiquait sous le régime colonial” (CIRCOFS 2002).   
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the will of a small, French-educated elite.7  CIRCOFS also invoked the principle of the 
will of the majority in a democracy and argued that the Muslim majority had the right to 
a family law that reflected its preferences.8  Finally, CIRCOFS critiqued the secular state 
and argued that the laïcité de l’Etat did not exist in most of the democratic states in 
Europe.  Senegal was secular simply because it imitated the French state model.9
For many observers within and outside of Senegal—scholars, journalists, citizen 
activists, and religious and political elites—the issue of a Muslim personal law inspired 
by Shari’ah raised questions about the meaning of secularism in Senegal.  For example, a 
group of civil society organizations formed the Collective for the Defense of Secularism 
and National Unity (Collectif pour la Défense de la Laïcité et de l’Unité Nationale au 
Sénégal, hereafter known as the Collective) and openly denounced CIRCOFS’ rejection 
of the Family Code (Bop 2003).
   
10
                                                 
7 “Critiqué et rejeté par nos éminents chefs religieux musulmans, le Code de la famille est, pour l’essentiel, 
ignoré par les populations…  Cette situation est la conséquence du fait que des élites politiques, 
administratives ou autres, formées à l’école française, subissant des influences extérieures, prennent leurs 
désirs pour des réalités et se croient investies du droit de faire des lois conformes à leurs vues et leurs 
aspirations personnelles en contradiction avec les points de vue et les aspirations de la grande masse de la 
population qui demeure profondément attachée à ses convictions religieuses musulmanes. De cette dualité, 
découle une situation grave et on ne peut plus déplorable car elle sape les fondements de l’Etat et elle est 
source d’anarchie : une loi votée que les citoyens rejettent et n’appliquent pas, qu’on s’évertue à leur 
imposer sans d’ailleurs y parvenir. C’est très grave.” 
8 “La communauté musulmane forme l’immense majorité de la population et les règles les plus 
élémentaires de la démocratie exigent que, contrairement à ce qui se passe actuellement, le droit musulman 
de la famille auquel obéissent 95% des Sénégalaise et des Sénégalaises soit érigé en cette matière, en droit 
commun au Sénégal”  (CIRCOFS 2002) . 
9 “Que la “laïcité de l’Etat” est un concept qui ne possède aucune définition légale, de sorte que ceux qui 
s’en prévalent lui donnent le contenu que chacun veut bien lui donner. C’est par pur mimétisme que l’on a 
inscrit dans notre Constitution, en l’important de France, le concept de laïcité qui ne figure pas dans la 
plupart des constitutions des pays d’Europe. C’est par pure ignorance que l’on croit que “la laïcité à la 
française” est un modèle, alors qu’elle n’est en réalité que l’exception en Europe.” 
10 According to one activist in the Collective, this group included trade unions, Senegalese NGOs, human 
rights associations, university professors, individual activists, Catholic groups, and “democratic” ‘ulama.   
  They claimed that a Muslim personal law would 
violate the secularism of the state, the guarantees of equality before the law for all 
citizens, and national unity.  Opposition to a personal status law did not come solely from 
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non-governmental organizations.  President Abdoulaye Wade immediately stated that he 
would never revise the Family Code while President (Sarr Diakhate 2003).   
 Advocates on either side of the family law debate publicized their positions 
through the mass media and acknowledged the need to mobilize public support behind 
their positions.  CIRCOFS aimed to persuade the public through an organized lobbying 
effort—“un programme de popularisation et de sensibilisation des populations,” which 
recognized the importance of public opinion (Seck 2003).11
 To date, Senegal’s Family Code remains unchanged, but this debate is only the 
most recent in a broader history of debate about family law and Muslim personal status.
  Throughout the heated 
debate, journalists represented diverse voices in news analyses and citizens themselves 
wrote opinion pieces and letters to the editor to weigh in on the issue.  The family law 
debate became, I argue, a debate about the general principle of Shari’ah as a source of 
law and of the secularism of the state.  The debate was framed as a competition between 
competing Islamist versus secularist political ideologies, and opinion leaders competed to 
define the meaning of secularism in Senegal.   
12  
Leaders of Senegal’s Sufi orders criticized the Family Code in 1972 (Villalón 1995, 227) 
and reformist and Islamist groups have led more recent calls for family law reform 
(Loimeier 1996).  CIRCOFS’ 2003 draft was the most organized challenge because it 
drafted an alternative law and launched an organized lobbying effort (Dieye 2008).13
                                                 
11 Even prior to CIRCOFS’ proposal, others have mentioned the importance of understanding what citizens 
themselves want in state family law.  For example, a legal scholar who had participated in prior family law 
reforms, and who was a critic of CIRCOFS’ draft project, had also called for further study of population: 
“Let’s consult the population before going farther.  Let’s see if the people are ready for these new changes” 
(Diatta 2002b).  
12 See Diouf (1998) for an analysis of calls for Muslim personal status in the French colonial state. 
  
13 CIRCOFS wrote: “…D’ores et déjà nous convions toutes les Associations islamiques du Sénégal, tous 
ceux et toutes celles qui, individuellement ou collectivement, militent pour un Sénégal nouveau, 
respectueux des valeurs religieuses du peuple profondément religieux de ce pays, à se mobiliser et à 
11 
 
Since 2003, many scholars have discussed the larger theoretical issues related to the 
debate over family law and Senegalese secularism (Brossier 2004b; Dieye 2008; Brossier 
2004a), but this study asks how ordinary citizens themselves understood this debate and 
why they took sides for and against a Muslim personal law that claimed to conform to 
Shari’ah.  My study seeks to understand how elite actors attempted to persuade the public 
about the legitimacy of their legal claims through the media, and how citizens themselves 
understood such debates about secularism and Shari’ah in a local context.   
 Public debates about family law reform require elites and the public to negotiate 
between religious and political authority.  In Senegal, as in the neighboring cases of 
Algeria, Mali, and Morocco, recent family law debates raise similar questions of the role 
of Shari’ah as a source of state law and who has the authority to interpret Shari’ah.  
Family law reform has immediate implications for individuals and families as states 
decide how to guarantee legal equality for all citizens while also respecting freedom of 
religion and protecting citizens’ right to mobilize for laws that reflect their values in a 
democracy.   
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 In this dissertation, I argue that how debates over Shari’ah as a source of law play 
out in any society depends quite strongly on how these issues are framed by opinion 
leaders, including civil society activists, journalists, and religious and political elites.  The 
mass media is a space for visible, public elite discourse where opinion leaders construct 
frames to highlight what is at stake in each public policy debate.  Elite discourse offers 
citizens interpretive packages that shape what citizens come to see as important (Gamson 
                                                                                                                                                 
intervenir activement pour que le gouvernement et le parlement de l’alternance adoptent une loi consacrant 
le projet définitif du Code du statut personnel. ” 
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and Modigliani 1989, 1987).  To construct frames that resonate with the public, however, 
elites also mobilize values that already exist in popular culture.  Elite discourse, then, 
shapes but also reflects broader cultural values and principles.  Of the relationship 
between elite discourse and public opinion, Gamson and Modigliani (1989, 2) write:  
Each system interacts with the other: media discourse is part of the process by 
which individuals construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by 
which journalists and other cultural entrepreneurs develop and crystallize 
meaning in public discourse. 
 
In this study, I examine how the issue of family law reform was debated in Senegalese 
elite discourse as found in print media.  I also examine how ordinary women and men 
made sense of the debate, and how key media frames made their way into popular 
discourse.   
 In Senegal, as in other comparative contexts, opinion leaders offer competing 
ways to interpret the issue of family law reform and Muslim personal status.  Advocates 
for laws that conform to Shari’ah principles often invoke the religious authority of the 
Shari’ah in order to push for strict observance of what they argue are clearly identifiable 
and immutable principles.  Shari’ah is thus framed as a simple question of religious belief 
and practice.  I argue that many ordinary citizens do view family law in such terms.  As 
such, religious predispositions should push them to support such a law.  However, 
citizens’ preferences are not simply a question of religiosity.  I will show evidence that 
there is a widely diffused discourse of secularism that has broad support in the general 
public.  There is also broad popular support for the principle of legal equality, 
conceptualized as applying one law to each citizen.  Defenders of the current Family 
Code framed support for the current law as a question of secularism and legal equality.  
As current state law, the Family Code reflects a mainstream elite consensus that the 
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current law is not only compatible with Senegal’s secular constitution, but that it is 
necessary for Senegal’s national unity and for its constitutional protection of legal 
equality for all citizens.  Opinion leaders who defended the Family Code constructed a 
secular interpretive package that attempted to activate predispositions toward secularism 
and equality.  According to this framing, predispositions toward secularism and legal 
equality should push citizens to oppose a Muslim personal law.   
 Relying on public opinion research that highlights the important role of elite 
discourse in shaping citizens’ preferences, as well as the common existence of multiple 
predispositions among most citizens, I argue that most citizens hold each of these 
predispositions toward religious authority, secularism, and legal equality (Hochschild 
1981; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Alvarez and Brehm 2002).  The critical argument in this 
dissertation is that most men and women profess commitment to the same values—they 
support a secular state and legal equality for all citizens and believe in the religious 
authority of the Shari’ah.  Religiosity seems to push them to support the law, but they are 
also strongly committed to Senegal’s political and cultural discourse of secularism that 
emphasizes mutual respect for all religions and the principle of equality before the law.  
Why do citizens who share the same values differ in their preferences for a state law 
based on Shari’ah?  One explanation is that they actively reject framing secularism and 
Shari’ah as state law as incompatible preferences.  I argue, however, that many citizens 
are simply less aware of elite discourse that frames these as opposing preferences.   
 I will show evidence that while print media tended to frame the issue as one of 
secularism versus Shari’ah, only some citizens see these preferences as mutually 
exclusive.  Citizens who view these preferences as mutually exclusive do so, in part, 
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because they pay more attention to media debates where this mainstream secular 
interpretive package is widespread.  Education and media exposure, which I suggest 
indicates a broader awareness of and information about mainstream elite discourse in 
Senegal, plays a critical role in shaping preferences for family law.  I argue that citizens 
with higher levels of education—who were most exposed to the media debate—should be 
more likely to discuss family law in the terms of elite discourse as found in the mass 
media, whether or not they support or oppose an Islamic family law.  I also argue that 
among individuals who support Senegalese secularism, more educated citizens are most 
likely to connect the issues of Shari’ah as a source of state law, the secular state, and the 
principle legal equality into a broader package of secular preferences.  These most 
educated and informed citizens, then, should be most likely to view Shari’ah and 
secularism as mutually exclusive preferences.    
 This argument does not assume an inverse relationship between religiosity and 
education.  I suggest, though, that many individuals with high levels of education and 
high religiosity will be more aware of potential tensions between their preferences and 
values if they are commonly framed as competing values in elite discourse.   
 I employ multiple methods to evaluate these questions in the dissertation.  First, I 
describe and interpret how elites framed the issue of family law and Shari’ah as a source 
of state law.  By analyzing a sample of newspaper articles, letters to the editor, and 
opinion pieces written in 2003-2004, I seek to uncover how ideas and values were 
“packaged” together for the public.  Second, I interpret the ways that citizens themselves 
understood the question of family law reform through coded short-answer narratives 
gathered from an original public opinion survey of 800 ordinary men and women in 
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Senegal.  I evaluate how ordinary men and women understood the family law debate and 
justified their positions.  Third, I interpret several multivariate statistical models that 
evaluate whether there are significant differences between citizens as to why they support 
or oppose an Islamic family law.  I evaluate differences between men and women, 
between Christians and Muslims, and differences across levels of self-reported religiosity 
and education.  I also evaluate if citizens’ preferences for a secular state are inversely 
related to their preferences for a state law that conforms to Shari’ah.  Finally, I address 
the question of which citizens view these preferences as incompatible.    
The structure of the dissertation is as follows.  In Chapter Two, I reference 
scholarship on secularism and Islamic law and place Senegal in the context of the 
diversity of institutional relationships between religion and state within predominantly 
Muslim countries.  In Chapter Three, I outline the main theories of public opinion I draw 
upon to explain how citizens form preferences for legislation based on Shari’ah, 
including literature on public opinion formation and media framing.  I highlight the 
important role of elite discourse in shaping how citizens form connections between their 
multiple core values.  I argue that we should pay more attention to the competing 
interpretive packages opinion leaders create and disseminate in order to persuade citizens 
whether state laws should conform to Shari’ah.   
In Chapter Four, I introduce the major ways elite actors in Senegal—journalists, 
religious and political leaders, and influential members of civil society—framed debates 
about Islamic family law in print media.  I carried out a content analysis of available print 
media debates from sources such as Wal Fadjri, Le Soleil, and Sud Quotidien, among 
others, from 2003-2004.  In Chapter Five, I introduce and describe the original survey of 
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public opinion used in this study, which yielded a probability sample of 800 face-to-face 
interviews in Dakar.  I describe the distribution of preferences for and against a personal 
status law inspired by Shari’ah across gender, levels of religious engagement, media 
exposure, and education.   
In Chapter Six, I analyze the 800 open-ended narratives gathered from men and 
women to examine how citizens themselves explain their preferences for a Muslim 
personal law based on Shari’ah.  Coding and analyzing citizens own words offers 
evidence of the considerations they judge to be most important as they contemplate 
family law reform.  Interpreting coded narratives provides evidence that citizens are 
aware of and mobilize many of the key frames from media discourse.  I also show that 
Muslims do not speak with one voice, and that citizens mobilize and articulate complex, 
multifaceted arguments justifying their preferences for and against a state family law 
based on Shari’ah.  Value judgments, including a commitment to secularism and to 
religious values, play an important role in helping citizens to make sense of family law 
reform.  
In Chapter Seven, I interpret an ordinal logit model that evaluates the role of 
demographic variables, predispositions, and awareness of elite discourse in explaining 
support for and opposition to a Muslim personal law.  Finally, I show in Chapter Eight 
that many citizens do not view family law reform in the stark terms of elite discourse.  
For these citizens, secularism and support for Shari’ah are not necessarily inversely 
related.  By comparing measures of opinion consistency across measures of education, 
media exposure, political knowledge and religious engagement, I find that the most 
educated and media-exposed, rather than the most “religious,” seem to connect the larger 
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frames of the family law debate into an interconnected set of preferences about religion, 
law, and state.  This finding is particularly important because many citizens who oppose 
an Islamic family law are as religiously engaged as those who support the law.   
Chapter Nine concludes with a summary of findings and discusses how results in 
Senegal may inform expectations for other comparative cases.  In particular, while 
debates about family law should entail discourses of rights and appeals to religious values 
and authority, elite framing should differ depending on historical and contemporary 
variations between countries in their respective institutional relationships between 
religion and state, the presence of multiple religions in the country, and differences and 




Chapter 2  
Islam and the Secular State: Senegal in Context 
 
Samuel Huntington argued in The Third Wave (1991) that secularism and 
democracy are inextricably linked: 
To the extent that governmental legitimacy and policy flow from religious doctrine 
and religious expertise, Islamic concepts of politics differ from and contradict the 
premises of democratic politics.  …With one exception, no Islamic country has 
sustained a fully democratic political system for any length of time.  The exception 
is Turkey, where Mustafa Kemal Ataturk explicitly rejected Islamic concepts of 
society and politics and vigorously attempted to create a secular, modern, Western 
nation-state.       
        ( 307-8) 
Huntington’s statement reflects a broadly held view that democratic politics requires a 
secular state.  Recently, however, scholars of contemporary politics have attempted to 
move beyond debates that frame democracy and Islam as competing systems resting on 
incompatible sources of authority.14  Political scientist Alfred Stepan (2001, 162) has 
played an important role in challenging scholars to disassociate secularism and 
democracy and writes: “secularism and the separation of church and state have no 
inherent affinity with democracy.”15
                                                 
14 Scholars also discuss the actual forms of differentiation between political and religious authority that 
existed in medieval Muslim states (Crone 2004; Jackson 1996). 
  In his more recent work, he explains variations in 
15 He argues that a democracy does not require a secular state, as the example of many European 
democracies with established churches demonstrates. Rather, he advocates for the “twin-tolerations.”  
Upholding the twin-tolerations means freedom of action for political institutions vis-à-vis religious 
authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions.  Stepan asserts that a 
democracy must give religions complete freedom to worship privately.  Furthermore, religious individuals 
and groups must have the right to organize political movements and parties.   To reinforce his point that 
there is no inherent relationship between a secular and a democratic state, Stepan turns to Robert Dahl’s 
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religion-state relations and “the multiple secularisms of modern democracies” (Stepan 
2007).16  This study begins from this premise and argues that it is as important to study 
how citizens understand and negotiate the appropriate relationship between religion and 
state as it is to understand their attitudes toward democracy as a system of government.  I 
examine how citizens negotiate religious and political authority in a secular state by 
studying how ordinary men and women understand and formulate preferences for the 
legitimate sources of state laws.17
  
     
 
Secularism and the Secular State 
 
Table 2.1 hints at the diversity of possible religion-state relations: religious states 
in which the legal and judicial processes are in the hands of religious authorities, and in 
which church and state are unified; states with established religions, which have at least 
one official or privileged religion, and therefore form an alliance between church and 
state; secular states which have no official religion, as in France, Turkey, India, the 
United States, and Senegal; and finally states that are antireligious, which are hostile to 
one or more religions.   
                                                                                                                                                 
(1971) famous definition of democracy.  Nowhere in Dahl’s definition, or in Linz and Stepan’s modified 
definition, is secularism or a separation of church and state a necessary or sufficient condition for a state to 
be democratic. 
16 Note that scholars of public opinion find that citizens tend to overwhelmingly support democracy, but are 
more evenly divided on the role of religion and state.  Some prefer “secular” democracy and others prefer 
“Islamic democracy” (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler and Gao 2005). 
17 It is important to note that secularism in this context does not refer to individuals who report lower levels 
of personal religiosity (Norris and Inglehart 2004).  See Casanova (1994, 2006)for different uses of the 
terms.   
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Despite the common usage of the term “secular state” and “secularism” to describe a 
unitary concept, Table 2.1 suggests is that there is great diversity within the category of 
“secular state” itself.  The diversity of institutional relationships between religion and 
state also exists within the category of predominantly Muslim countries that scholars and 
pundits refer to as the “Muslim world.”  Table 2.2 shows that in 22 predominantly 
Muslim countries, Islam is not the official religion of the state.  Eleven states make no 
constitutional declaration concerning the Islamic or secular nature of the state, while an 
additional eleven countries have constitutions that proclaim the state to be secular.   
Combined with the roughly 300 million Muslims that do not live in predominantly 
Muslim countries, “the majority of the world’s Muslim population currently lives in 
countries that either proclaim the state to be secular, or that make no pronouncements 
concerning Islam to be the official religion of the state” (Stahnke and Blitt 2005, 951).  
Moreover, only 15 constitutions of the forty-four predominantly Muslim countries 
provide for “Islamic law, principles, or jurisprudence as a source of, or limitation on, 
general legislation.”  Like many predominantly Christian countries with established 
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churches, states in which Islam is the established religion tend to have institutional 
differentiation between religion and state as well.    
Table 2.2 Variations in role for Islam in Muslim-majority states 
States that have Islam as Official Religion (total 
22) 
States that do not have Islam as Official Religion 
(total 22) 




Declared Secular State 
(in Constitution) 





















Source:  (Stahnke and Blitt 2005) 
 
Political theorist Rajeev Bhargava (2006b, 5) clarifies three components 
underlying the relationship between religion and state that helps to distinguish secular 
from theocratic states and states with establish religions.  At the first level, non-secular 
states have formed an alliance between state and religion and share a common end that is 
defined by a common religion.  At a second level, there may or may not be an 
institutional differentiation or disconnection between religion and state.  The third level 
is policy and law.  Non-secular states may be connected to religion through policies and 
laws that are justified by religion.  The critical difference between states with an 
established church and theocracies is at the second level—their institutional 
disconnection of church and state.18
                                                 
18 There is variation within theocracies and established states as well.  In a theocracy, there is no 
institutional separation and religious leaders are also political leaders.  States with established churches can 
actually have no established church (if the religion has no church, such as the desires of some Hindu 
nationalists in India); can establish of a single church; or can establish multiple churches or multiple 
religions. 
  Secular states are often similar to states with 
established churches at the second level of differentiation between the institutions of state 
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and religion, but secular states tend to have a more complete disconnection by 
disestablishing churches or refusing to grant any official status to any religion.  The key 
area of difference stems from the first area—not sharing a common end—and the third 
area—the level of law and public policy.  Secular states differ most in how their doctrines 
of political secularism treat religion at the level of law and public policy.   
Bhargava (2006b, 10) argues that many secular states are “value-based secular 
states, i.e., states guided by values such as peace, liberty, or/and equality.”  As such, they 
justify their constitutional secularism in the name of guaranteeing values such as religious 
liberty or equal citizenship rights regardless of religion.  However, secular states may be 
guided by the same values but differ in how they treat religion in the realm of law and 
public policy.  In the Turkish model of secularism and earlier forms of French secularism, 
the state aggressively excludes religion from law and policy in order to control it, and 
may do so in the name of equality for all citizens.  The US model or the later French 
model, often called a model of strict neutrality or “liberal-democratic secularism,” 
attempts to be “respectfully indifferent” to all religions.  The US model has attempted to 
create a “wall of separation” between religion and state law and policy, also in the name 
equality in the law for all citizens, individual liberty, and freedom of religion, but aims to 
exclude rather than to control religion.  In the US model, public policy and state law must 
be religiously neutral so that all citizens can submit to state law even if they do not accept 
the religious belief or value upon which it rests.19
                                                 
19 Note that this “neutrality” is contested by many who point out that state law inevitably privileges some 
religions over others, and the courts do venture into the terrain of defining what constitutes legitimate 
“religious” practice (Sullivan 2005). 
  Other scholars who discuss variation 
between secularisms tend to focus on this third level of law and public policy as well.  
Stepan (2001) uses the terms “hostile” versus “friendly” secularisms to distinguish 
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between states that assert more versus less control over religions.  Moreover, states may 
become more hostile or friendlier to religion over time.  Political scientist Ahmet Kuru 
(2007) also focuses his definition of a secular state in the area of a state’s legal and 
judicial processes.  He uses the terms “passive” and “assertive” secularism to explain 
different models of political secularism in Turkey, the United States, and France. 
Many political scientists critique the model of “liberal-democratic secularism” 
found in the US that attempts to keep religion out of the legislature and out of public 
debate.  Some argue that citizens must be able to publicly argue morality in the realm of 
law and policy if laws are to be deemed legitimate by citizens (Gutmann and Thompson 
1996).  Others argue that much of religion and politics is emotional, and that US 
secularism places too much emphasis on rational, “neutral” justifications for law and 
policy.  By keeping religion out of political and policy debates, secularism in the US 
endangers pluralism within democratic politics (Connolly 1999).  Liberal-democratic 
secularism can be intolerant of believers because it “does not understand the believer’s 
life as it is lived from the inside.  …A religious life is not just a life of personal and 
whimsical attachment to a personal God but one in which one submits to his commands 
and lives obediently by them” (Bhargava 2006b, 14).  Charles Taylor (1998) argues 
against older secular models that aimed to keep religion out of the public debate and 
advocates for a newer version in which citizens still must accept certain political 
principles as morally binding, such as equality, even if they disagree on the moral or 
religious basis for these principles or legislation.  However, religious and moral 
disagreement should take place publicly and often.  According to these authors, religion 
is not easily privatized for many citizens and cannot be kept out of political discourse and 
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policy debates.  The very secularism that aims to guarantee religious liberty and equal 
citizenship may violate these rights for citizens of faith if secularism does not allow a 
larger public role for religious discourse and debate.  
 As historical models of Western secularism are critiqued by their own citizens, 
scholars are paying increasing attention to other “non-Western” versions of secularism 
that do not follow the liberal-democratic model or the “assertive” secularism of the 
Turkish model.  Bhargava describes Indian secularism as a model of “principled 
distance” wherein states may intervene in religious affairs as long as the intervention 
promotes the multiple values of “freedom, equality, or any other value integral to 
secularism”  (Bhargava 2006b, 18-19).  Indian secularism is a “multi-value secularism,” 
then, that differentiates itself from the US or French versions by more actively engaging 
with religion in the realm of law and policy.  Because of its religious diversity and deeply 
religious citizenry, this model values peace between religious communities and interprets 
the values of liberty and equality in terms of individuals and communities.  In this model, 
a state may enact a law grounded purely on religious doctrine as long as it is compatible 
with the values the secular state prioritizes—such as equality or freedom.  For example, 
the state may enact different laws for citizens of different religions if this promotes 
equality for religious groups even if it differentiates between them.  In this view, 
secularism is more contextual (Bhargava 1998).  There may be value-conflict in this 
model of political secularism, however: “to accept that secularism is a multi-value 
doctrine is to acknowledge that its constitutive values may come into conflict with one 
another.”  The model encourages accommodation between the state and religion “to make 
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each work without changing the basic content of apparently incompatible concepts and 
values,” such as equality through differentiation (Bhargava 2006b, 22).  
Other advocates for a secular state in the Muslim world advance alternative 
models that allow a larger role for religion in public discourse and legislative 
deliberation.  For example, legal scholar Abdullahi An-Na’im (2008) argues for a 
separation between religion and the state, but not a separation between religion and 
politics.  Citizens in a secular state must be able to publicly express and advance their 
desires, values, and beliefs in politics, even if they stem from religious sources.  His 
vision of a secular state also rests on values of religious freedom and equality, but it 
differs in that a state should not be able to enact Shari’ah as state law, even in the realm 
of state family law, because to do so violates religious freedom: “compliance with 
Shari’ah cannot be coerced by fear of state institutions or faked to appease their officials.  
This is what I mean by secularism,…namely a secular state that facilitates the possibility 
of religious piety out of honest conviction.”  A key area of debate and disagreement 
within secular states, then, takes place within this area of law and policy and centers on 
the extent to which a secular state may enact laws that claim to conform to religious law.   
In this dissertation, I focus on a key debate within the area of law and public 
policy in Senegal.  Senegal has been considered “the leading democracy in the Islamic 
world since 2000” (Stepan 2008; Gellar 2005)  and also declares itself secular in its 
constitution.  Article One, for example, states that “the Republic of Senegal is secular, 
democratic, and social.  It ensures equality before the law for all citizens, without 
distinction of origin, race, gender or religion.  It respects all beliefs.”20
                                                 
20Article One states : “La République du Sénégal est laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l'égalité 
devant la loi de tous les citoyens, sans distinction d'origine, de race, de sexe, de religion. Elle respecte 
  Senegal meets the 
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simple definition of a secular state in that it has no official religion, there is an 
institutional differentiation between religion and state, and the legal and judicial 
processes are out of institutional religious control.  Senegal has garnered recent attention 
for its “friendly” model of secularism in which the state offers support to all religions 
rather than being indifferent to them (Dieye 2008).  Stepan (2007) currently classifies 
Senegal and India as models of “respect all, support all” secularism.21  With a highly 
religious population and a history of diverse membership in Sufi orders and an important, 
if small, Christian population, Senegal—both during the period of French colonial rule 
and during the postcolonial period—has a well-documented relationship of 
accommodation between religion and state (Robinson 2000; Cruise O'Brien 1971; 
Villalón 1995). 22
                                                                                                                                                 
toutes les croyances.”  Senegal’s constitution also protects freedom of religion.  Article Five states: Any act 
of racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, as well as regionalist propaganda that may affect the internal 
safety of the state or territorial integrity of the Republic shall be punished by law.  Article 24 states:  
Freedom of conscience, freedom of religious practice or worship, and the profession of religious education 
is guaranteed to all, subject to public order. Religious institutions and communities have the right to 
develop without hindrance.  They shall not be subject to the supervision of the State.  They shall regulate 
and manage their affairs in an autonomous manner.  
21 He also cites Senegal’s high global rankings for religious freedom (Fox 2006).  He also includes 
Indonesia in this comparison. 
22 The Tijaniyya is the largest Sufi order, or tariqa, but most scholarship has focused on the Murid order.  
Others adhere to the Qadiriyya and Layene orders.  Many have written of the historical relationship of 
mutual exchange or exchange of services between political and religious elites that characterizes Senegal’s 
stability (Cruise O'Brien 1992; Coulon 1981).  David Robinson (2000) argued that the relationship or 
“paths of accommodation” between religious and political authority helped the French to gain legitimacy as 
they managed colonial affairs through extensive connections with Sufi religious leaders.  The system of 
mutual benefit is loosely described as one in which the state managed its affairs, collected taxes, recruited 
soldiers, and expanded agricultural production through their association with religious leaders.  Religious 
leaders received assistance from the French and by association, reinforced their own power in the eyes of 
their followers through their connections to the state.  Political scientist Leonardo Villalón (1995) notes that 
these patterns of interaction continued during the postcolonial period.  However, this state-religion 
relationship was also characterized by ambiguity and divergent long-term interests.  Thus, while the 
relationship between mainstream religious leaders in the Sufi orders and the state is a friendly one, and 
many have emphasized its stability, the interests of state leaders and Sufi religious leaders often have not 
converged.  Others observers acknowledge that changing political realities—especially since the 2000 
presidential elections in which an opposition party was elected for the first time—are leading to new 
alliances within the system of state-religion cooperation.  According to Villalon, all candidates in the 2000 
election openly sought the support of religious figures, yet the major marabouts did not take sides and did 
not endorse any candidate (Villalón 2004, 66).   
  A critical component of Senegalese secularism is its culture of “mutual 
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respect” between the Sufi orders and between the Christian and Muslim populations.  
This emphasis on mutual respect for all religions and religion-state cooperation typifies a 
popular political and cultural discourse on the meaning of Senegalese secularism.  In the 
words of former President Abdou Diouf, secularism, or  
“Laïcité in itself is a manifestation of respect of others.  It acts in this way if it is 
laïcité well understood and properly practiced.  Such laïcité cannot be anti-
religious, but neither if it is true laïcité can it become a state religion.  I would say 
further that such a laïc state cannot ignore religious institutions.  From the fact 
that citizens embrace religion flows the obligation for the state to facilitate the 
practice of that religion, as it does for other vital activities of citizens...  Respect 
of religion does not only mean tolerance, it does not mean only to allow or to 
ignore, but to respect the beliefs and practices of the other.  Laïcité is the 
consequence of this respect for the other, and the condition of our harmony”  
 
      (cited in Stepan 2008, 28) 
Senegalese secularism is, according to this discourse, critical to Senegal’s national unity 
in a highly religious and religiously diverse society.  Stepan’s term of “respect all, 
support all secularism” describes this secular discourse.  A recent newspaper article in 
Sud Quotidien entitled “Pour la République Laïque” (Fall 2009) provides an  additional 
example of the secular consensus in Senegal.  In short, Senegalese secularism ensures 
equal rights and legal equality for all citizens of the republic, while at the same time 
permitting religious pluralism and the pursuit of common values.23
Secularism is freedom, but also equality, equality among all citizens regardless of 
their beliefs.  In the Senegalese conception of secularism it is the State’s duty to 
ensure that all religious communities enjoy freedom of expression.  It is up to the 
State to see to it that no group, no segment of society, dominate by reason of 
religion or brotherhood affiliation.  …What means other than secularism can 
create the conditions allowing all Senegalese to live together with respect for the 
   Another scholar 
writes:  
                                                 
23 “La laïcité, assurant l’égalité en droit des citoyens dans le respect des lois de la République, permet à la 
fois l’expression du pluralisme des convictions et la recherché de valeurs communes pour construire une 
communauté de destin.  Ce creuset de notre commun vouloir de vivre en commun.” 
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cultural, spiritual, and religious differences and a common commitment to a 
certain number of values? 
      (Dieye 2008, 48) 
 Senegalese secularism is an example of a multi-value secularism that values religious 
diversity, peace between religious communities, religious freedom, individual liberty, and 
a republican ideal of the legal equality of all citizens.   
Despite the ubiquity of this elite discourse on Senegalese secularism, which is 
well-represented in scholarly literature, and as I will show in later chapters, is broadly 
diffused in the population, the meaning of laïcité and the appropriateness of Senegalese 
secularism is also contested.   The most intense and sustained opposition to the secular 
state in Senegal has generally come from what scholars call Islamist and reformist groups 
that tend to function outside the Sufi orders.  These groups have challenged the 
orthodoxy of the Islam practiced by Sufi religious leaders and citizens, argue for the 
implementation of Islamic law, and advocate a greater role for Islam in social and 
political life (Loimeier 2000, 1996).24
                                                 
24 Among the most important reformist groups is the Jama’at ‘Ibad ar-Rahman (JIR, Society of the 
Servants of the Merciful, also known as the Ibadou Rahmane), founded in 1978.  The JIR developed 
organizations throughout the country and established schools and a network of mosques.  In 1991, the JIR 
publicly presented a program that sought to reorient society towards the Qur’an and Sunnah.  The JIR 
aimed to establish a more Islamic society in Senegal and to challenge the secular nature of the state.  While 
recent challenges to the established social, political, and religious order are important, some scholars have 
emphasized the historical antecedents to these contemporary reformists.  Loimeier notes that about 50 such 
groups had been founded by 1936.  The most important of these was the Muslim Cultural Union (Union 
Culturelle Musulmane, UCM) founded in 1953, which offered a broad program of reform.  The UCM 
focused on the larger struggle against the colonial system and the Sufi leaders who had collaborated with 
the French.  The UCM verbally attacked marabouts as being the “chief perpetrators of the backward 
development of Senegalese society” (2000, 173).  However, these reformers were also willing to work with 
the state to reform certain “obsolete social and religious customs” (Loimeier 2009, 241).  See also Bathily, 
Diouf, and Mbodj (1995).     
  The secularism of the state was also at the center 
of public debate in 2001 when the new government drafted a reformed constitution.  The 
principle of secularism was removed from the draft constitution but was reinserted after 
loud public outcry.  According to one observer, “the legitimate preoccupation with 
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preserving peace in the nation was perhaps what finally led the authorities to once again 
include secularism among the attributes of the Republic, a positive move that put an end 
to the debate that was beginning to divide the Senegalese citizens”  (Dieye 2008, 46).   
Perhaps the most contentious space where Senegal is negotiating this model of 
mutual respect is in the area family law. 25
 
  The key tension exists between the multiple 
values the secular state claims to protect, including religious freedom and legal equality, 
and the extent to which the state’s family law is thought to protect or violate these rights.  
The debate about family law becomes one of how to conceptualize and implement 
equality before the law for all citizens regardless of religion and gender, while at the 
same time allowing individuals to fully and freely practice their religion without state 
interference.  Does the state envision an ideal form of impersonal, uniform legal equality 
in which each individual citizen is subject to the same law, with no individual or group 
having special rights or privileges, and wherein religious freedom means that the state 
does not impose one religious interpretation on its citizens?  Or does the state envision a 
group-centered version of equality that privileges legal pluralism over uniformity in laws, 
that conceives of legal equality as “equality in difference,” and that defines religious 
freedom as the right to be governed by laws that conform to one’s religious beliefs?  I 
argue that family law entails fundamental competition between the principles of legal 
pluralism and legal uniformity as a means to achieve legal equality.   
 
                                                 
25 Villalon (1995) describes the early opposition of Sufi religious leaders to the state’s Family Code as it 
was drafted and enacted.  While important Sufi religious leaders did sign on to CIRCOFS’ proposal, the 
ultimate heads of the Sufi orders, or khalifes généraux, did not directly take sides on this latest challenge to 
the Family Code launched by CIRCOFS (Brossier 2004b).  Others note that Islamic reformist groups in 
Senegal have opposed the Family Code since it was enacted (Augis 2002).   
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Family Law in a Secular State: Legal Uniformity versus Pluralism 
 What makes newer models of secularism attractive in much of the world, 
according to Bhargava, is that they are more flexible in how they incorporate religion in 
public discourse as well as in law and policy in multireligious societies.  As An-Na’im’s 
(2008) argument demonstrates, however, other advocates for a secular state want religion 
to play a public role but do not want state laws to be explicitly based on Shari’ah.  In 
many comparative contexts, and not only in secular states, family law is also an 
increasingly important area where citizens are demanding legal equality for women 
(Widner 2001-362; Sow 2003).  In states as diverse as India, Algeria, Morocco, and 
Malaysia legal reformers and advocates for women’s rights have argued that there is a 
fundamental contradiction between the equality in law guaranteed in the constitution and 
the rights of women in family laws that claim Shari’ah as the source of law.26
 Legal scholar Sherman Jackson (2004, 101-103) highlights that one of the key 
issues in all modern applications of state law, not just Islamic law, is the tension between 
legal uniformity and legal pluralism.  Islamic law developed in “conscious opposition” to 
the early Islamic state and jurists sought to “guard their interpretive authority from any 
and all encroachments from the state.”  Legal authority rested with jurists, primarily, and 
  These 
debates takes place directly in that critical space for law and public policy that defines the 
relationship between religion and state, and entail competition over alternative visions of 
legal equality.   
                                                 
26 Claims about women’s rights and the relationship to Islamic family law takes place at least at the level of 
elite discourse and scholarship.  The most contentious legal battles over particular articles in state family 
laws do tend to focus on issues of gender, including marriage, divorce, maintenance after divorce, paternal 
guardianship, and inheritance.  Scholars discuss these issues in cases as diverse as Senegal (Camara 2007b; 
Sieveking 2007; Creevey 1996), Mali and Benin (Wing 2009; Soares 2009),  Morocco, Algeria, and 
Malaysia (Salime 2008; Mihalache ; Archer 2007), and in India (Baird 2001).  
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therefore outside the institutions of the state.  As such, diverse legal interpretations could 
be considered authoritative, which suggested greater legal pluralism.27
A major problem is the position of religious personal law in the legal structure of 
present-day India.  That a Hindu, a Muslim, and a Christian, all citizens of the 
same country, should be governed by different inheritance laws is an anachronism 
indeed in modern India and diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles 
of secularism.   …The conception of the secular state both presupposes a uniform 
  In contrast, the 
modern state has an “absolute monopoly over lawmaking that results in a uniform set of 
rules equally applied.”  The trend in today’s centralized legal systems is toward 
uniformity in interpretation and enforcement of state law within fixed territorial 
boundaries.  Modern states—whether Islamic or secular—have “the ability to impose a 
uniform code of behavior on the entire society”( 106).  Thus, states applying Islamic or 
secular laws tend to seek to apply one version of law to all citizens, envisioning equality 
before the law as uniformity in law.  Legal pluralism is often associated with 
differentiation in rights, but Jackson notes that uniformity often disrespects citizens’ 
beliefs and differences.   A key interpretive issue surrounding the principle of legal 
equality, then, is the tension between legal uniformity and legal pluralism.   
 A critical challenge to any state family law which seeks to respect religious 
difference while upholding the principle of equality before the law is to balance legal 
pluralism and universalism.  In India, following the colonial practice of applying different 
personal laws to different religious groups, the postcolonial state enforced separate 
personal laws for the Hindu majority and Muslim minority.  Donald Smith famously 
critiqued this practice as a clear violation of the principle of secularism: 
 
                                                 
27 In a separate study, Jackson (1996) discusses the decentralized authority to interpret and adjudicate law.  
Even so, political rulers often privileged one school of law, which could result in one interpretation being 
privileged over all others.  However, jurists fought against this trend and remained independent from the 
state bureaucracy.   
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civil law, and requires that the religious beliefs of a minority be respected.  
Probably 90 percent of the Indian Muslims feel that their law is the very essence 
of Islam.  This is the dilemma which must one day be faced.  
 
       (Quoted in Larson 2001, 2) 
In this view, secularism guarantees legal equality through an ideal of impersonal, 
individual citizenship rights that rests on the principle of one nation/one law.  The 
application of different personal laws for citizens of different religions prompted many to 
call for a uniform civil code that would apply to all citizens in order to guarantee equality 
before the law to previously marginalized groups—including women (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 2001, 55).  Bhargava (2006b) praised India’s flexible approach toward religion 
in the realm of law and policy, but this is also among its most contentious 
characteristics.28
                                                 
28 Bhargava (2006a) explores the issue of personal laws elsewhere. 
  Some view the system of different personal laws as discriminatory, 
while others interpret it as a means of treating each religion equitably by respecting 
religious differences and identities.  As one author argues, a uniform law “does not 
necessarily mean a common law but different personal laws based on uniform principles 
of equality of sexes and liberty for the individual” (Sathe 1995).  Within secular states, 
family law entails competition over alternative visions of legal equality that rest on 
competing principles of legal uniformity versus legal pluralism.   
...Legal universalism has been associated with liberal and nationalist ideas about 
equal, uniform citizenship.  Speaking analytically, legal pluralism posits corporate 
groups as the basic units, the building blocks, of a multi-cultural society and state.  
…Legal universalism treats individuals as the basic unit of society and the state 
and imagines homogenous citizens with uniform legal rights and obligations.    
  
     (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001, 36-38)   
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Through debates over family law reform, citizens negotiate the boundaries of religious 
and political authority, and the meaning of secularism, equality in law, and religious 
freedom. 
 Similar to Jackson, scholars note that “universality is the strategy of centralizing 
modern states” (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001, 38).  As the example of India again 
suggests, the actual process of codifying one personal law for Hindus and another for 
Muslims was itself an example of the modern trend toward uniformity in law.  These 
codifications tended to reduce the variety of religious interpretations and practices that 
actually existed within diverse religious communities, including religious minorities 
within Islam (Chatterjee 1994, 365).  “To assert legally that there is one undifferentiated 
“Hindu” and “Muslim” personal law was itself a significant act of homogenization” 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 2001, 52).  The unification of each personal law aimed to reform 
religious practices that were deemed undesirable by modernists who used legal reform to 
define the legitimate practice of religion.  An even stronger push for legal uniformity 
came from those who advocated for a uniform civil code, but advocates of legal pluralism 
still embodied the drive toward uniformity in law. 
 The Senegalese example also shows this movement toward unification in the law 
as a means to achieving legal equality in a secular state.  After Senegal became a 
sovereign state in 1960, policy makers pursued significant legal reform aimed to unify the 
judicial system. 29
                                                 
29This tension between legal uniformity and legal pluralism also existed in the French colonial state.  Sarr 
and Robert  (1991) show that the drive for unification in the law and the idea of uniform rights was an 
ongoing issue in the French colonial state.  Muslims fought to be judged under a different personal status 
through Muslim tribunals.   
  The secular state of Senegal abolished Muslim courts in this judicial 
unification.  It further reformed its personal laws by drafting and enacting a single legal 
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code applicable to all citizens in the form of the 1972 Family Code.  These reforms 
attempted to unify the legal system, strengthen the secular character of society, 
acknowledge the principles of individual rights, and guarantee the equality of all citizens 
under the law (Loimeier 1996).   
Senegal’s Family Code exhibits the underlying tensions that existed between the 
principles of legal pluralism, on one hand, and uniformity in laws and rights within a 
single nation, on the other.  Sovereign African states were seen to have two options: 
“either abolish the customary laws and enact a modern family law in order to build a 
homogenous nation or choose to reconcile with African culture in codifying the customs 
and so reject the ‘modern law’” (Mbaye 2007, 194).   Senegal’s Family Code offered a 
hybrid example because it included “modern” law and customary and Islamic law and 
served to both “preserve the unity of the family and respect the social diversity” of the 
nation  (2007, 195).  The Family Code attempted to apply a uniform family law to all 
citizens within a unified court system.  However, it also attempted to respect religious 
and cultural diversity by granting citizens certain customary and Islamic options within 
the code, most notably for Islamic inheritance law.30
                                                 
30 See Article 571, law no. 72-61, 1972, which grants Muslims the right, not the obligation, to use Islamic 
inheritance law:   “Those persons who, while living, have explicitly or by their behavior indisputably 
demonstrated their desire to see their succession devolved upon according to the Muslim laws of 
succession.” 
  One legal scholar described this 
successful balance of legal unification while preserving basic diversity: “…it is essential 
to remember that the earnest wish of the public authorities has been to create a uniform 
code applicable to all.  Yet, by reason of the social heterogeneity of its population, 
Senegal could not adjust to a total unification of family legislation”  (Sow Sidibé 1993-
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1994, 422).31  Senegal’s family law retains some elements of legal pluralism but tends 
toward uniformity in law, and is generally viewed as a secular law: “there is absolutely 
no doubt that the Family Code adopted in 1972 is secular in nature”  (Dieye 2008, 43).32
Through the process of drafting this law, legal reformers in Senegal sought to 
identity and preserve what was essential to “religion” but also aimed to reform religious 
practices deemed undesirable, such as divorce by repudiation.
   
33
The proposed code, which seeks to accord the wife rights that should be hers, 
would not permit the husband to dissolve the marriage by unilateral decision.  
Through the elaboration of this code, Senegal is in the process of modernizing its 
law and looking toward the emancipation of women.  The boldness of the project, 
and the many instances in which the proposed provisions contradict customary 
law, lead one to wonder whether adoption and effectuation will be long delayed.   
…For the Senegalese woman, as conscious of her rights as of her duties and 
  Writing in 1972, 
Maimouna Kane exemplified the view that  the law sought to modernize family law and 
to enhance women’s rights:  
                                                 
31 Sow Sidibé (1993-1994, 425-426) also notes that the state wished to modernize the law and used the 
technique of “producing a unified family law in spite of certain situations in which legal pluralism is 
retained.  This unification is an aim of legal policy and appears from the abrogation of the status rules in 
operation before the advent of the Family Code.  Unification is also seen in the creation of a single rule for 
each of the questions relating to personal status.  The rules regarding betrothal, divorce, filiation, 
incapacities, gifts and wills have all been completely unified.”   
32 El Hadj Moustapha Guèye, the President of the Association of Imams and Ulema in Senegal noted in Le 
Matin, the actual Family Code is secular and belongs to no religion (Diarra 2003).  In critiquing CIRCOFS’ 
proposal, he noted a risk of a proliferation of religious laws if each community demands its own laws, and 
that the current law already contains elements of Islamic law.  “Maintenant, je crois qu’il faudrait aussi 
réfléchir à la faisabilité et à l’opportunité des choses.  Si les musulmans exigent leur code, les autres 
communautés religieuses doivent faire de m6eme, car le code actuellement en vigueur est un code laïc; il 
n’appartient à aucune confession religieuses.  …Si chacun demande un code inspiré de ses croyances, 
combien de codes allons-nous avoir ?  …J’ajoute que le code actuel contient des dispositions, destinées en 
principe aux musulmans, comme dans le domaine de la succession par exemple. ”   
33 To draft the law, the state studied 68 officially-recorded customs throughout the country in 1961.  In 
1965, an Options Committee was set up to process the information gathered through questionnaires.  The 
Options Committee included judges, deputies in the National Assembly, lawyers, law professors, qadis, 
and presidents of the former indigenous courts of justice.  This committee was charged with: elaborating 
one law for the nation; adding rare exceptions to a uniform rule when absolutely necessary; including and 
modernizing the rules common to all customs; finding a compromise with religious law by identifying what 
is a truly religious rule versus what is wrongly thought to be a religious rule; and in the case of Islamic law, 
only including what is obligatory and prescribed in the Qur’an.  This committee worked in 1966 and 
submitted a text that formed the basis for a state family law, which was written in April 1967 and 
comprised 854 articles, and was passed by the National Assembly on June 12, 1972..  All prior family laws 
were considered null and void except for traditional marriage ceremonies (Camara 2007b).  See also 
Brossier (2004b).    
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proud to assume them, the proposed family code opens a new route through which 
she may liberate herself from constraints that make her an inferior being.  She is 
still in the throes of a slow and painful evolution, but the future is opening before 
her and its promise is unlimited. 
       
 
Overall, there is a consensus that the Family Code was a necessary compromise that 
respected religious diversity while also strengthening individual rights, but this dominant 
interpretation is contested.  Writing in 2007, legal scholar Fatou Camara (2007c) notes 
that the law codified patriarchal French and Islamic principles and reduced women’s 
rights compared to African indigenous laws.  In this sense, the content of the law matters 
more for legal equality than the principle of legal uniformity.34
 Whereas the rights of women are central to family law reform in Senegal 
(Sieveking 2007), I will show in Chapter 4 that this most recent debate in Senegal 
   
Others complained that the “secular” law violated the core religious beliefs of the 
majority Muslim population.  As Chapter 1 described, a vigorous public debate began in 
2003 in response to a draft Muslim personal law put forward by the Islamic Committee to 
Reform the Family Code in Senegal (CIRCOFS).  CIRCOFS advocated a return to the 
colonial-era system of personal laws and sought to make personal law conform to 
Shari’ah for Muslim citizens.  Legal pluralism, conceptualized as applying different 
family laws to different citizens, was the only means to respect Senegal’s religious 
diversity.  Faced with such arguments, many who typically critique the Family Code for 
failing to grant women equal rights defended it and argued that it already respects 
religious diversity.   
                                                 
34 This author notes that most citizens outside of urban areas are unaware of the contents of the code 
(Camara 2007b).  Another notes that literate and urbanized women “do not hesitate to apply to the courts” 
regarding certain areas of family law, and that knowledge of the code outside urban areas has been growing 
(Sow Sidibé 1993-1994).  
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emphasized the principles of uniformity versus pluralism in laws and rights for all 
citizens.  Moreover, in response to CIRCOFS’ demand to apply different laws to the 
Muslim and Christian populations, this most recent debate also highlighted the 
relationship between Christians and Muslims.  Christians, as a religious minority, tended 
to defend the Family Code.  Muslims who defended the Family Code also argued that it 
was critical to Senegal’s national unity and highlighted the inter-religious conflict faced 
by other multireligious states such as India, where citizens’ are subject to different laws 
based on their religious identity.  In Senegal, the religious minority preferred legal 
uniformity.  In India, in contrast, the Muslim religious minority has fought to protect their 
separate personal law and saw a uniform law as a threat to their cultural and religious 
identity.   
 What is similar in these debates over family law that have taken place in these 
multireligious, secular states, is that family law entails a struggle over the relationship 
between religion and state.  These multi-value secular states claim to respect equality 
before the law for all citizens, religious freedom, and peace between religious 
communities.  Yet in both cases, these secular states have intervened in legislation that 
decides what is essential to religion  Both have sought to reform certain religious 
practices through family law that were deemed undesirable.  Each system has 
components of uniformity and pluralism, even if public debates frame the question as a 
zero-sum competition between legal uniformity versus pluralism.  As a result, these 
debates exhibit “a process in which legal uniformity and legal pluralism jockey for 
dominance, not for the whole” (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001, 56).  I suggest that the key 
issue at stake in family law reform is competition over the meaning of the multiple values 
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each secular state prioritizes and the best legal means to achieve these values.  Within 
multireligious secular states, there is constant negotiation over the meaning of religious 
freedom and legal equality, as well as over the appropriate balance between legal 
uniformity versus pluralism. 
 
Shari’ah, State Law, and Popular Sovereignty 
 In addition to the question of who has interpretive authority over the content of 
Islamic law, the desires and demands of the public also play a role in debates over family 
law.  Those arguing for a Muslim personal law in Senegal claimed to speak for the 
majority of Muslims whose religious beliefs were violated.  Part of their claim to 
authority, then, rests on the notion of popular sovereignty.  Are calls to enforce the 
Shari’ah as state law nothing more than desires to have legislation conform to the values, 
aspirations, and will of the people?     
 In his discussion of the “twin tolerations,” Stepan (2001) notes that  all religious 
individuals and groups must be able to participate in the political process and advocate 
for legislation that reflects their desires and values.  In his discussion of the “multiple 
secularism of modern democracies,” however, he also writes that “… officially 
implemented systems of Shari’ah law would necessarily have a strong element of ‘state 
Shari’ah’ because one side of the multi-vocality would be state privileged and have the 
coercive powers of the state behind it” (Stepan 2007, 17).  Discussing the example of 
Indonesian secularism, he argues that “an Islamic state … would lead to the non-
consensual imposition of a single group’s vision of ‘state Shari’ah.’”  An-Na’im (2008, 
2002) claims that even in the realm of family law, Shari’ah becomes the coercive 
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political will of the state when enacted and enforced as state law.  There is a clear tension 
between simultaneously desiring a secularism that allows citizens to advocate for 
legislation that reflects their values, while at the same time denying citizens’ demands for 
laws that they believe represent their values in order to avoid “state Shari’ah.”  
 Legal scholars are grappling with ideas of popular sovereignty and contemporary 
calls for Islamic law as state law.  For example, Noah Feldman (2008) advocates for a 
new theory of Islamic constitutionalism simply because citizens already claim to want 
Shari’ah as state law in many countries.  Because the “meaning of the Shari’ah is 
explicitly being made the province of the legislature and the courts of the state” rather 
than the exclusive terrain of jurists, the greatest challenge is “identifying who is in charge 
of specifying the meaning of the Shari’ah and by what authority” ( 13).  Feldman 
proposes that Shari’ah become “democratized,” so that popularly elected legislatures may 
hold the authority to interpret Islamic law as they pass legislation that claims to conform 
to Shari’ah.  He also proposes that Shari’ah become “constitutionalized,” so that a state 
court may hold the authority of judicial review over such legislation.  He gives citizens a 
role as interpreters of Islamic law as well: 
A democratically elected legislature responsible for enacting provisions in 
accordance with—or at least not repugnant to—the Shari’ah represents a unique 
step in the history of Islamic law: the democratization of the law so that the 
ordinary citizen might, through his elected representatives, shape the content of 
laws that govern him. 
       
       (Feldman 2008) 
 
 Feldman bases his claim of the popularity of Shari’ah based on public opinion 
survey data from the Gallup World Poll (Esposito and Mogahed 2007).  What do 
ordinary citizens mean when they say they want a law, including a personal law, to 
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conform to Shari’ah?  As it is important to clarify what is meant by the secularism of the 
state, it is important to discuss what is meant by the term “Shari’ah.”  In legal terms, 
Shari’ah is divine, revealed law, as compared to Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh, which is 
the human effort to understand and interpret Shari’ah (Balz 2008).  In popular discourse, 
Shari’ah may mean the divine ideal as well as the methodology of jurisprudence to 
determine its content.35
 Writing about Egypt, Nathan Brown (1997b) notes that public understandings of 
Shari’ah have changed along with colonial and postcolonial legal reforms,  Specifically, 
Shari’ah transformed from a set of practices and institutions to a set of legal rules.
   
36  
Legal reforms in 19th century Egypt, and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, were based 
on the French legal system.37  Eventually centralized governments asserted control of the 
legal system by bureaucratizing courts and codifying laws (364).38
The Islamic Shari’ah, understood no longer as connected to specific institutions 
and practices, but instead as a set of identifiable rules, has become the most 
  As these legal 
reforms took hold in the 20th century and most states unified their legal systems, the 
meaning of Shari’ah also changed to mean law in a narrower sense, as a set of clearly 
identifiable legal rules.   
                                                 
35 An-Na’im distinguishes between Shari’ah as a concept and as the particular methodology for 
determining its normative content.  As a concept, Shari’ah is the religious law of Islam “which is derived 
from human interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet.”  As a methodology, the content of 
Shari’ah is “what comes to be accepted as authoritative formulations of Shari’ah in a particular time and 
place.”  The content of Shari’ah can change over time as alternative methodologies come to be accepted 
and applied by Muslims (An-Na'im 2008, 3). 
36 Brown describes these processes and practices as including methods for deriving law, legal instruction, 
and adjudicating disputes.  Jurists wrote commentaries on practices, and wrote commentaries on those 
commentaries.  Courts operated without lawyers, and litigants paid for courts and judges.   
37 Again, this trend is noted in Senegal in the mid-19th century to the 20th century (Sarr and Robert 1991). 
38 Brown notes that bureaucratization integrated the courts into the fiscal apparatus of the state rather than 
relying on court fees.  It also established administrative offices, built modern court buildings, law schools, 
and created clear processes of appeals and legal hierarchies.  Reforms also changed how Islamic law was 
taught.  For example, al-Azhar introduced modern education methods such as lectures, and students could 
study Shari’ah as a subject of law as they would study other areas, like torts or constitutional law (369). 
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widely accepted indicator of the degree to which a society and political system are 
Islamic.  Departures from clear Shari’ah-based law are often held to render a 
social or political system both illegitimate and immoral. 
 
   ( 371) 
With this change in meaning, the idea of Shari’ah grew in political potency ( 369).39
 I end this chapter by turning again to the great diversity of institutional 
relationships between religion and state, as well as diversity within predominantly 
Muslim states as to their incorporation of Islamic law.  By situating family law reform in 
the context of the religion-state relationship, this dissertation is a study of the politics of 
Islamic law and the politics of secularism within one secular and predominantly Muslim 
state.  Accompanying this institutional diversity, I expect that there will be as much 
variation within ordinary citizens’ understandings of secularism and Shari’ah.  A goal of 
   
When citizens call for Shari’ah as state law, then, they are advocating for a 
relatively new kind of Shari’ah.  As the example of Senegal’s family law shows, these 
calls often mean codifying a set of legal rules into one “personal law” to be applied to all 
Muslims within a state.  If Shari’ah is seen as a set of legal rules, they may also desire 
one law to be uniformly applied to all citizens.  When asked whether or not they prefer a 
law to conform to Shari’ah, many citizens are likely to conjure images of a divine ideal 
and will make direct references to the Qur’an and Sunnah rather than to fiqh or to any 
specific method of legal interpretation.  
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
39Brown (1997b, 373) notes: “In its current form, as a set of rules, it is sometimes not implemented, but it 
forces itself onto the political agenda throughout the region.” Similarly, Brinkley Messick writes about 
Yemen: “As a Shari’ah politics grounded in madhhab affiliations gave way to a nation-state politics 
anchored in the new notion of a citizenry, so the old manual texts …would be replaced by a new type of 
authoritative text, the legislated code” (Messick 1993, 53). 
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this study is to identify how citizens themselves discuss Shari’ah and their desire to have 
state laws conform to it, as well as how citizens discuss secularism and their reasons for 
supporting it.  In this chapter, I have also emphasized the important role that the 
principles of legal uniformity and pluralism play in debates over family law reform.  As 
some note:  “the opposition between legal pluralism and legal uniformity is not likely to 
yield a smooth progressive historical narrative in which society moves inexorably from 
the first to the second” (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001, 56).  If state family law entails 
negotiation of the religion-state relationship and of the principles of legal uniformity 
versus pluralism, to what extent do ordinary men and women discuss family law in terms 
of secularism and legal uniformity?  How broadly do citizens support the principles of 
secularism and equality through legal uniformity?  Finally, how do citizens view the 
relationship between Shari’ah and secularism?  In Chapter 3, I address the question of 




Chapter 3  
Elite Frames and Values: Public Responses to Political Debate 
 
Every policy issue has a culture with an “ongoing discourse that evolves and 
changes over time, providing interpretations and meanings for relevant events” (Gamson 
and Modigliani 1989, 1-2).  Family law is no exception and the Family Code and has 
been publicly debated in Senegal since the National Assembly passed the law in 1972.40
In Chapter 1, I raised several questions to be addressed in this dissertation.  How 
do citizens form preferences for Shari’ah as a source of state family law, and why do 
citizens disagree about the role of Shari’ah as a source of state law?  Are ordinary 
Muslims’ preferences for a secular state and for Shari’ah as state law related?  Do men 
  
In this study, I argue that citizens’ preferences for Shari’ah as a source of law are strongly 
influenced by how these issues are framed by opinion leaders, including civil society 
activists and religious and political elites.  Elite discourse plays an important role in 
shaping the kinds of values and considerations that citizens mobilize as they form their 
preferences.  However, citizens differ in their exposure to elite discourse, and awareness 
of and information about family law debates should also play a key role in shaping the 
direction of citizens’ preferences as well as the connections they form between their 
values and preferences.   
                                                 
40 This issue has been widely covered in the print media, and many newspapers articles discussing the 
Family Code appeared in 1972.  Subsequent reforms have been discussed in the media in the 1980s and 
1990s as well.  (see, for example, Gomis 1972h, 1972b, 1972d, 1972g, 1972f, 1972c, 1972a, 1972e; Bart 
1983; Samb 1987). 
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and women view preferences for Shari’ah and for a secular state as mutually exclusive?   
To address these questions, I emphasize the role of values and of information about elite 
discourse in shaping how citizens understand debates over family law and how they form 
preferences.  Accordingly, this study makes a contribution by incorporating broader 
theories of public opinion into the study of Muslim public opinion (Moaddel 2007).   
 
Explaining Popular Preferences for Family Law  
Elite discourse offers citizens interpretive packages that shape what citizens will 
see as important (Gamson 1992).  In Chapter 2, I suggested that in a comparative sense, 
family law reform entails debates about larger values—secularism, religious identity and 
practice, legal equality for men and women and citizens of diverse religious affiliation, 
religious freedom, and legal uniformity versus pluralism.  In Chapter 4, I analyze how the 
print media debate in Senegal framed the issue of family law in terms of these commonly 
held values.  For value frames to impact public opinion, however, these values also need 
to resonate with the public.  They need to have broad popular support, or cultural 
resonance (Gamson and Modigliani 1987).  If values are so important to debates about 
family law, what are values? 
Values help individuals to form ideas about how to live in the best way possible 
(Rohan and Zanna 2001, 467-468).  Values help individuals to “describe the world as it 
should or ought to be” and provide a “vision of an ideal world” (Suhay 2008, 3).  For 
example, valuing equality as one law for all citizens describes an ideal of how the world 
should be, even if the empirical reality is more complex.  Laura Stoker’s (2001, 433-434) 
notion of value judgments suggests how citizens might articulate their preferences for or 
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against a law that claims to conform to Shari’ah.  Value judgments are “judgments made 
in politics about what is valuable or of value—to anyone or to us,” and often entail the 
“language of morality.”  As citizens make value judgments, they talk about what is good 
or bad, what is right or wrong.  Men and women often talk about what is morally relevant 
as they make sense of policy choices.  In the public policy debate over family law reform, 
then, it should come as no surprise that elites frame issues in terms of broader societal 
values.  Moreover, we should also expect ordinary men and women to articulate value 
judgments—what they believe to be good, right, wrong, or bad—about the idea of a 
family law based on Shari’ah.  Values are a particularly important form of predisposition 
that should shape the direction of citizens’ policy preferences (Alvarez and Brehm 2002). 
 Advocates for a Muslim personal law attempted to frame the issue as a question 
of the religious authority of the Shari’ah and of the core religious beliefs and values of 
Muslims.  Muslims have the right to be governed by a family law that respects their 
religion.  As a result, religious values should play a role in shaping the preferences of 
some men and women.  Moreover, a survey question that specifically asks men and 
women whether a state law should be based on Shari’ah is likely to activate religious 
predispositions.  To evaluate the importance of religious predispositions on family law 
preferences, I analyze narrative data in Chapter 6 that gives citizens the opportunity to 
discuss religious values, if they are salient to their preferences.  In Chapter 7, I evaluate 
closed-ended survey data measuring religious predispositions through the frequency of 
participation in a broad range of religious activities.  I expect religious predispositions to 
push individuals to support a law based on Shari’ah.   
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However, while some scholars have interpreted survey items asking if Shari’ah 
should be the source of state law as an indicator of Islamic orthodoxy (Davis and 
Robinson 2007), I argue that preferences for a state law based on Shari’ah are not simply 
a question of religious commitment or interpretation.  These survey items do not simply 
indicate religious predispositions.  Rather, other values emphasized in elite discourse 
should also play a role in shaping citizens’ preferences for state law based on Shari’ah.  
Elite discourse may activate other complementary or competing core values.  Similar to 
Bhargava’s (2006b, 10) notion of “value-based secular states, i.e., states guided by values 
such as peace, liberty, or/and equality” and multi-value secularism, Senegalese discourse 
on secularism is a clear example of this multi-value secularism that emphasizes mutual 
respect between religious affiliations, equality for all citizens, and peace between 
religious communities (Stepan 2008).  Given the dominant discourse of secularism in 
Senegal described in Chapter 2 as it has been widely articulated by journalists, civil 
society activists, public intellectuals, political elites, as well as mainstream religious elites 
who cooperate with the secular state, a majority of men and women in Senegal are likely 
to profess commitment to many of these secular values—commitment to a secularism 
based on mutual respect, to the principle of legal equality within a republic, and to idea of 
peaceful coexistence of all religions.  I will show in Chapter 4 that the most recent family 
law debate framed the issue family law as a question of the secularism of the state and the 
principle of equality before the law for all citizens.  Defenders of the Family Code 
claimed these values that have broad cultural resonance in order to create associations 
between popular secular values and the current Family Code.  Because the current law is 
the official law of the state, opinion leaders who defended the Family Code articulated a 
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current elite consensus on the family law issue.  They put forward a secular interpretive 
package by framing support for the current law in terms of support for secularism, legal 
equality, national unity, and peace, which was covered extensively in the media.41
Given the multiple values emphasized in media debates about family law, I argue 
that multiple predispositions should shape preferences for family law, including religious 
values, secularism, and legal equality.  In framing the issue, placing a high value on the 
religious authority of the Shari’ah should push individuals to support a Muslim personal 
law.  Framing the issue as a question of secularism and legal equality should push 
individuals to oppose a Muslim personal law.  How do citizens holding each of these 
predispositions reconcile these values if media discourse frames them as in conflict?  
Furthermore, why do citizens who might share the same values of secularism and legal 
equality nevertheless disagree in their preferences for a state law based on Shari’ah?  One 
explanation is that those who support the law and secularism actively reject frames that 
pit secularism and an Islamic family law as mutually incompatible.  Instead, I turn to 
  For 
some citizens, then, predispositions toward secularism and legal equality should also 
shape their preferences.  According to this framing, citizens who favor these secular 
principles should oppose a Muslim personal law.  I evaluate the importance of these 
predispositions by analyzing citizens’ narrative responses in Chapter 6.  I also evaluate 
closed-ended survey items measuring support for secularism and for the principle of one 
law for all citizens.   
                                                 
41 Note that by “secular elites” I simply mean elites that defended the idea of the secularism of the state and 
the Family Code, rather than making any assumption about their religious orientations or credentials.  
Defenders of the Family Code and secularism included religious elites and scholars of Islamic law.  Elites 
who challenged the Family Code and advocated for a personal law based on Shari’ah for Muslims would 
not be considered “secular elites.” 
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literature on public opinion formation to argue that it is more likely that these citizens are 
unaware that elite debate frames them as opposing preferences.   
Contemporary models of opinion formation posit that individuals form attitudes 
on the basis of “considerations” and “predispositions” (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 
1992; Alvarez and Brehm 2002).  Considerations are the reasons we favor one side of an 
issue over another, and include the general idea of information as well as affective 
judgments about an issue .  Information may come from many sources, including social 
interactions and personal experience, but in this study I focus on opinion leaders as a 
primary source of information about family law policy.  Opinion leaders and the elite 
discourses they produce are particularly important given their power to construct 
interpretive packages and to disseminate alternative versions of “what goes with what” in 
this debate over family law (Converse 1964; Gamson and Modigliani 1989).   
Predispositions include our core beliefs and values.42
The impact of people’s value predispositions always depends on whether citizens 
possess the contextual information needed to translate their values into support for 
  According to Zaller (1992, 
22-23), predispositions “regulate the acceptance or nonacceptance of the political 
communications the person receives.”  Individuals who have higher levels of information 
about elite discourse are thought to have more considerations at their disposal as they 
form opinions.  They are also thought to internalize a more consistent set of 
considerations about current debates than less informed citizens (Zaller and Feldman 
1992).  Information plays a key role in shaping opinions because, as Zaller (1992, 25) 
notes:  
                                                 
42 I focus on values in this study, but predispositions can also include group attachments (e.g., identifying 
primarily as a Muslim or a Christian in this debate), affective judgments, and expectations (Alvarez and 
Brehm 2002).   
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particular policies….and the possession of such information can…never be taken 
for granted” 
 
Information helps individuals to identity which values are relevant as they contemplate a 
policy preference.  As Zaller (1992, 6) notes, then, “every opinion is a marriage of 
information and predisposition.” 
 As I have argued, value predispositions should play an important role in shaping 
preferences for and against a state family law based on Shari’ah, but information about 
elite discourse has a key role to play as well.  Moreover, I expect that men and women 
will hold a wide range of predispositions that could lead them to take either side of the 
family law debate—Senegal is widely noted for its highly religious population and for its 
cultural discourse and practices of secularism.  Using Alvarez and Brehm’s (2002) 
terminology, information from elite discourse on what is relevant to the family law 
debate should “activate” their predispositions as they contemplate family law.   Through 
in-depth interviews and coded open-ended narratives, scholars have shown that ordinary 
citizens tend to hold multiple, contradictory values and preferences.  If made aware of 
potential contradictions between their values and specific policy preferences, they often 
respond with frustration (Hochschild 1981, 1993; Zaller and Feldman 1992).43
Drawing on these theories, I argue that even on an issue as important to citizens as 
family law and the role of Shari’ah as a source of law, predispositions as well as 
information about elite discourse will play a critical role in shaping preferences.  
   
                                                 
43 Until these studies, there was much disagreement about Converse’s (1964) findings that most individuals 
respond inconsistently to interrelated questions within a single survey interview, and that few hold 
meaningful attitudes or constrained belief systems.  Critics of this view suggested that citizens do hold 
“true attitudes,” but surveys simply cannot accurately measure them (Achen 1975; Ansolabehere et al. 
2008).  Those who emphasized core values argued that individuals hold meaningful preferences because 
they hold strong, stable values (Feldman 1988).  Zaller and Feldman (1992) made an important contribution 
by pointing out that even those individuals with deeply held values need enough information to recognize 
when their values are at stake in a given public policy debate. 
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Predispositions will play a key role because religious and secular values may be activated 
in these debates.  However, individuals will also vary in their awareness of elite discourse 
and their knowledge of the interpretive packages offered to make sense of this debate.  As 
a result, then, men and women should vary in their likelihood of mentioning the key 
frames used in media debates.  I expect, first, that men and women with higher levels of 
information about elite discourse will be most exposed to the mass media, and as such, 
will be more likely to discuss family law in the terms of elite discourse, whether they 
supported or opposed a Muslim personal law.  In their open-ended responses, men and 
women who have more information about the family law debate should be more likely to 
mention the values that were discussed in the media, such as secularism and its corollary 
values of legal equality and mutual respect between religions.  Men and women with 
more information about elite debates should also be more likely to mention the frames 
used to support the Muslim personal law in their open-ended narratives, such as popular 
sovereignty or legal pluralism.  Information about elite discourse should shape the kinds 
of values and considerations that are salient to citizens as they form their preferences for 
family law. 
 I have also argued, though, that most citizens should hold multiple values that 
may all have been emphasized in elite discourse.  A key to making sense of citizens’ 
preferences, then, is to understand how men and women form connections between 
values that were framed as competing in this debate over family law.  Senegal has a long 
historical discourse of secularism, and I will show in Chapter 5 that a majority of citizens 
in this study support the principle of secularism and one law for all citizens.  However, 
only some citizens who support these principles also oppose an Islamic family law.  In 
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other words, only some citizens connect these values to their family law preferences in a 
way that mirrors the secular interpretive package promoted by a broad array of elites, 
including both religious and political elites, as well as civil society activists and 
journalists.  I suggest that information about elite discourse plays a key role in explaining 
why these citizens form connections between their values and policy preferences.  We 
should expect those who are most informed to not only be more aware of elite discourse, 
but also to form stronger connections between their preferences in a way that reflects 
such an elite consensus.  I will show evidence that citizens who supported secularism and 
the principle of one law for all citizens and opposed the law also tended to be more 
educated and media exposed.  These more educated and media exposed individuals are 
most likely to adopt the secular interpretive package that received broad media coverage, 
and are therefore most likely to view Shari’ah and secularism as mutually exclusive 
preferences.  Those who are less informed about the family law debate also support 
secularism and the principle of one law for all citizens, but support a Muslim personal 
law based on Shari’ah.  They are less likely to be aware that these secular values were 
framed as reasons to oppose such a law.  I suggest that their lower levels of media 
exposure and information suggests not that they actively rejected this framing, but rather 
that they were unaware that their preferences might be in tension.  By emphasizing the 
important role of values and information in shaping preferences for state laws based on 
Shari’ah, this study makes an important contribution to literature on public opinion.  
First, I argue that survey questions measuring support for state laws that conform to 
Shari’ah are not simply indicators of Islamic orthodoxy nor are they simply a question of 
religiosity.  Most citizens hold a complex array of values that could lead them to 
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understand the question of Shari’ah as a source of law in a number of ways.  Moreover, 
information plays an important role in shaping the direction and interconnectedness of 
preferences even on highly charged, relevant issues as family law and Shari’ah as a 
source of law.   
Many studies in the US use education to measure information or awareness of 
elite discourse (Sniderman et al. 1991; Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Judd et al. 1981; Judd 
and Milburn 1980).  Some argue that education primarily indicates cognitive ability 
(Bobo and Licari 1989), but others argue that education imparts knowledge of larger 
political and cultural values found in the society.  In postcolonial states, political leaders 
have often embraced national education to promote national identity (Meyer et al. 1979; 
Bleich 1999).  I rely on education and media exposure to measure awareness of elite 
discourse.  I suggest that education does not simply indicate socialization into the secular 
elite discourse, as there is broad support for the values of secularism, religious diversity, 
and legal equality across the lowest levels of formal education in Senegal.  My evidence 
from open-ended and close-ended survey responses suggests that these are popular and 
culturally relevant values for citizens across all levels of education.  Therefore supporting 
secularism is not simply the result of socialization through formal instruction in state 
schools.  I employ an additional measure of media exposure, which is highly correlated 
with education.  Nonetheless, I rely most heavily on education because I believe it 
captures the greatest variation in levels of information about a broad array of issues and 
policies in the population.  Moreover, I clarify in Chapter 5 that there is no linear 
relationship between education and religiosity, and individuals are as likely to be engaged 
in religious activities across all education levels.  
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By focusing on the role of predispositions and information in shaping ordinary 
preferences on issues that entail religious and political value judgments, this study also 
contributes to literature on the structure of belief systems.  In his article The Nature of 
Belief Systems in Mass Publics, Philip Converse (1964) defined a “belief system” as a 
configuration of ideas and attitudes which are bound together by some form of constraint.  
Constraint, in the simplest sense, means that certain attitudes should “go together” in the 
minds of citizens.  Regarding political ideology, Converse noted that holding a 
conservative belief system means that an individual who holds a “conservative” opinion 
on one item should be more likely to hold other “conservative” ideas.  However, only the 
most educated citizens seemed hold what could be described as ideological belief 
systems.   
Converse (1964, 229) hypothesized that constraint was a general construct that 
should structure any belief system: “A set of questions on matters of religious 
controversy should show the same pattern between an elite population like the clergy and 
the church members who form their mass ‘public.’”44
I conclude the study with an empirical investigation of the interconnectedness of 
citizen attitudes about key frames in the family law debate—support for Islamic family 
law, support for a secular state, and support for uniformity in law.  I also examine the 
  Constraint could form around 
political values or religious values, for example.  Contemporary public and media 
discourse about Islam tends to describe Muslims in a way that suggests a kind of 
ideological constraint—as moderate, conservative, and extremist Muslims (Khan 2008; 
Pipes 2004; Slackman and el-Naggar 2008; Drame 2003).   
                                                 
44 In an empirical analysis in the US, Ted Jelen (1990) also found little evidence of constrained belief 
systems between various Christian denominations in the United States. 
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connections between citizens’ attitudes on a series of survey items measuring 
interpretations of Islam.  In Chapter 8, I ask if religiosity distinguishes between 
individuals with “liberal” versus “conservative” interpretations of Islam, or rather, does 
information differentiate citizens who connect their views in such consistent directions?  I 
evaluate the existence of consistent Islamic belief systems across different measures of 
information—political information, education, and media exposure—and personal 
religiosity.  In so doing, I problematize the plausibility of whether ordinary citizens can 
be described as ideologically liberal or conservative in their Islamic interpretations given 
available survey measures.  I suspect that information, rather than religiosity, will play 
the key role in differentiating the strength of the connections individuals form between 
their responses.  However, the direction of consistent responses—in a liberal or 
conservative direction, or a secular or anti-secular direction—should also depend on their 
predispositions.   
In summary, my findings offer support for the argument that predispositions and 
information play an important role in shaping preferences on issues as relevant and 
important to ordinary citizens as family law and the role for Shari’ah.  Values tell us 
something about what individuals find important, about what they believe to be good in 
the world.  Individuals who oppose a secular state and support a Muslim personal law 
may do so based on deeply held religious values and desires.  But individuals who oppose 
such a law are not necessarily less religiously committed.  I argue that those who are 
most educated are also, generally, more likely to be aware of elite framing that a Muslim 
personal status law is incompatible with a secular state and with the principle of legal 
equality.  How do highly educated and highly religious individuals reconcile their values 
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as they form preferences on the issue of family law?  I show evidence in Chapter 7 that 
more educated and highly religiously engaged citizens who also support secularism still 
tend to oppose the law.  However, their religiosity means that they are indeed less likely 
to do so than those who are highly educated, committed to secularism, but less religiously 
engaged.  Thus, information and multiple predispositions plays an important role in 
shaping preferences.   
 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I argue that most citizens in Senegal will hold religious and 
secular predispositions, especially given Senegal’s historical discourse on secularism that 
not only respects but supports and accommodates all religions.  Information about the 
family law debate pushes men and women to oppose a Muslim personal law in Senegal, 
in part, because their attention to elite discourse activates their predispositions for legal 
equality and secularism.  They are more likely to adopt the secular interpretive package 
that associated the Family Code with these popular values.  Because Senegal has a 
dominant discourse of secularism and legal equality that is also supported by most 
citizens, framing the issue of a Muslim personal law in terms of these values should be 
most successful among those who are most aware of these frames.  Information helps 
these citizens to connect their values to their preferences.  Many ordinary men and 
women in this study also hold the same secular values but support a Muslim personal 
law.  Religious predispositions help to explain why they support a Muslim personal law.  
I argue, though, that their lower levels of information suggest that they were less aware 
that other strongly held values of secularism and legal equality were at stake.  In the 
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remaining chapters, I will present evidence that this educated segment of the public tends 
to connect their values and preferences in a way that mirrors the dominant secular 
interpretive secular package found in print media.  They also hold more consistent 
preferences regarding Islamic interpretations, suggesting that they form broader 
connections across a diverse range of issues.   
I cannot address the issue of stability in preferences over time, but I speculate that 
citizens’ views about a state family law based on Shari’ah might differ if they became 
aware that other core values besides religious values were at stake, such as peace between 
religious communities.  In other words, I suggest that preferences for state law based on 
Shari’ah are not simply religious questions that can be explained by variations in 
religious predispositions.  Rather, they depend on how the issues are framed by opinion 
leaders. 
In the Chapters that follow, I analyze how elites constructed the issue of family 
law reform in Senegal.  In the remaining chapters, I offer survey and narrative evidence 
that citizens differ in their religious and secular predispositions, but also in their levels of 
education and exposure to media discourse.  Accordingly, more educated citizens are 
more likely to discuss family law in the terms of elite discourse.  My emphasis on the 
important role of information as well as predispositions does not imply that education 
will always push individuals to oppose state laws based on Shari’ah, either in Senegal or 
elsewhere.  What is important is how the issues are framed in public discourse.  If elites 
construct an interpretive package that invokes broadly held cultural values, then those 
who are more aware of this discourse should be more likely to form preferences 
according to this consensus.  If there is no broad-based elite consensus, or elites 
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themselves are deemed illegitimate by the most informed and educated citizens, then 
information may play an entirely different role.  More educated and aware citizens might 
be more likely to oppose the elite interpretive package.  Or, if elites themselves are more 
divided—if Senegal’s secular discourse was anti-religious or unpopular—more informed 
citizens may divide their preferences according to the competing available interpretive 
packages.  However, information allows these individuals to form stronger connections 
between their values and preferences on issues that are as important as the issue of 
Shari’ah as a source of state law.   
  In short, then, I argue in this dissertation that men and women form preferences 
about Shari’ah as a source of state law as they would form other attitudes about state 
policy.  While citizen’s values—such as religious commitment and a commitment to 
secularism—do shape their preferences, men and women also actively construct 
preferences as they pay attention to opinion leaders who shape and construct the issues at 
stake, and as they respond to an interviewer’s questions about Shari’ah as a source of 
state law.  Discourse surrounding family law and the role for Shari’ah will no doubt 
continue to change over time, which will in turn shape how ordinary men and women 




Chapter 4  
Framing Shari’ah and the Family Code 
   
As CIRCOFS unveiled its draft personal status law, a vigorous debate took place 
between defenders and critics of Senegal’s current Family Code.  Journalists wrote news 
analyses and quoted influential opinion leaders, and citizens wrote opinion pieces to 
weigh in on the debate.  As the debate played out in the mass media, opinion leaders and 
communication sources constructed frames that defined the important issues surrounding 
family law and Shari’ah as a source of state law.  The debate over family law represents 
what Chong and Druckman (2007) refer to as a “competitive framing environment” in 
which citizens are exposed to multiple frames offering alternative ways of making sense 
of the debate.  In this chapter, I describe and analyze the ways that opinion leaders 
framed the family law debate for the public within Senegalese print media.  I discuss the 
major frames that emerged from both supporters and opponents of CIRCOFS’ proposed 
personal status law in a sample of 35 articles that appeared in diverse print and online 
media sources in 2003-2004, including Wal Fadjri, Le Soleil, Le Quotidien, Sud 
Quotidien, and Jeune Afrique.  
 Gamson and Modigliani (1989, 2) write that each policy issue has a culture with a 
related discourse that includes “metaphors, catchphrases, visual images, moral appeals, 
and other symbolic devices.”  Media discourse constructs and contains interpretive 
packages that give meaning to issues being debated.  Policy debates are in a sense “a 
59 
 
symbolic contest over which interpretation will prevail” ( 2).   I argue in this chapter that 
the debate about state family law became a debate about the merits and meaning of the 
secularism of the state.  The dominant secular interpretative package debated the meaning 
of equal citizenship and whether legal equality was best achieved through uniformity in 
law for citizens of all religions versus different laws for citizens of different religions.  
The issue of state family law was also framed as an ideological debate between 
“secularists” and “Islamists.”    
 
Shari’ah, Family Law, and the Secularism of the State 
 
 This chapter analyzes media discourse in 2003-2004.  It is important to note, 
however, that state family law has been a subject of intense debate since the Family Code 
was enacted in 1972.  The Family Code has been criticized both for abandoning Islamic 
principles and for its failure to go far enough in granting women equal rights.  Indeed, 
prior to the debate surrounding CIRCOFS draft law, newspapers reported on a conference 
in which legal practitioners criticized the Family Code because it did not comply with 
international conventions guaranteeing equal rights for all citizens, including women.  
Newspaper articles in February 2002 wrote that the current law privileged men’s 
authority in the household (Diatta 2002a; Arab 2002b).45
                                                 
45 Lawyers debated reforming Articles 152 and 153.  Article 152 states that the husband is the head of the 
family: “Le mari est le chef de famille.  Il exerce cette qualité (et non plus ce pouvoir) dans l’intérêt du 
ménage et des enfants. ”   Furthermore, other articles in the law privileged “puissance paternelle” over 
“autorité parentale.”   
  In this framing, state family 
law is precisely a place where equality in law and equal citizenship rights are guaranteed 
and protected by the state.  Media coverage also emphasized the importance of giving the 
general public a larger role in expressing their views on family law (Diatta 2002b; Arab 
2002a).   Similarly, an opinion piece in Wal Fadjri (Ndiaye 2002) criticized the current 
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Family Code for weakening the Senegalese family.  The current law was said to 
minimize paternal authority at the expense of the rights of women and children.46  This 
opinion piece hinted at the frustration felt by Muslims who felt that the current law was 
the product of elites who are “intellectuals, Westernized, and those who are detached 
from the people.”47  Using the rhetoric of “Muslim public opinion,” this author claimed 
to speak for ordinary Muslims who feel that the current law attacks their faith.48
 In 2003, media discourse surrounding CIRCOFS’ draft personal status law and 
the current Family Code constructed an interpretive package that emphasized the 
relationship between the secularism of the state, family law, and the principle of one 
nation/one law underlying the legal equality of all Senegalese citizens.  Implicit within 
this secular frame, however, was the creation of a dualism between a secular family law 
and an Islamic family law.  Before I discuss the dominant frame of secularism and its 
interconnected element of legal equality, I describe how the debate framed the current 
   
 As CIRCOFS unveiled its alternative law in 2003, debate over family law reached 
a new urgency.  Whereas legal reformers had critiqued the Family Code for falling short 
on Senegal’s constitutional promise of legal equality for all citizens, these reformers now 
defended the law as an important pillar of Senegal’s secular republic.   
 
Religious and Secular Authority: Competing Political Ideologies 
                                                 
46 “…la cellule familiale est menacée de destruction.  Les femmes et les enfants mineurs sont manipulés 
pour réclamer des droits exorbitants.  Le rôle du père dans une famille est minimisé et tend à disparaître.  
Son rôle de stabilisateur de la vie familiale fait place à la liberté sans borne qui prostitue les enfants.  Les 
conflits sociaux actuels se passent de tout commentaire.”   
47 “Ce qui est regrettable, c’est qu’il y a toujours une poignée d’intellectuels, snobs, détachés du peuple, 
occidentalisés, assimilés ou neutralisés par une idéologie corruptrice des sociétés secrètes qui enveniment 
les problèmes touchant le statut familial.” 
48 “Il suffit de prêter attention aux prêches de vendredi dans les mosquées pour se rendre compte de la 
réalité de l’opinion publique musulmane qui s’indigne de ce qui se passé.  Ils se sentent agressés dans leur 
foi et appellent à la raison.” 
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family law as a secular law that served the goals of the secular republic.  I also describe 
how the debate framed CIRCOFS’s draft law as an Islamic family law, and therefore a 
law that rested on the religious authority of the Shari’ah.  Supporting a state law based on 
Shari’ah was framed as a question of religious conviction for practicing Muslims.  For 
some, then, the debate became one of competition between secularists—who supported 
the secular state and opposed state laws based on Shari’ah—versus Islamists—who 
opposed the secularism of the state and favored Shari’ah as state law.   
 In the text of their draft law, CIRCOFS argued that the current law so completely 
violated Islamic principles, and therefore the religious beliefs of most Muslims, that a 
new law must subject Muslim families to the complete body of family law provided by 
the Shari’ah.49  CIRCOFS played an important role in framing the current law as a 
secular law.  Through the act of drafting an alternative legal code that made reference to 
the Shari’ah, CIRCOFS attempted to associate their draft law with the religious authority 
of the Shari’ah.50
                                                 
49 “Il serait donc faux et dangereux de se contenter de simples modifications de tels ou tels articles de 
l’actuel Code de la famille. Il s’impose en vérité d’adopter un autre Code totalement différent dans sa 
substance de l’actuel Code de la famille. Pour se faire, il convient de respecter la liberté de conscience de 
chacun inscrite dans notre Constitution en substituent au code de la famille un code de statut personnel qui 
soumet chacun à sa loi personnelle, c’est-à-dire qui soumet les musulmans à la charia, les chrétiens et le 
non-musulmans à leur loi personnelle.  Ce ne serait d’ailleurs qu’un retour à ce qui, à peu de choses, se 
pratiquait sous le régime colonial” (CIRCOFS 2002).   
50 Many articles throughout the draft code make reference to the “conditions” or “limits” of the Shari’ah, 
which implies that the law conforms to the dictates of Islamic law.  For example, Article 37 of their draft 
law makes reference to the Shari’ah by saying that a wife must obey her husband under the conditions 
given by the Shari’ah.  “La femme doit obéissance à son mari dans les conditions fixées par la Charia.”  
Similarly,  Article 277 suggests that Shari’ah is the primary source of the law: “Les dispositions du présent 
code sont d’ordre public et il ne peut y être dérogé que dans les limites permises par la Charia.” 
  To oppose their law, then, would be to oppose Islamic family law and 
the principles of the Shari’ah in favor of a secular state law.  By invoking the religious 
authority of the Shari’ah, CIRCOFS framed the issue as question of religious conviction 
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and belief for practicing Muslims.51  CIRCOFS also critiqued Senegal’s status as a 
secular state (the laïcité de l’Etat).  Specifically, Senegal simply imitated the French state 
model by declaring itself a secular state in its constitution.52
 Many journalists and opinion leaders who opposed CIRCOFS proposal 
contributed to framing the current Family Code as a secular law and the draft personal 
status law as an Islamic family law that conformed to the principles of the Shari’ah.  For 
example, one of the first articles published on April 9, 2003 in Wal Fadjri labeled 
CIRCOFS’ proposal a “personal status law in conformity with Islamic Shari’ah.  It would 
apply only to Senegalese Muslims instead of the actual Family Code, which would 
continue to apply to Christians”
   
53 (Seck 2003).  In a May 2003 article in Le Soleil, a 
journalist called CIRCOFS’ draft a “new Family Code inspired by the Shari’ah” (Sarr 
Diakhate 2003).54
                                                 
51 The current law was said to be a product of French-educated elites and was criticized Senegal’s eminent 
religious leaders.  Moreover, the law contradicted the fundamental religious beliefs of Muslims : “Critiqué 
et rejeté par nos éminents chefs religieux musulmans, le Code de la famille est, pour l’essentiel, ignoré par 
les populations…  Cette situation est la conséquence du fait que des élites politiques, administratives ou 
autres, formées à l’école française, subissant des influences extérieures, prennent leurs désirs pour des 
réalités et se croient investies du droit de faire des lois conformes à leurs vues et leurs aspirations 
personnelles en contradiction avec les points de vue et les aspirations de la grande masse de la population 
qui demeure profondément attachée à ses convictions religieuses musulmanes..”   
52 “Que la “laïcité de l’Etat” est un concept qui ne possède aucune définition légale, de sorte que ceux qui 
s’en prévalent lui donnent le contenu que chacun veut bien lui donner. C’est par pur mimétisme que l’on a 
inscrit dans notre Constitution, en l’important de France, le concept de laïcité qui ne figure pas dans la 
plupart des constitutions des pays d’Europe. C’est par pure ignorance que l’on croit que “la laïcité à la 
française” est un modèle, alors qu’elle n’est en réalité que l’exception en Europe.  … Il va de soi que dans 
ces différents pays, le droit de la famille tient compte des traditions religieuses et culturelles des peuples 
concernés.” 
53  “Un code de statut personnel en conformité avec la charia islamique pour régir les musulmans 
sénégalais à la place du Code de la famille qui devrait continuer à être appliqué aux chrétiens.”  
54 This journalist described the law as proposed by a religious group in favor of a new Family Code 
inspired by the Shari’ah:  “…une groupe religieux qui milite en faveur d’un nouveau Code de la famille 
inspiré par la charia.”  
  Communication sources on multiple sides of issue helped to associate 
CIRCOFS’ proposed law with the religious authority of the Shari’ah, as compared to the 
current secular law.   
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 Because CIRCOFS’ personal status law was said to conform to or be inspired by 
Shari’ah, another element in the larger discourse surrounding family law was the idea that 
the Shari’ah itself can be easily reduced to and codified as a set of legal rules  For 
example, a journalist discussed President Wade’s opposition to the personal status law 
but nevertheless equated it to the “application of Shari’ah” (Sarr Diakhate 2003).55  Such 
statements created associations between the draft personal status law and the religious 
authority of the Shari’ah.  The President was said to argue against a Muslim personal law 
by arguing that Muslims do not practice everything that is found in the Qur’an, but such 
arguments did not challenge the idea that a state law could claim the religious authority 
of the Shari’ah itself.56  Some legal scholars did address this notion by discussing 
divergent interpretations within Islamic legal schools.  For example, in a May 2003 
opinion piece in Le Soleil, Abdoullah Cissé (2003) argued that it was difficult to privilege 
a single conception of Islamic law without rendering other authoritative interpretations 
less-authoritative.57
                                                 
55 “Le Président de la République a invité Me Niang à attendre les prochaines élections pour présenter la 
sanction des Sénégalais sa proposition d’application de la Charia s’il le voulait.” 
56 “Il a précisé qu’il y a dans le Coran beaucoup de choses qui ne sont pas pratiquées.  Il a cité le cas de la 
flagellation des femmes adultères, de la mutilation des mains des voleurs, autant de pratiques qu’on laisse 
de côté pour se lever un beau matin pour demander l’application de la charia. ”  The examples given are 
criminal punishments, including the flagellation of adulterous women and amputating the hands thieves. 
57 “Dans ce contexte, il peut dès lors devenir difficile au nom de l’Islam, de privilégier une conception 
moniste du droit en disqualifiant d’autre interprétations qui en font partie intégrante.  Il pourrait résulter 
d’une telle attitude, une réduction de l’Islam à l’une seule de ses expressions, peut-être moins éloquent, très 
préjudiciable à la fois à l’esprit de l’Islam et aux musulmans eux-mêmes ouverts, par tradition au partage 
des valeurs. ” 
  Likewise, Saliou Kandji, a noted scholar of Islamic law argued 
against reforming the Family Code on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence in an interview 
in a 2004 article in Wal Fadjri (Gaye and Dramé 2004).  Specifically, Islamic law 
recognizes multiple interpretations from multiple schools of jurisprudence, contrary to 




 Because CIRCOFS’ draft personal status law was commonly framed as a law that 
conformed to Shari’ah—even by its opponents—much of the debate centered on whether 
a state law could or should be based on Shari’ah in a secular state.   As such, family law 
reform could be understood as a larger ideological debate about the secularism of the 
state.  In an April article entitled “Islamists assault secularism,”
  Nevertheless, the dominant media discourse tended to discuss family law 
reform as if two choices existed—a law that conformed to Shari’ah and a secular law.   
59 a journalist described 
the CIRCOFS proposal as part of a larger Islamist agenda (Ndiaye 2003).  Specifically, 
while Islamists have challenged the secular republic for some time, this was their most 
comprehensive undertaking to date, including a media and lobbying campaign.60  This 
journalist invoked the popular will of the people at the end of the article and claimed that 
Senegalese Muslims reject Islamic extremism.  Furthermore, the draft law had little 
chance of success because adopting such a law would require amending the secular 
constitution.” 61
                                                 
58 Among other statements : “L’islam n’est pas un seul avis.  C’est une somme d’avis.  Il y a plusieurs 
écoles et les courants sont aussi valable les uns que les autres.  Si vous savez ça, vous mesurez la difficulté 
de faire une loi pour une société fortement marquée par la diversité.  …Pour moi, la modification du Code 
de la famille ne s’impose pas parce que c’est difficile à imposer. Je viens d’indiquer que les Sénégalais ne 
pensent pas de la même manière.  Les musulmans n’adhérent pas à un seul type de droit, contrairement à ce 
que les gens croient.”   
59 “Les islamistes à l`assaut de la laïcité.” 
60The first line begins: “Ce n’est pas le premier assaut que les islamistes sénégalais, si divisés et aux 
intérêts opposés soient ils, lancent contre la République laïque au Sénégal sur cette question comme sur 
d’autres.  Mais c’est la première fois qu’ils soumettent un projet aussi achevé avec à la clé un important 
lobbying et une puissant campagne de communication.”    
61 The article ends: “Mais dans un pays dont les populations à majorité musulmane récusent tout corset 
intégriste, le projet des extrémistes sénégalais a peu de chance d’être adopté, car cela impliquerait la 
réforme de la constitution laïque adoptée il y a moins de deux ans.”  
  There are several elements that comprise this secular frame.  First, 
individuals who advocate for Islamic family law are deemed “Islamists” and charged 
with an ideologically “extremist” agenda.  Second, a personal status law based on 
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Shari’ah would violate the secular constitution.  Thus framed, debate over family law 
becomes a competition between competing secular versus Islamist political ideologies.   
 Other authors also suggested that the debate was not a simple question of family 
law.  Indeed, a May 19 article in Le Soleil argued that the call for a personal status law 
formed part of a larger Islamist plan to push for the broader application of Shari’ah in the 
future (Djouf 2003).62  CIRCOFS was not simply asking for Islamic family law; it was in 
fact testing the resolve of the secular state.  Likewise, a journalist and defender of the 
current Family Code “warned the Islamists that we will mobilize to defend secularism 
and democratic gains in our country.  We are aware that they are still very determined to 
achieve their objective of getting Shari'ah implemented in Senegal” (Bop 2003).63
 While some critics of a personal status law labeled their opponents as Islamists or 
extremists who opposed secular state and who favored a broader application of Shari’ah, 
some supporters of the law retorted with ideological labels of their own.  A June 2003 
letter to the editor published in Wal Fadjri (Dieye 2003) charged that many opponents of 
the personal status law were intolerant secularists, or secular fundamentalists, who panic 
at the mere mention of the term Shari’ah.
   
64
                                                 
62 “…l’islamisme rampant ne passera pas.  … Car il sait que ce qui se joue aujourd’hui sur la question d’un 
statut personnel à caractère islamique avec comme argument que l’écrasante majorité de la population est 
musulmane, et que par conséquent il faut se référer à la religion pour organiser la vie de la plupart des 
familles du pays est un faux argument.  C’est en réalité un test lancé contre l’Etat pour voir si la puissance 
publique acceptera de se plier à des groupes drapés du manteau de la religion pour faire passer leurs idées. 
On commence par le statut personnel, si l’Etat ferme les yeux ou lâche du lest, demain on va revendiquer 
que les voleurs aient la main tranchée.  Et après-demain que l’on flagelle des gens coupables d’adultère en 
public.  Et de spirale en spirale, jusqu’où ira-t-on ?” 
63 Codou Bop is also Coordinator of the Groupe de Recherche sur les Femmes et les Lois au Sénégal 
(GREFELS). 
64 “Mais pour peu qu’on s’évertue à étudier la personnalité de ce musulman intégriste laïc et intolérant qui 
se dresse résolument contre le nouveau projet, on ne sera pas surprise de cette levée de bouclier.  En effet, 
le personnage qui se cache derrière ce laïc intolérant, c’est d’abord le voleur potentiel – à col blanc – qui 
craint pour ses mains crochues, et qui est envahi de frissons dès que le mot charia est prononcé…”  
  These secularists include, among others, 
hypocritical politicians who use religious devotion to win votes, as well as Muslims who 
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believe the full and complete practice of Islam is incompatible with modernity.65  For this 
author, supporting an Islamic family law is a question of religious piety.  Those who 
prefer the current Family Code are Muslims who limit their religious lives to daily 
prayer, when it is convenient, and fasting during Ramadan.66  Similarly, in a May 2003 
opinion piece in Le Soleil, another advocate for an Islamic family law critiqued a noted 
Senegalese public intellectual and professor who spoke out in favor of the Family Code 
(Kébé 2003).  Such supporters of the Family Code, he argued, promoted only an 
“intolerant and dogmatic” version of secularism.67
 The dominant interpretive package surrounding family law reform framed the 
issue in terms of Senegal’s identity as and commitment to being a secular state.  This 
helps to explain why some defenders of the Family Code labeled advocates for a personal 
stats law as Islamists who oppose the secular state.  Thus, as journalists and elites debated 
state family law, they also debated the meaning of the secularism of the state itself.  An 
  Both critics and defenders of the 
Family Code, therefore, contributed to framing the issue of family law reform as a larger 
debate over the religious and secular authority of state laws, and between competing 
secular and Islamist ideologies.   
   
The Family Code and the Secularism of the State: Legal Uniformity (and Equality) versus 
Legal Pluralism (and Differentiation) 
 
                                                 
65 “… c’est encore le politicien hypocrite, soi-disant taalibe qui, pour engranger des suffrages, n’hésite pas 
à s’accroupir avec une feinte humilité devant “ son ” marabout pour solliciter des prières, tirées du Coran.  
Cet intégriste laïc, c’est aussi celui que quelqu’un a qualifié de “musulman honteux,” à qui les ennemis de 
l’Islam ont fait croire que la pratique totale de cette religion est une chose du passé, qu’elle est 
incompatible avec la modernité.” 
66 “Ceux-là qui veulent confiner leur univers religieux à la prière quotidienne, quand ils en ont le temps—et 
à l’abstention de manger et de boire durant le Ramadan—savent qu’il leur est loisible de continuer avec 
leur ancien code… ” 
67 “Notre professeur de se livrer à une apologie systématique de la laïcité qui trahit son laïcisme 
dogmatique et intolérant.”    
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integral element of this secular frame was the idea that secularism ensures equality in law 
for all citizens, no matter one’s race, origin, sex, and most importantly in this debate, 
one’s religion.   For example, as Article One of the Constitution states, the “Republic of 
Senegal is secular, democratic, and social.  It shall ensure equality before the law of all 
citizens, without distinction of origin, race, gender or religion; it shall respect all 
beliefs.”68
 For example, in April 2003, the group of civil society organizations calling 
themselves the Collective for the Defense of Secularism and for National Unity openly 
  Legal scholars also note that a key justification for the Family Code has been 
the principle of unifying the law so that one law applies to all citizens to the greatest 
extent possible (Camara 2007b; Sow Sidibé 1993-1994).   
 Because media discourse tended to frame the personal status law as a law that 
conformed to Shari’ah principles—thus resting on religious authority—the current 
Family Code was framed as an integral part of the secularism of the state in which all 
citizens must be treated equally under the law.  To obtain legal equality, state law and 
state courts should be impersonal and impartial and should not distinguish between the 
religious affiliations and beliefs of its citizens.  In contrast, the proposed personal status 
law would apply Shari’ah to Muslims, which would by definition differentiate between 
citizens of different religions.  As such, the dominant interpretive package framed 
secularism and the current family law as intricately connected to the principle of 
uniformity in law and rights for all Senegalese citizens.  More precisely, equal citizenship 
rested on the principle of one nation/one law, and the impersonality of the courts, rather 
than subjecting each individual to different laws and courts depending on their religion.   
                                                 
68 “La République du Sénégal est laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l'égalité devant la loi de tous 
les citoyens, sans distinction d'origine, de race, de sexe, de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances.” 
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denounced CIRCOFS’ proposed personal status law.  The Collective drafted a letter to 
President Wade and sent a public declaration to the media in which they stated that 
“secularism is the first principle of articulated in the Senegalese Constitution and all 
Senegalese are equal no matter what their religion, gender, ethnic group, etc.” (Bop 
2003).  To oppose the personal status law, the Collective defended secularism and the 
principle of legal equality for all citizens.  Similarly, a journalist writes in the Bulletin 
d'Information Africaine (Quenum 2003): 
If this plan to change family law were adopted, then Islamic Courts would be set 
up and what is worse, there would be a two-tier justice system, one for Muslims 
and another for non-Muslims.  Likewise, if this project is successful, then a non-
Muslim would not be able to marry a Muslim woman.69
The notion of a “two-tiered” system of justice with different rights and laws for citizens 
of different religions would violate the principle and constitutional guarantee of equality 
for all citizens.  Another journalist in Wal Fadjri (Guisse 2003)  framed the personal 
status law as creating frustrations on the part of minorities, including religious groups and 
women, suggesting that legal equality also entailed women’s rights.
   
 
70
 On May 19 in Le Soleil (Djouf 2003), a journalist described the President’s 
categorical opposition to any family law reform that would undermine the republican and 
secular foundations of the state.  This journalist further argued that all citizens—Muslims, 
Christians, animists, and atheists—enjoyed the same rights, obeyed the same laws, and 
   
                                                 
69 “Car ce projet de code de la famille, s’il venait à être adopté, va instaurer des tribunaux musulmans et 
pis, une justice à double facette: une pour les musulmans et une autre pour les non-musulmans. De même, 
si ce projet aboutissait, un non-musulman ne pourrait pas épouser une musulmane… ” 
70 “…la mise en œuvre d’un code de statut personnel islamique peut occasionner des sentiments de 
frustration de la part des groupes et des minorités.  C’est dans ce cadre que ce réseau dit rester vigilant à 
l’encontre de ‘toutes tentatives de remise en cause des acquis démocratiques (comme la laïcité) visant à 
protéger les droits de groupes les plus vulnérables et en particulier les femmes.’” 
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were protected by the state.71  As such, this journalist framed the “merits of the Family 
Code” as a defense of secularism and legal equality; it permits Muslims, Christians, and 
all other Senegalese—as simply citizens—to present themselves to an “impersonal 
tribunal” to regulate their disputes.72
Some supporters of a personal status law contested this dominant packaging of 
secularism, the current family law, and legal uniformity and equality into a coherent 
interpretive package.  Instead, they argued that greater legal pluralism, rather than 
uniformity, allowed citizens the right to practice their religion freely.  Freedom of 
religion was itself a constitutionally protected right.  I have described how CIRCOFS 
itself framed their draft law as a means to respect freedom of conscience by allowing 
Muslims the right to live according to Shari’ah.
   
 
Legal Pluralism and Freedom of Religion  
73
                                                 
71 “Cette fois si, le Président n’a fait ni dans la nuance ni dans la dentelle pour oppose un niet catégorique à 
tout ce lobbying déclenché pour saper les fondements de l’Etat républicain et laïque, et que le Sénégal 
entend conserver aussi longtemps qu’il sera à la tête de l’Etat, où musulmans, chrétiens, animistes, voire 
athées ou libres penseurs, ont les mêmes droits, obéissent aux mêmes lois et sont protégés par l’Etat.” 
72 “C’est le mérite du code de la Famille actuel qui, en son temps, à associer toutes les obédiences 
religieuses, qu’elles soient musulmanes, chrétiennes, les spécialistes du droit, les autorités coutumières…  
…C’est ce même code qui permet aux couples musulmans et chrétiens de se marier ensemble si ça leur 
chante en tout légalité, et en cas de divorce, de se présenter librement devant des tribunaux impersonnels, 
pour régler leurs problèmes, avec toutes les voies de recours possibles et prévues par la loi” (Djouf 2003).  
73 Again quoting CIRCOFS : “Pour se faire, il convient de respecter la liberté de conscience de chacun 
inscrite dans notre Constitution en substituent au code de la famille un code de statut personnel qui soumet 
chacun à sa loi personnelle, c’est-à-dire qui soumet les musulmans à la charia, les chrétiens et le non-
musulmans à leur loi personnelle.  Ce ne serait d’ailleurs qu’un retour à ce qui, à peu de choses, se 
pratiquait sous le régime colonial.” (CIRCOFS 2002).   
  Moreover, the French colonial legal 
system was framed as a time when Muslim beliefs and practices were better respected as 
compared to the current secular state and family law.  These frames appeared throughout 
the media debate about family law reform and critiqued the dominant interpretive 
package of secularism. 
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 For example, a full page opinion piece written in Le Soleil (Kébé 2003) critiqued 
the dominant interpretive package that linked secularism, legal uniformity and equality, 
and the current law.74  Instead, Senegal should break from the French model of 
secularism and move toward a model that rests on legal pluralism, such that each citizen 
should refer their own law, be it Canon law, Shari’ah, or positive law.75
 Similarly, in a front page article in June 2003 (Saada 2003), a journalist 
summarized the arguments offered by an association of young religious leaders, the 
Collectif des Jeunes Chefs Religieux du Senegal, in favor of the personal status law.  
These religious leaders framed the issue as an attempt to protect religious freedom 
through legal pluralism.  Rather than protecting citizens’ rights through an impersonal 
and uniform law, everyone should be judged according to his or her own religious 
convictions.
  According to 
this advocate for an Islamic family law, a system of personal status laws rather than a 
uniform legal system offers a more attractive model of Senegalese secularism.  This 
author does not overtly challenge the secularism of the state, but rather contests the 
meaning of secularism as providing legal equality by applying one law to all citizens. 
76
                                                 
74 “ …On prétend que ces statuts varies ne militant pas en faveur de l’unité nationale, n’assure pas l’égalité 
juridique des citoyens, constitue une entrave à l’intégration dans la modernité et une menace à la laïcité de 
la constitution et de l’état ”   
75 “ …  Il s’agit dans le cas du Sénégal de redéfinir notre système juridique, et partant notre conception de 
la laïcité qui n’a été au moment de notre indépendance qu’une copie conforme du modèle français.    
…En optant pour un pluralisme juridique à plusieurs statuts, le Sénégal romprait avec la laïcisme et 
élaborerait une laïcité souple, ouverte et dynamique, qui prendrait en compte la spécificité de l’islam qui 
dès le VIIe siècle a fondé et codifié un système juridique auquel tout musulman conséquent doit se référer.  
Cette laïcité doit également mettre des garde-fous pour empêcher toute dérive communautaire et garantir à 
chacun le droit de se référer au système qui lui convient, qu’il soit le droit canon, la sharia ou le droit 
positif. ”   
76 “ Ils se veulent des positivistes pour qui la laïcité signifie que chacun soit jugé selon ses convictions 
religieuses.” 
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 Others critiqued the secular republic by harkening back to the period of French 
colonization as a time when Muslims had greater rights and lived under Islamic laws 
(Dieye 2003).  If Muslim tribunals coexisted with secular ones under French 
colonization, why should they not coexist today when Senegal is a sovereign and 
democratic republic?77
 Legal scholar Abdoullah Cissé’s opinion piece in Le Soleil (2003) disputed 
framing personal status laws—and the French colonial legal system—as a time when 
Muslims had greater rights.
   
78  Rather, personal status laws prevailed in colonial legal 
contexts and under apartheid because the legal system operated on a discriminatory logic.  
Colonial rulers simply found it advantageous to subject indigenous people to an inferior 
legal status.79  Cissé framed the issue as one of competing legal visions: differentiation in 
law based on religious affiliation versus a conception of law that seeks to secure equality 
for all citizens.  Secularism—and by extension the current family law—is itself a means 
to manage diversity and pluralism.80
                                                 
77 “Si des tribunaux musulmans ont pu coexister avec des tribunaux laïcs pendant de longues années sous la 
colonisation, on ne voit pas ce qui empêcherait de revivre l’expérience.  Doit-on penser que la tolérance et 
la démocratie s’accommodaient mieux à la colonie du Sénégal qu’à la République du Sénégal?  Les 
explications qu’on a tenté d’en donner ne convainquent même pas leurs auteurs. ” 
78 He contends that Islamic law does conceive of law as applying to persons rather than to territories, and 
that the community of faith transcends national borders, but he challenges any claim of authority to legally 
define a Muslim’s status.   
79 The legal of concept of personal status: “a été consacré dans certains pays pour designer les divers 
aspects de la situation personnel et de famille des individus vivant en société.  Il s’agit en fait d’une 
technique juridique importée pour désigner certains aspects du droit de la famille dans les sociétés qui 
traitent les citoyens selon une logique discriminatoire : chaque individu est soumis à un statut personnel et 
correspond un régime juridique particulier.  C’est ce concept qui a prévalu notamment dans le système 
juridique colonial ou celui de l’apartheid et dans certains Etats qui en on repris la lettre sans l’esprit.  Il peu 
paraître surprenant de vouloir chercher à le consacrer à nouveau dans un Sénégal indépendant et souverain 
en semblant regretter un passé colonial (sic) où l’Islam et les musulmans étaient mieux respectés.  Or, 
l’intention du législateur colonial était tout simplement de maintenir les indigènes dans un statut inférieur 
en feignant les assujettir à leurs propres lois et coutumes, ce qui était, pour lui, doublement avantageux.”  
80 “Il ne serait pas superflu de rappeler que la laïcité dans l’Etat moderne n’est rien d’autre qu’une 
technique opérationnelle d’ordonnancement et de gestion du pluralisme sous toutes ses formes.” 
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 While supporters of a personal status law framed the issue as a question of 
religious freedom and legal pluralism, opponents also attempted to tie freedom of 
conscience into their dominant secular interpretive package.  In an opinion piece in Le 
Soleil, prominent legal scholar Amsatou Sow Sidibé explained the state’s justifications 
for the Family Code as pursuing national unity and the legal equality of all citizens by 
minimizing the diversity of statutes that were legally binding (2003).81  Though the 
Family Code sought legal equality, it also incorporates legal pluralism through the 
options it gives citizens regarding marriage and inheritance.  This author defended 
secularism because it rests on the principle of religious freedom, and Islam itself protects 
liberty of conscience.82
Because it already included specific legal options for Muslims and Christians in 
inheritance and marriage, the current law already respected freedom of religion.  An 
April 2003 Wal Fadjri article (Idrac 2003) labels opponents of CIRCOFS’ personal status 
law as “those who invoke secularism, the neutrality of the state, and freedom of 
  Writing for the Collective for the Defense of Secularism and 
National Unity, Codou Bop (2003) argued: 
even though 94% of Senegalese are Muslim, the large majority of them are not in 
favor of an Islamic Family Law, because our Family Code is drafted in such a 
way that it gives options to Muslims as well as to Catholics to choose according 
to their religious beliefs as far as family matters are concerned.   
 
                                                 
81 “Telle est l’économie générale du Code sénégalaise de la famille.  En élaborant cet instrument juridique, 
les pouvoirs publics sénégalais étaient guidés par un certain nombre d’objectifs tous d’actualité.  Il 
s’agissait de renforcer l’unité nationale en consolidant la conscience nationale.  Il était en outre question 
d’assurer l’égalité juridique des citoyens en évitant au maximum la diversité des statuts et la hiérarchie 
entre les individus à cables.  Il fallait faciliter l’intégration de la République du Sénégal dans le concert des 
Nations modernes. ” 
82 “Le pluralisme juridique du droit sénégalais de la famille a un fondement laïc.   …Dès lors, toutes les 
institutions se rattachant à l’Etat, y compris la famille, sont censées être empreintes du sceau de la laïcité.   
Dans le contexte sénégalais, la laïcité ne signifie pas ignorance ou hostilité vis-à-vis des religions.  Elle 
repose sur deux principes également affirmé par la Constitution : la non-confessionnalité de l’Etat et la 
liberté de Conscience.   …La laïcité est d’autant plus défendable au Sénégal que l’Islam prône la liberté de 
conscience.  Ainsi, en témoigne ce verset du Saint Coran: “La vérité émane de notre Seigneur.  Croit qui 
veut !  que soit mécréant qui veut ”” (Sourate XVIII, la Caverne, Verset 29). 
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conscience,” which offers additional evidence that defenders of the Family Code also 
claimed the value of freedom of religion.83
Part of the interpretive package of secularism offered in the family law debate 
was that the secularism of the state allowed Senegal’s multireligious population to 
peacefully coexist within a unified nation.  By dividing people on the basis of their 
religion, an Islamic family law could create conflict between Christians and Muslims.  
For example, the Collective for the Defense of Secularism and National Unity framed 
movement toward a law based on Shari’ah as creating the potential for the kinds of 
religious conflicts and national divisions experienced in Nigeria, Bangladesh, Sudan, and 
India (wluml.org 2003).
  In short, advocates for the current family law 
and for the draft Islamic family law both claimed that their laws protected the freedom of 
conscience guaranteed in Senegal’s constitution.   
 
Religious Diversity, National Unity, Peace, and Tolerance 
84
 Similarly, a journalist’s front page article highlighted the risk of religious 
divisions in the title: “Projet de Reforme du Code de la Famille: Les Risques de Divisions 
Religieuses? ”(Guisse 2003).  This article connected Senegalese secularism to the 
currently peaceful relations between Senegal’s religious communities, and the proposed 
  As a political ideology and a cultural practice, then, 
secularism formed the foundation of the peaceful cohabitation between religions that 
Senegal has historically enjoyed.     
                                                 
83 “Les réticents à cette idée, eux, invoquent la laïcité, la non-confessionnalité de l’Etat et la liberté de 
conscience.” 
84 “Un tel projet s’avère dangereux, car il annihile les quelques progrès contenus dans l’actuel Code de la 
famille et renferme les germes d’une division de la nation et pourrait être à l’origine d’un conflit religieux 
grave au Sénégal, comme en ont connu le Nigeria, le Soudan, le Bangladesh ou l’Inde.”   
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Islamic family law could threaten this balance.85  A journalist in Sud Quotidien (Konte 
2003) began by suggesting that an Islamic personal status code could create conflict and 
intolerance.86
 Senegalese secularism was, therefore, intimately connected to popular discourses 
of national unity, peace, and religious respect and tolerance.   The President himself 
highlighted this frame of peace and religious conflict as he discussed family law, noting 
that Senegal is a country known for peace and the very proposal troubled “our Christian 
brothers”
   
87  (Djouf 2003).  Throughout the debate, journalists highlighted Christians, as 
religious minorities, as benefitting from the secularism of the state.  In one article,  the 
Archbishop of Dakar was quoted calling on young Catholics to fight to maintain the type 
of positive secularism that has guaranteed peace (Ndiaye 2003).88 In a different article 
entitled “President Wade on extremism: ‘Senegal is a model of religious tolerance to be 
preserved,’” the President articulated the elite discourse on tolerance and its culture of 
mutual respect between citizens of different religions (Djouf 2003).89  National unity 
meant that citizens are Senegalese first, not Christian or Muslim.90
                                                 
85 “Mais la mise en œuvre d’un projet de code de statut personnel islamique ne risque-t-elle pas de créer 
une scission dans la communauté religieuse sénégalaises qui s’est longtemps vantée de sa laïcité? ”   
86 “La proposition d’un Code de statut personnel pour les musulmans est de ces actions qui ouvrent des 
perspectives de conflit et d’intolérance” 
87 “Le chef de l’Etat pense que ce genre de déclaration est ‘très grave’ pour l’image de notre pays.  
‘…Alors que le Sénégal a la paix et que tout le monde nous apprécie, c’est incompréhensible qu’on soulève 
ce genre de problème pour susciter l’inquiétude chez nos frères chrétiens.” 
88 The Archbishop of Dakar Théodore Adrien Sarr was quoted: “parfois, nous percevons des signes qui sont 
sources d’inquiétude, et nous nous demandons si cette laïcité qui, jusqu’à présent est la gloire du Sénégal, 
une garantie de la paix, ne va pas entre rognée de plus en plus. …Alors veillez à lutter pour le maintient de 
la laïcité positive.  Veuillez à lutter pour que l’égalité, le droit et le devoir de tous se maintiennent le plus 
longtemps possible.”  
89 “[Le Sénégal] s’efforce de consolider cet acquis ainsi que le respect mutuel entre citoyen sénégalais de 
religions différentes.” 
90  “Au Sénégal, on ne se perçoit pas en Chrétien ou en Musulman, mais ‘tout simplement’ en Sénégalais, et 
cela veut dire que ‘l’évolution vers la nation et a la citoyenneté a pour conséquence le recul de tous les 
intégrismes au profit d’un humanisme qui commence d’abord par les communautés nationale.”  
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  In Wal Fadjri, a journalist linked the Family Code to the secularism of the state 
and Senegal’s social stability, which has made Senegal a great nation (Dieng 2003).91  
Another journalist connected secularism with civil peace: “All Senegalese who care 
about civil and social peace agree with the President, and refuse to make any concessions 
to these ideas that will lead the country toward the unknown.  …Senegal is a secular 
republic and a democracy, and will remain so.  The Family Code will continue to 
organize Senegalese personal status (Djouf 2003).”92  A prominent legal scholar wrote 
that only secularism permits the consolidation of the Senegalese nation, including a 
peaceful cohabitation of religions (Sow Sidibé 2003).93  Similarly, a prominent scholar of 
Islamic law noted in Wal Fadjri that Islam did not require the adoption of an Islamic 
family law.  Instead, he defended secularism as a system of liberty that protects each 
belief and ensures mutual respect between diverse communities (Gaye and Dramé 
2004).94
 Journalists who wrote more favorably toward CIRCOFS’ draft emphasized the 
difficulty of the proposal given Senegal’s reputation for secularism, peace, and tolerance.  
In Le Quotidien, for example, the draft proposal was framed as a delicate question given 
  
                                                 
91 “ Aussi, soutiennent-elles le maintient du Code de la famille en vigueur au Sénégal depuis 1972, pour 
sauvegarder la laïcité de l’Etat, mais aussi l’équilibre qui fait du Sénégal une grande nation” 
92 “ Tous les Sénégalais soucieux de paix civile, de paix sociale sont d’accord avec le Président pour refuser 
de faire toute concession à ces idées qui risquent d’installer le pays vers des dérives, vers l’inconnu voire 
les incertitudes dans nos vies individuelles et collectives.  Le Président l’a réaffirmé avec force et tout le 
monde est d’accord avec lui : le Sénégal est une République laïque et démocratique et le restera.  Le code 
de la famille va continuer à organiser le statut personnel des Sénégalais.  Et le Code pénal, les crimes et 
délits.  C’est tout et c’est tant mieux comme cela pour la paix de l’âme de tout le monde.” 
93 “La laïcité présente des avantages indéniables.  Elle est un instrument d’organisation et d’administration 
des sociétés humaines notamment des sociétés qui, comme le Sénégal, sont caractérisées par la pluralité 
religieuse dont le corollaire est le pluralisme juridique.  Elle seule peut alors permettre une cohabitation 
pacifique.  …La laïcité est une solution aux problèmes que l’existence de minorités religieuses pose à 
l’Etat.  …Seule la laïcité peut permettre la consolidation de la Nation Sénégalaise dans le respect des 
différences.” 
94 “La laïcité est un système de liberté.  Chacun doit s’organiser dans le respect des autres.  Dans une 
diversité ethnique, culturelle et linguistique comme la notre, seul le système laïc maintient la convivialité et 
la commune volonté de vie commune. ” 
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Senegal’s secularism and tolerant Islam (Gaye 2003).95  As this frame suggests, any 
proposal to reform family law has to contend with the dominant discourse on secularism 
and must argue why such a law will not threaten Senegal’s national unity, peace, and 
culture of tolerance.96
 The Collective for the Defense of Secularism proclaimed, for example, that 
Islamic associations had been trying to weaken the democratic foundations of the state, 
including secularism (wluml.org 2003).  “We must mobilize to preserve national unity, 
secularism, and the democratic gains we’ve achieved.”
       
 
The Will of the Majority: Senegal as Muslim Country  
 Finally, the issue of state family law raised fundamental questions of national 
identity and the meaning of democracy.  For some, as a predominantly Muslim 
democracy, the values and views of the majority should be reflected in state law.  For 
others, not all of Senegal’s citizens are Muslim and democracy must protect the minority 
over the will of the majority.  Advocates for both laws competed to frame their arguments 
as compatible with the logic of democracy.     
97
                                                 
95 “Les représentants des familles religieuses et des associations ont exprimé, le 10 avril, leur souhait de 
voir le rétablissement des tribunaux musulmans.  Un vœu d’une délicatesse inouïe dans un pays à la laïcité 
consommée [l’islam sénégalais est réputé pour sa tolérance], qui semble pourtant avoir fait l’unanimité au 
sein de la communauté musulmane sénégalaise, tant la demande est revenue à maintes reprises.”   
96 The dominance of this discourse may also explain why some advocates of the law attempted to flip the 
discourse of tolerance on its head, arguing instead against the “intolerant secularists.” 
97 “Mobilisons-nous pour préserver l’unité nationale, la laïcité et les acquis démocratiques. Depuis 
plusieurs années, un groupe d’associations islamiques tente de saper les fondements démocratiques de 
l’Etat sénégalais, en remettant régulièrement en cause sa laïcité et les acquis juridiques régissant la famille. 
Avec un projet de Code remis au Chef de l'État, que la presse a largement commenté, ces associations 
exigent l’adoption d’une loi portant code de statut personnel applicable aux seuls Musulmans.  
  In this framing, secularism is 
inextricably connected to democracy.  Of the Collective, another journalist writes: 
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Regarding secularism, it’s not a question of an innovation or a new aspiration, 
since this principle is clearly established in Senegal’s Constitution.  It’s up to the 
State to see that this secularism is not subject to human whims. The [Collective 
for the Defense of Secularism and for National Unity’s] aim is to warn public 
opinion about the risk of “undermining Senegal’s democratic foundations.”98
As discussed, the President Wade also appealed to the will of the people as he explained 
his opposition to an Islamic family law.  In particular, he critiqued the leader of 
CIRCOFS and invited him to compete in the next elections to present the “application of 
Shari’ah” to the people rather than pushing for the direct adoption of a new law (Djouf 
2003).
 
        (Quenum 2003) 
99
 In contrast, CIRCOFS framed its actions as a simple expression of the democratic 
will of the majority of citizens, who are themselves Muslim.
   
100  As such, CIRCOFS 
framed family law both as a question of the religious authority of the Shari’ah and as a 
question of the democratic will of the majority.  This frame reappeared in media 
discourse.  For example, a Le Quotidien journalist summarized CIRCOFS’ argument that 
laws should reflect the will of the majority: because 90% of the population is Muslim, the 
beliefs and desires of the people must be reflected in legislation (Gaye 2003).101
                                                 
98 “En fait de laïcité, il ne s’agit point d’une innovation ou d’une aspiration nouvelle, puisqu’elle est 
clairement consacrée par la Constitution sénégalaise. A l’Etat de faire en sorte que cette laïcité ne soit pas 
sujette aux caprices des hommes. Tel est le sens du combat de ce Collectif, qui met toute l’opinion publique 
en garde contre les risques de «saper les fondements démocratiques de l’Etat sénégalais. ”  
99 “Me Wade a dit sa désolation de voir Me Babacar Niang prendre ce genre d’initiative et qu’il aurait dû 
mettre sa proposition dans son programme de champagne électorale.  Le président de la République a invité 
Me Niang à attendre les prochaines élections pour présenter à la sanction des Sénégalais sa proposition 
d’application de la Charia s’il voulait. ” 
100 “La communauté musulmane forme l’immense majorité de la population et les règles les plus 
élémentaires de la démocratie exigent que, contrairement à ce qui se passe actuellement, le droit musulman 
de la famille auquel obéissent 95% des Sénégalaise et des Sénégalaises soit érigé en cette matière, en droit 
commun au Sénégal”  (CIRCOFS 2002) . 
101 “Une opposition à cette requitte ne serait pas démocratique dans la mesure où les musulmans sont 
largement majoritaires [l’islam est pratiqué par 90% de la population].  En plus de cet argument, il estime 
qu’il ne peut y avoir de développement si l’on ne tient pas compte des croyances des populations.” 
  This 
democratic frame is based on the principle of majority rule in a democracy.  Similarly, 
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another journalist summarized the views of some religious leaders, who argued that it 
was antidemocratic for President Wade to categorically reject the proposed law (Saada 
2003).102
 Critics of a personal status law also admitted that it was important to study the 
views of the people prior to enacting future reforms, but argued against the wisdom of 
relying on majority rule.  Relying on the logic of public opinion and the will of the 
people, for example, some argued that each citizen had a legitimate right to form an 
opinion on the issue (Cisse 2003).
      
103  The problematic area, however, was defining the 
relevant majority.  The same logic could be used to enact laws that applied to other 
majorities such as ethnic groups.104
 Others did not challenge the idea of Senegal as a Muslim-majority country, but 
rather challenged the empirical validity of CIRCOFS’ claim that the majority of Muslims 
favored an Islamic family law.
   
105  As a noted professor of Islamic law argued in an 
interview in Wal Fadjri in January 2004,  there is no single subject about which 95% of 
Senegalese believe the same thing (Gaye and Dramé 2004).106
                                                 
102 “Le niet catégorique du chef de l’Etat à toute réforme du Code de la famille a servi de détonateur et on 
juge inacceptable que Me Wade veuille demander aux députés de voter contre tout projet de code de statut 
personnel islamique.  Selon le collectif, c’est antidémocratique même.” 
103 “Il est du droit légitime de chaque citoyen d’être mis à même de se constituer son propre jugement sur 
l’adéquation de projet aux aspirations des familles sénégalaises.” 
104 “Ne risquerait-on pas, en suivant cette logique de la majorité, de légitimer, par le droit, notre exclusion 
de nombre d’instances régionales out internationales ou bien de voir émerger au sein de société sénégalaise 
d’autres projets de codes ayant vocation à ne s’appliquer qu’à des entités ethniques ou religieuses 
spécifiques.”    
105 CIRCOFS wrote : “Cette situation est la conséquence du fait que des élites politiques, administratives ou 
autres, formées à l’école française, subissant des influences extérieures, prennent leurs désirs pour des 
réalités et se croient investies du droit de faire des lois conformes à leurs vues et leurs aspirations 
personnelles en contradiction avec les points de vue et les aspirations de la grande masse de la population 
qui demeure profondément attachée à ses convictions religieuses musulmanes.”  
106 “Il n’y a pas 95% de Sénégalais pensant la même chose.  Or, on ne peut donner de code qu’à des gens 
qui pensent la même chose.  Moi, je suis musulman, mais je ne me retrouve pas dans ce code-là. » 
  As mentioned, some 
argued that CIRCOFS itself only reflected the will of a small group of Islamists (Djouf 
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2003),107 while others argued that the Senegalese people rejected Islamic extremism 
(Ndiaye 2003).108
 As this chapter demonstrates, media discourse surrounding the issue of family law 
constructed interpretive packages for the public and offered alternative ways to make 
sense of this debate.  The central interpretive package was that of the secularism of the 
state.  Opponents of a Muslim personal law defended the current Family Code by 
invoking secularism, the principle of one nation/one law, and the legal equality of all 
citizens.  As they critiqued a family law based on Shari’ah, they conjured images of other 
       
 Throughout these debates, then, the issue of family law was also framed as a 
question of democracy and the will of the people.  For some, as a Muslim-majority 
country, the beliefs of the people should be taken seriously and should be reflected in 
law.  The assumption was that most Muslims would support a state family law based on 
Shari’ah and opposed the current Family Code.  Such a law had both religious and 
democratic legitimacy.  For others, the will of the people was also a source of legitimacy 
for state laws, but the issue should be taken up directly with the people.  The assumption 
was that though Senegalese Muslims are devout, the people would ultimately reject such 




                                                 
107 “…l’islamisme rampant ne passera pas.  … Car il sait que ce qui se joue aujourd’hui sur la question 
d’un statut personnel à caractère islamique avec comme argument que l’écrasante majorité de la population 
est musulmane, et que par conséquent il faut se référer à la religion pour organiser la vie de la plupart des 
familles du pays est un faux argument.  C’est en réalité un test lancé contre l’Etat pour voir si la puissance 
publique acceptera de se plier à des groupes drapés du manteau de la religion pour faire passer leurs idées.” 
108 “Mais dans un pays dont les populations à majorité musulmane récusent tout corset intégriste, le projet 
des extrémistes sénégalais a peu de chance d’être adopté, car cela impliquerait la réforme de la constitution 
laïque adoptée il y a moins de deux ans.”  
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multireligious states with religious conflict and suggested that the peaceful coexistence of 
Senegal’s religious population rested on the secular foundations of the state.   For some, 
Senegal’s democratic gains and secularism were intimately connected.   
 Supporters of a Muslim personal law also contributed to this secular frame.  
CIRCOFS made a moral appeal to the religious authority of the Shari’ah and critiqued the 
state’s current secular law.  In particular, they argued that the current law violated 
fundamental religious beliefs of Muslims.  By making reference to the Shari’ah, the issue 
was framed as a question of religious belief and practice.  These critics of the status quo 
opposed what they saw as the dominant version of secularism that was “intolerant,” and 
they advocated for legal differentiation so that Muslims could freely practice their 
religion.  Moreover, as a Muslim country and democracy, they claimed that the majority 
of the people themselves supported this law.  As such, a state family law based on 
Shari’ah had both democratic and religious legitimacy.   
 What is clear from this discussion is that journalists and opinion leaders on both 
sides claimed to speak for “public opinion,” but they disagreed about the extent to which 
popular sentiments supported their own position.  In the next chapters, I take up this 
question of public opinion about family law reform and examine how ordinary men and 
women themselves understood this debate.  I examine and analyze how the values 
invoked in elite discourse made their way into ordinary citizens’ views.  I also evaluate 
the role of gender, religious engagement, and education in shaping popular support for 
and opposition to a state family law that claims to conform to Shari’ah.   
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Chapter 5  
A Survey of Senegalese Opinion:  Bringing Citizens’ Voices into Focus  
 
Chapter 4 described and analyzed the major ways journalists and opinion leaders 
framed the issue of family law reform.  This chapter presents the results of opinion data 
about family law reform collected directly from an urban sample of Senegalese citizens 
living in Dakar in 2004-2005.  I asked citizens directly if they supported or opposed 
reforming the current Family Code and instead adopting a state family law based on 
Shari’ah.  The rest of this study analyses citizens’ own voices and addresses the question 
of who supports and who opposes a state family law based on Shari’ah.  In this chapter, I 
show bivariate patterns in this original opinion data and evaluate possible demographic 
differences that  may explain variations in citizens’ preferences.  Chapter 6 evaluates 
men’s and women’s own narratives as they describe their preferences, and Chapter 7 
evaluates the significance of the demographic categories discussed in this chapter in a 
multivariate analysis. 
 
Data and Study Design 
The data for the remaining chapters in this study come from an original public 
opinion survey carried out in Dakar, Senegal in 2004-2005.  The study population is 
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urban and lives in 15 neighborhoods across Dakar,109 the political and economic center of 
Senegal, and its largest city.  According to government figures, Senegal had an estimated 
2005 population of 10.8 million, with about 50% of the population living in urban 
contexts.  Of these urban residents, more than half live in the larger metropolitan region 
of Dakar.  The city of Dakar contained approximately 1.03 million inhabitants.110
Figure 5.1 shows a graphic approximation of the city of Dakar, though the precise 
location of neighborhoods is not accurately represented given limitations in available 
maps.  Our sample includes one neighborhood in zone marked Yoff, two neighborhoods 
in Grand Yoff, two neighborhoods in the area marked Fass/Guele-Tapée/Colobane, one 
neighborhood in Fann/Point E, three neighborhoods in the Liberté area, one 
neighborhood in Grand Dakar, one in Ouakam, three in HLM, and one in Pikine, which is 
located in the area labeled Cape Verde Peninsula.
   
111
                                                 
109 Neighborhoods are popularly known as quartiers, and administratively are known as Communes 
d’Arrondissement. 
110 République du Sénégal, Département de la Prévision et de la Statistique.   
111 Large areas of the zone marked Yoff include unpopulated areas, including the international airport.  The 
large area marked Hann-Bel Air includes the port and a large industrial zone. 
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 The neighborhoods included in the study broadly represent the socioeconomic 
diversity of the capital city and were selected through careful qualitative interviews with 
census statisticians, neighborhood leaders (chefs de quartiers), NGOs, and academics.  
Neighborhoods have meaningful geographic boundaries that citizens themselves use 
when describing where they live.  However, the government collects data in smaller 
administratively defined census districts within each neighborhood, and as such each 
neighborhood contains more than one census district.  To create the sampling frame for 
each neighborhood, two census districts were selected at random from each neighborhood 
using preliminary figures from the latest government census.   
To select households, and finally individuals to be interviewed, a team of trained 
researchers conducted a door-to-door enumeration of households in each selected district 
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in order to create a comprehensive list of households.112
The sample population includes 800 respondents comprising 52% men and 48% 
women.  This gender division approximates the final government census percentages for 
Dakar, which enumerated 50.1% men and 49.9% in Dakar (Démographie 2008).
  This allowed a more accurate 
sampling frame because many lower income neighborhoods in urban contexts, known 
locally as popular neighborhoods (quartiers populaires), have densely populated housing 
blocks in which one building or address may contain many different households.   
Using these comprehensive household lists, households were selected at random 
to be included in the study.  Finally, upon arriving at the household and receiving 
permission to interview a randomly selected individual from the household, interviewers 
selected the final respondent using Kish selection tables.  This extensive sampling 
procedure was used to ensure that the survey population reflected the basic generational, 
gender, socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic diversity that broadly exists across Dakar.  
All interviews were conducted in person with trained interviewers, and respondents were 
given the option of conducting the interview in either Wolof or French.  Interviews took 
place from late December 2004 to May 2005.     
113
                                                 
112 The design of the sampling frame was developed with experts at the University of Michigan’s Survey 
Research Center. 
113 The 2003 Afrobarometer survey in Senegal sampled a similar 51.6% men and 48.4% women in their 
sample of Dakar.    
  The 
religious affiliation of the sample population is 86% Muslim and 14% Christian.  Of the 
Senegalese Muslims in the sample, 12% report having no affiliation with a Sufi tariqa 
and the remaining 88% identify with one of the Sufi orders.  Of these, 28% report 
affiliation with the Tariqa Murid, 52% with the tariqa Tijaniyya, 3.5% with the 
Qadiriyya, and 4.3% with the Layene.   
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This urban sample includes a larger percentage of Christians than national 
estimates, which range between four and twelve percent.114
The sample is also socioeconomically diverse, as measured by household wealth 
and education.  To capture the economic status of each individual, the survey asked 
respondents whether or not their household owned a total of 13 consumer goods.
  Given the historical focus on 
the role of the tariqa Murid in many studies of Senegalese history and politics (Babou 
2007; Cruise O'Brien 1971; Coulon 1981; Buggenhagen 2001; Babou 2003), it is 
important to note the diversity within the Senegalese Muslim community.  Though 
scholars have also focused heavily on the Sufi orders, there is actually a substantial 
number of Muslims in this urban sample who claim no affiliation with a Sufi order.  Men 
are more likely to fall into this category, with 62% men compared to 38% women 
reporting no affiliation with a Sufi order.  There is also no significant age difference 
between these individuals.  Muslims who claim to belong to a Sufi order are roughly 
evenly split between men (52%) and women (48%).  
Individuals identifying as Wolof comprise the largest ethnic group (27%), 
followed by Pulaar (18%), Sereer (13%), Diola (12%), Lebou (10%), Malinke (3%), and 
Soninké (2%).  Sixteen percent identity with more than one of these ethnicities or 
mention some other category.   
115
                                                 
114 The CIA Factbook (United States. Central Intelligence Agency.) suggests that 94% of the population is 
Muslim and 5% Christian, while other sources, including media sources, suggest a range of between 88%-
94% Muslim, and 4-12% Christian.  Most studies do not cite a source as they discuss religious affiliation or 
identify the CIA Factbook as their source.  It is likely that urban areas such as Dakar have a higher 
concentration of Christians, even if national estimates give lower percentages of 5%.  Over-representing 
Christians in this urban sample compared to national samples allows me to make inferences about 
differences in preferences for the Senegalese Christian population. 
  The 
115 The items included a farm, animals, bicycle, motorcycle or scooter, car, a boat or fishing boat, 
telephone, watch or clock, refrigerator, radio, television, house or dwelling, stove or oven, air conditioner, 
computer, satellite.  In a pretest, the item asking for income led to a high rate of refusal or respondents 
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mean number of items each household owns is 6.4, with 25% of the population reporting 
five or fewer items and 90% owning 10 or fewer out of a total of 13.  Roughly 34% of 
respondents have not completed a primary school education, while 25.7% report having a 
high school diploma or higher.  The median age is 35 years, with 44.9% of the sample 
between ages 18 to 33 years and 34.8% between ages 34 and 49.  The remainder of this 
chapter discusses citizens’ preferences for a state family law based on Shari’ah and 
presents bivariate relationships between citizen preferences and key demographic 
characteristics. 
 
Popular support for and opposition to a family law based on Shari’ah   
After a few brief demographic questions to begin the survey interview, 
interviewers briefly described the debate about Senegal’s family law and asked 
respondents their views on the issue: 
Now I’d like to ask you some questions about a debate taking place in Senegal.  
Recently, some people and certain religious leaders have said that we should reform 
the Family Code (le Code de la Famille) so that some laws would apply only to 
Muslim and their families.  The Islamic Committee to Reform the Family Code in 
Senegal (le Comité Islamique pour la Réforme du Code de la Famille au Sénégal, or 
CIRCOFS) has proposed an Islamic personal status law (projet de code de statut 
personnel islamique) that would enforce parts of the Shari’ah for Muslims.  The 
President of the Republic and certain other groups have opposed this.  
 
Can you tell me if you support the proposal by some Muslim religious leaders to 
enforce Shari’ah or if you oppose the proposal to enforce Shari’ah in the Family 
Code?   
 
Why do you feel this way?116
                                                                                                                                                 
indicating that they did not know their household income.  This item measuring household wealth instead 
of income has been used in similar studies, including the Afrobarometer Surveys. 
116 All survey items and indexes are also described in Appendix.  Please contact the author for additional 
information.    
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The question briefly introduced key aspects of the debate—that CIRCOFS had proposed 
reforming the Family Code and had proposed an Islamic personal status law that would 
be based on Shari’ah, that it would apply to Muslims and their families, and that there 
was some disagreement about the issue, with some individuals and religious leaders 
supporting the proposal and the President and other groups opposing the proposal.  
Survey interviewers first recorded binary responses of support or opposition.  Then, they 
asked a simple retrospective, open-ended probe that asked respondents why they 
supported or opposed this proposal.  Interviewers recorded word-for-word the narrative 
short-answer responses each respondent offered.  Interviewers continued to probe for 
answers until respondents indicated that they had sufficiently communicated their 
preferences.117
 The general framing of this question sought to capture ordinary men’s and 
women’s views about the principle of whether or not a state family law should conform 
to Shari’ah principles.   The questionnaire intentionally avoided specific frames in media 
discourse because a major goal of this study is to gather the range of considerations 
respondents themselves offer as they discuss their views on family law and Shari’ah as a 
source of state law.  The study aimed to capture the most salient desires, concerns, 
associations, and values as citizens themselves articulated them, rather than pushing the 
respondent to consider specific issues such as the secularism of the state, legal equality, 
  Next, we asked respondents the intensity of their response, ranging from 
strongly support to strongly oppose.  Finally, we asked respondents if they felt any 
emotions about the possibility that Senegal might enforce Shari’ah in its state family law, 
ranging from fear, anger, and shame, to pride and hope.     
                                                 




religious authority, or any other consideration.  Chapter 6 analyzes the extent to which 
the major frames in media discourse about Senegalese family law actually appear in 
citizens’ own narratives.   
The survey question wording avoided an even more general framing found in 
surveys that ask men and women if they want Shari’ah as a form of legislation, the only 
source of legislation, or not a source of legislation at all (see Esposito 2002).  This was 
intentional because actual debates taking place in each country vary considerably.  The 
debate may focus on criminal law, as in Nigeria (Harnischfeger 2008), or debates about 
family laws, as in India, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, or Senegal.  My survey question 
attempts to capture views on a more context-specific debate because it asks specifically 
about Shari’ah as a source of state family law.  The remainder of this chapter summarizes 
the bivariate relationships between support and opposition to an Islamic family law and 
pays particular attention to the relationship between education, gender, and religious 
engagement.   
 
Education, Religious Engagement, and Gender 
Table 5.1 shows that that ordinary citizens do disagree about family law.  Of the 
761 respondents, a clear majority of the population—56.4%— supports a family law 
based on Shari’ah, but a substantial 43.6% opposes this proposal.118
                                                 
118 Of the 800 citizens in the sample, 95% responded to the question and 5% (39 of 800) said they did not 
know or refused to answer.  The analysis presented here focuses on the 95% of respondents who expressed 
either support or opposition.   
  Citizens also feel 
differently about the intensity of their preferences: 41.7% strongly support the law and 
14.7% offer support, while 16.3% oppose and 27.3% say they strongly oppose the law.  
Table 5.1 also displays support and opposition by gender.  Male respondents are almost 
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equally divided over the question, with roughly 52% of men supporting and 48% 
opposing.  Women are much more likely to say they support a family law based on 
Shari’ah: 62% express support and 38% express opposition.  The strength of women’s 
support for reforming the Family Code in favor of a law based on Shari’ah is notable 
given that opponents of the Family Code have historically argued that it grants women 
greater rights and have called it “the Women’s law” (Augis 2002, 66).   










Men 48.4% 51.6% 403 
 
Women 38.3% 61.7% 358 
 
Total 43.6% 56.5% 761 
N=761.  Cells show the percentages of men and women who express support and opposition to a state 
family law based on Shari’ah.  The bivariate relationship between gender and family law preferences is 
significant (p=.005). 
 
Table 5.2 shows a strong bivariate relationship between education and preferences 
for family law.  Individuals with higher levels of formal education are significantly more 
likely to oppose a family law based on Shari’ah.   
 
Table 5.2 Education, by preferences for a family law based on Shari’ah 



















79.3% 67.6% 44.6% 36.5% 30.1% 
Total 150 253 159 126 73 
N=761.  Cells show the percentage of respondents within each education category who express support or 
opposition.  This table recodes a 13 category education variable for presentation purposes.  The bivariate 




Men are also more likely than women to have obtained higher levels of education, 
as shown in Table 5.3.  While there is a strong bivariate relationship between family law 
preferences and education, as well as between family law preferences and gender, there is 
no significant difference between men’s and women’s preferences within each education 
category.  For example, men and women with a primary school education are equally 
likely to say they oppose the law.  The large gender gap in levels of formal education, 
therefore, may help to account for women’s significantly higher levels of support for a 
family law based on Shari’ah.  In other words, education may mediate the impact of 
gender on family law preferences.      
Table 5.3 Education, by gender 














13. 7% 29.3% 24.3% 20.0% 12.7% 
Women 
 
27.3% 37.8% 16.7% 12.2% 6.0% 
Total 162 267 165 130 76 
N=800.  Cells show the distribution of education levels by gender.  This table recodes a 13 category 
education variable for presentation purposes.  The bivariate relationship between education and gender is 
significant at the p<0.001 level. 
 
Chapter 4 analyzed print media debates, and citizens also report substantial 
variation in their levels of exposure to the mass media.  Media exposure is index variable 
averaging self-reported consumption of news on television, local and foreign radio 
stations, and newspapers.119
                                                 
119 People find out about foreign and local events from many sources: from talking to other people, from 
radio, from television, and from newspapers.  Thinking about this past week, how often did you learn about 
foreign and local events from (1) television; (2) foreign radio stations; (3) local radio stations; (4) 
newspapers?  The Cronbach’s alpha for this index meets a minimum threshold of reliability with an alpha of 
.64. 
  Chapter 3 suggested that education, media exposure, and 
political knowledge have each been used to measure information and exposure to elite 
discourse.  Indeed, education and exposure to the mass media are relatively highly 
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correlated (r=.46).  Like education, men also report higher mean levels of media 
exposure, but the substantive difference in men’s and women’s mass media consumption 
is smaller than the educational gender gap.  Like education, there is also a positive 
relationship between higher levels of media exposure and opposing a family law based on 
Shari’ah (p=.000).  Education is also highly and positively correlated with political 
knowledge, which is measured by a six-item index of knowledge questions (r= .59).120
 
  
Like education and media exposure, women also have significantly lower levels of 
political knowledge than men.  Media exposure and political knowledge are also 
significantly correlated (r=.50).  Like education and media exposure, there is a positive 
relationship between higher levels of political knowledge and opposing a family law 
based on Shari’ah (p=.000).   
There is some evidence that individuals with higher household wealth are more 
likely to oppose the law as shown in Table 5.4.  However, it is important to note that 
there is substantial opposition across all three categories of household wealth.  Household 
wealth is also positively correlated with education (r=.45), media exposure (r=.46), and 
political knowledge (r=.59). 
                                                 
120 Political knowledge is measured as the total number of correct responses out of a total of six questions.  
Individuals had to correctly identify three political figures (the UN Secretary General, the president of the 
Assemblée Nationale, and the Prime Minister).  They also had to provide the correct answer to the 
following three questions: how many terms the President of the Republic may be elected, the length of the 
term of a deputy in Assemblée Nationale, and whether an ethnic or religious group can legally create a 
political party and run candidates for political office.  The alpha for this index is .73. 
 
In this study, I rely on education as my primary measure of overall information of and exposure to public 
discourse.  There is more variation in education than in measures of media exposure and political 
knowledge.  Studies that prefer political knowledge as a measure have taken place in the US, where there 
are fewer differences between most citizens in levels of education, and where education levels are skewed 
toward the upper levels (Zaller 1992, 1990).  Moreover, my measure of political knowledge is skewed 
toward higher levels of knowledge (with a mean is 3.6 out of a total of 6), suggesting that these questions 












Oppose an Islamic Family Law 
 
39.0% 46.5% 49.4% 
Support an Islamic Family Law 
 
61.0% 53.5% 50.6% 
 354 241 166 
N=761.  Cells show the percentage of support and opposition for individuals who fall into three categories 
of household wealth, which has been recoded into thirds for presentation purposes from the original 13 
category variable.  The relationship is significant at the p<.01 level.  The lowest category (N=354) reports 
owning between zero to six items; the middle category (N=241) between seven and eight items; and the 
highest wealth category (N=166) owns between nine and thirteen items.   
 
In contrast to education and wealth, age does not appear to be associated with 
family law preferences.  Table 5.5 shows that there are no significant differences in the 
percentage of citizens who support or oppose an Islamic family law across age categories.   
 
Table 5.5 Age, by preferences for a family law based on Shari’ah 
 18-33 34-49 50+ 
Oppose an Islamic Family Law 44.9% 35.8% 19.2% 
 
Support an Islamic Family Law 
 
45.2% 34.3% 20.5% 
Total 343 266 152 
N=761.  Cells show the distribution of support and opposition by age.  Age is recoded into three categories 
for presentation purpose.  There is no significant relationship between age and family law preferences 
(p=.86).   
 
However, Table 5.6 shows that religious affiliation has an important and complex 
bivariate relationship with family law preferences.  Christians overwhelmingly expressed 
their opposition to a state family law based on Shari’ah even though it would be applied 
only to Muslims and their families.  Eighty-nine percent of Christians opposed and only 
11% said they supported such a law.  Most of the support for a family law based on 
Shari’ah comes from Senegalese Muslims, unsurprisingly.  Almost 63% said they 
supported an Islamic family law and 37% opposed.  There appear to be important 
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differences within the Muslim community, however.  Sixty five percent of those who 
identify with a Sufi order express support for the law, as compared to only 47% of those 
who do not identify with a Sufi order.  There appears to be no difference between the Sufi 
orders and supporting the law at the bivariate level. 
Table 5.6 Religious identity, by preferences for a family law based on Shari’ah 
 Membership 








35.2% 52.6% 89.1% 
Support  
 
64.9% 47.4% 10.9% 
Total 586 76 92 
N=754.  Cells show the percentage of Christians who support and oppose (N=92), of Muslims who do not 
identify with a Sufi order (N=76), and the percentage of Muslims who do identify with one of the Sufi 
orders (N=586).  The relationship between religious affiliation and family law preferences is significant at 
the p<.001 level.  
 
Christians and Muslims also appear to differ in their emotional responses and 
intensity of feelings about a family law based on Shari’ah.  Christians are substantially 
more likely to feel strongly about their opposition than are Muslims.  Of those who 
oppose the law, 74.4% of Christians strongly oppose the law and 25.6% simply oppose 
the law.  Of Muslims who oppose, 58.8% say they strongly oppose the law and 41.2% 
simply oppose the law.  Christians were also significantly more likely to report feeling 
negative emotions about the possibility that Senegal might enforce Shari’ah in its family 
law.  For example, 73% of Christians who opposed the law reported feeling anger about 
this possibility compared to 27% of Muslims who opposed the law (p=.000).  Seventy-
four percent of Christians also reported feeling fear compared to 57% of Muslims who 
opposed (p=.008).  Finally, 62% of Christians reported feeling ashamed about this 
possibility, as compared to 34% of Muslims who opposed the law (p=.000).   It would 
appear that Christians oppose the law more intensely and feel a greater threat as they 
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consider the possibility that Senegal could enact a family law that conformed to Shari’ah.  
Most Muslims who supported the law reported positive emotions: 96% reported feeling 
pride about the possibility that Senegal might enforce Shari’ah in state family law and 
82% reported feeling hopeful.   
Family size and marital status might also shape family law preference.  In 
particular, individuals who have either chosen polygamous marriages or who have prior 
experience with family law through a divorce, or those with children, may have 
significantly different preferences from other citizens or may feel more strongly about the 
law.  Five percent of Senegalese citizens in this urban sample reports being divorced, 
while approximately 39% are single, 42% are in marriages with one other spouse, and 
14% are in marriages that they describe as polygamous.  The mean number of children is 
two, but the range is broad.  Twenty percent of the sample reports having four or more 
children, while 39% of the sample reports no children.121
This brief descriptive look at the distribution of preferences shows that gender, 
religious affiliation, marital status, education, and household wealth each have a 
significant bivariate relationship with preferences for family law.  Higher levels of 
education correlate with opposing the law, and men are also more likely than women to 
  There are significant positive 
bivariate relationships between supporting an Islamic family law and being in a 
polygamous marriage (p<.001).  The average number of children is also higher for 
supporters of an Islamic family law (p<.01).  Finally, support for an Islamic family law 
and being single or divorced are negatively related (p<.05).   
                                                 
121 Education is moderately negatively correlated with having higher numbers of children (r=-.23) and 
being in a polygamous marriage (r=-.10), and there is a small but positive correlation between education 
and being single (r=.11) or divorced (r=.09).  There is no significant correlation between education and 
being in a monogamous marriage.   
95 
 
oppose the law.  I have suggested that in a multivariate setting, the gender gap in formal 
education may explain why women are more likely to support an Islamic family law.  As 
a religious minority in Senegal, Christians differ substantially from Muslims, but there 
are also significant differences between Muslims themselves.  Members of Sufi orders 
appear more likely to support the law compared to those who identify simply as Muslims.  
There appear to be no significant age differences at the bivariate level, but those with 
lower levels of household wealth are more likely to say they support the law.   
I have discussed the distribution of preferences for men and women, across levels 
of education, and for basic religious affiliation, but to what extent do individuals differ in 
terms of religious engagement, and how do preferences for family law correlate with 
levels of religious engagement?  Advocates for a personal status law attempted to 
associate their draft project with the religious authority of the Shari’ah and framed the 
law as a question of religious belief and commitment.  Moreover, they argued that the 
Family Code violated the religious beliefs of the majority of Senegalese Muslims.  There 
is, therefore, reason to believe that preferences for family law may vary to some extent by 
religious engagement. 
To measure religiosity, or what I call religious engagement in this study, I created 
an index variable of individuals’ self-reported participation in religious activities.  I argue 
here that simple participatory measures cannot capture the complex range and depth of 
religious experience and commitment, but they can capture basic differences between 
individuals and offer a rough approximation of religious commitment and 
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participation.122  The index of religious engagement used in this study includes seven 
items that ask respondents how often they perform activities such as socializing with 
friends at religious associations as well as mosque and church contexts, how often they 
participate in the activities of religious associations—including Sufi orders as well as 
religious associations such as Dahiras123
When discussing and evaluating the relationship between religious engagement 
and preferences for state family law, it is important to discuss the ways that religious 
engagement may map differently for Muslim men versus women, as well as for 
Christians and Muslims.  Indeed, the mean score of religious engagement is a value of 
three on a scale of one to five.  However, men score approximately one point higher on 
the five category religiosity variable: overall mean religious engagement for women is 
just below average (2.4) compared to slightly above average (3.5) for men (p=.000).  This 
gender difference stems from Senegalese Muslims rather than Christians.  The average 
level of religious engagement for Muslim men is 3.5 on a scale of one to five as 
 and Christian choral groups—and how often 
they participate in the general activities and prayer services of mosques and churches.  A 
final measure included respondent’s frequency of reading the Qur’an or Bible.  These 
items have a Cronbach’s alpha of .73, offering evidence that these measures are highly 
interrelated.  I recoded this index into a five category variable of quintiles of religious 
engagement, ranging from the lowest (20.3% have the lowest value of one) to the highest 
level of religious engagement (19.6% have the highest value of five).   
                                                 
122 For example, individuals who participate more in Sufi orders, in mosques, who read religious texts, and 
who socialize with members of their religious associations and orders may be more exposed to diverse 
religious messages, religious elites, and the views of other coreligionists. 
123 Creevey (1996) defines a Dahira as “associations set up to rally the followers of a brotherhood and 
perhaps raise money for a marabout.  These dahira organize religious song sessions as much as once a 
week and collect contributions from disciples after the singing.”  
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compared to 2.3 for Muslim women. 124
Table 5.7 Quintiles of religious engagement, by gender 
  Table 5.7 shows the distribution of religious 

















6.0% 16.4% 26.2% 23.3% 28.1% 
Women  
 
35.9% 23.2% 13.3% 17.2% 10.4% 
Total 163 157 160 163 157 
N=800, comprising men (416) and women (384).  Cells show the distribution of religious engagement by 
gender.  Religious engagement divides respondents into quintiles based on their responses to seven items.  
The bivariate relationship between gender and religious engagement is significant at the p<0.001 level.  
The percentages are similar when we only look at Muslim women: (Lowest=41.9%, 2=22.8%, 3=10.6%, 
4=15.6%, 5=9.1%).  
 
What accounts for these gender differences between Muslim men and women in 
religious engagement?  Previous studies have argued that Muslim men played a larger 
role in the Sufi orders than women, or more dramatically, that women were excluded 
from membership in the Sufi orders  (Cruise O'Brien 1971; Creevey 1991).  However, 
others have revised these conclusions by arguing that Muslim men’s religious practice 
simply differs in visibility from that of women (Creevey 1996; Coulon 1988; 
Buggenhagen 2001, 2009).  “Women are active Muslims, even if  their practices are 
informal, hidden, parallel, or heterodox; hence it is wrong to relegate the female Muslim 
universe to this twilight zone where it only appears to belong because of our inability to 
study it” (Coulon 1988, 115).  According to this view, women’s participation takes place 
quite vigorously in the Sufi orders but is “essentially outside conventional places of 
                                                 
124 The mean level of religious engagement for Christian men is 3.4—statistically indistinguishable from 
mean level for Muslim men, which is 3.5.  Christian women’s mean level of religious engagement is 3.2, 
not significantly different from Muslim or Christian men.   Substantively, both Christians and Muslims 
have an average a score of three on this categorical measure of religious engagement.  The overall 
difference in means for men and women stems from Muslim women’s lower than average scores. 
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worship (such as mosques).”125
Coulon focuses on participation in the Sufi orders and notes that “fundamentalist Islam” 
“recruits hardly any black African women.”  However, other studies focus on the 
importance of women in reformist Sunnite movements in urban Dakar (Augis 2002).  
Indeed, my survey evidence shows no significant difference between men and women in 
their self-reported levels of engagement in the activities of Sufi orders.
  Recent scholarship has explored the various ways that 
women do participate in religious activities.  For example, Beth Buggenhagen (2009, 
191), has argued that women play a much larger role in the life of the Sufi orders than 
previously acknowledge:   
My female interlocutors disagree, however, not only do they contribute to the 
tariqa, they further emphasize the centrality of Islam to their lives through their 
search for religious merit, or tuyaaba, which is often achieved through offerings 
of cooked food on ritual and religious occasions including pilgrimage, Tabaski 
(Eid al-Adha), Ramadan, birth, matrimonial and mortuary rituals, acts of charity 
and hospitality and ndawtal, or gifts given during the life cycle rituals.  The 
degree to which women participate in the tariqa and how their ritual practices 
during life cycle ceremonies are central to their articulation of what it is to be a 
good Muslim are under debate by Muslims in West Africa, and they are little 
reflected in the scholarly literature. 
      
126
                                                 
125 “The Islam of the brotherhoods and the marabouts has become primarily the religion of the women” 
(118).   Coulon describes women’s participation as including participation in chanting and religious 
associations such as Dahiras, visits to religious leaders (sheikhs) and shrines, religious pilgrimages to holy 
places, and the worship of female saints.  These activities amount to the search for baraka—blessing or 
grace—which “allows a break from that dichotomy of the public and private spheres” (1988, 116).  These 
are all “public” activities. 
126 To compare gender differences in Sufi orders, I averaged the three survey items pertaining to 
participating in the activities in one’s tariqa, Dahira, and socializing with friends in religious associations 
such as a Dahira.  Taking Sufi Muslims as a whole, there are no significant gender differences.  Looking 
within each brotherhood, there are also no significant gender differences for members of the Tijaniyya.  
The sample sizes of the Layene and Qadiriyya orders make gender comparisons difficult.  However, Murid 
men do report slightly higher participation levels than Murid women, which is significant at the p<.05 
level.   
  However, men 
are significantly more likely to report praying at and socializing with friends at mosques, 
as well as reading the Qur’an.  In interviews with Senegalese women, many explained to 
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me that frequent mosque attendance is not a norm for women.127  My data actually 
suggest that many women report at least some participation in the activities of mosques 
rather than no participation at all.  Women are simply less likely to appear in the highest 
level of religious engagement because men participate across a broader range of visible 
and measurable religious activities.  These differences stem from different norms 
regarding certain types of religious practices—namely mosque attendance and reading 
the Qur’an—for Muslim men and women (Bop 2005),128
As a result, I argue in this study that though women score lower than men in 
religious engagement, they should not be viewed as less “religious” than Muslim men.  
Moreover, measurement difficulties as well as gendered norms of religious practice in 
certain areas of worship may impact men’s and women’s preferences for laws based on 
Shari’ah in different ways.  I evaluate this argument more carefully in Chapter 6, where I 
analyze men’s and women’s narrative responses explaining their support and opposition 
to a family law based on Shari’ah, and in Chapter 7, where I evaluate the importance of 
religious engagement in explaining variation in family law preferences in a multivariate 
setting.  I expect that gendered norms and difficulties in measuring Muslim women’s 
 as well as from difficulties 
measuring Muslim women’s religious engagement, which has historically led to 
conclusions that women play a less central or active role in Islam.   
                                                 
127 Note that though some women suggested in interviews that gender norms against praying at the mosque 
mainly applied to younger women, I find no significant age differences for women’s reported levels of 
participation in mosques.   
128 The major gender difference between Christians and Muslims appears to exist for mosque attendance 
rather than for reading religious texts.  Christian men and women report statistically identical mean levels 
of church attendance.  However, like Muslim women, Christian women report lower levels of reading the 
Bible than Christian men.  Within this sample of urban citizens, then, the main difference between 
Christians and Muslims appears to stem from gendered norms of participation at churches versus mosques, 
as opposed to religious associations and reading religious texts.   
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religiosity will shape the magnitude of the impact of religiosity, not the direction, because 
standard measures inadequately include women in the highest levels of religiosity.129
Table 5.8 Religious engagement, by Muslims’ support for a family law based on Shari’ah 
   
For example, Table 5.8 shows levels of religious engagement by the percentage of 
men and women who say they support a family law based on Shari’ah.  The percentage 
of men who report supporting the law increases substantially as men report higher levels 
of religious engagement.  However, the relationship is less dramatic for women, most 
likely because standard measures of religious engagement capture variation in men’s 
religious engagement more accurately than women’s.  In Chapter 7, I take up this 
question of the role of religious engagement in shaping men’s and women’s family law 

















30.0% 33.9% 56.8% 63.4% 69.4% 
Women  
 
62.9% 66.7% 75.0% 77.6% 86.2% 
Total 147 134 120 131 137 
N=761.  Cells show the percentage of men and women within each category of religious engagement who 
express support for a state family law based on Shari’ah.  
 
Overall, these bivariate results are informative because they show great diversity 
between Senegalese men and women in their frequency of participating in religious 
activities.  They are also informative because they highlight the importance of cautiously 
evaluating the relationship between religious commitment and preferences for Muslim 
men and women depending on local norms of religious practice.  I use the term religious 
                                                 
129 Note that some religiosity survey items attempt to capture religious beliefs, such as belief in God, 
religion, and in heaven, as in the World Values Survey which attempts to compare cross-nationally.  
However, these items show little variation within Muslim contexts and they are less useful indicators of 
differences in religious engagement between Muslims.  
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engagement interchangeably with religiosity to make a subtle point that measures of 
religiosity also capture norms of participation—rather than simply religious commitment 
and piety—which may vary by demographic groups and across national and religious 
contexts.  Individuals who score lower on religiosity measures may indeed be less 
committed to certain type of religious practice, but societal norms and measurement 
strategies that privilege some types of practices over others also explain some of the 
individual variation in religiosity.   
 How is religious engagement related to the other demographic variables 
previously discussed?  The most notable significant negative correlations are between 
being female (r=-.38) and being divorced (r=-.07).  Religious engagement is significantly 
and positively correlated with media exposure (r=.14), political knowledge (r=.07) and 
being single (r=.09).  Religious engagement is not significantly correlated with education, 
household wealth, age, or having higher numbers of children.  This suggests that 
Senegalese citizens across levels of education are similarly religiously engaged.   
 
Frames in Media Discourse 
In addition to framing family law as a question of religious authority and belief, 
Chapter 4 argued that the issue of family law reform was framed as a question of 
secularism.  Moreover, opponents of an Islamic family law argued that secularism was 
associated with legal equality, while advocates argued for greater pluralism so that 
different laws might apply to citizens of different religions.  In Chapter 2, I also discussed 
the important discourse of secularism, equality, and mutual respect for all religions and 
suggested that I suggested were broadly held across the population.  In the final section of 
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this paper, I briefly discuss the distribution of preferences for secularism and principle of 
legal equality through uniformity in law.  To measure support for a secular state, 
individuals were provided with a minimal definition and asked the following question:  
Do you believe that Senegal should be a secular country, where there is no legal or 
official relationship between religion and the state?130
                                                 
130 Respondents replied to a four category response option ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
  Christians overwhelmingly said 
they strongly supported the secular state (80.9%), while just over half of Muslims 
strongly support a secular state (53.7%).  Support for a secular state and for an Islamic 
family law are also significantly and negatively correlated (r=-.24).  At a bivariate level, 
individuals with higher levels of religious engagement appear more likely to oppose a 
secular state, while individuals will higher levels of education are more likely to support 
secularism.  Table 5.9 shows the distribution of religious engagement for Muslim citizens 
by a recoded binary variable of support for or opposition to a secular state.  Indeed, while 
the differences are not large at lower levels of religious engagement, individuals with 
higher levels of religious engagement are more likely to oppose the secular state 
(p=.000).  Sixty-six percent of those with the highest level of religious engagement 
support a secular state, compared to 83% of those in the lowest level of religious 
engagement.  Despite this relationship between opposing secularism at higher levels of 
religiosity, it is critical to note the strong levels of support for political secularism across 
all levels of religious engagement.  There is clearly widespread support for the principle 


























83.1% 83.7% 85.3% 77.4% 65.9% 
Total 154 135 122 133 138 
N=682.  Cells show the percentage of individuals within each category of religious engagement who 
express support and opposition to a secular state. This relationship is significant at the p<.001 level 
(p=.000) 
 
Table 5.10 shows the relationship that exists between education and support for a secular 
state.  Again, though individuals who oppose secularism are more likely to have lower 
levels of education, it is clear that support for a secular state is widespread from the least 
to the most educated urban Senegalese citizens.  Ninety percent of those with the highest 
level of education support a secular state, compared to 68% of those with no formal 
education.   
Table 5.10 Education for Muslims, by opposition to and support for a secular state 



















67.6% 75.4% 85.1% 87.6% 90.3% 
Total 145 228 134 113 62 
N=682.  Cells show the percentage of individuals within each category of education who express support 
and opposition to a secular state.  The bivariate relationship is significant at the p<0.001 level (p=.000). 
 
A similar relationship exists between preferences for Islamic family law and 




                                                 
131 Respondents were asked: Now, I’m going to read you two opposing statements, and imagine a series of 
numbers from 1 to 8. Position 1 says that Senegal should have the same laws and rights for all its citizens 
no matter what their religious beliefs and practices.  Position 8 says that Senegal should have different laws 
and rights for citizens of different religions, so that some laws would apply only to Muslims and other laws 
would apply only to Christians.  On a scale from 1 to 8, please tell me your view on this question, or you 
can pick a position in between. 
  Recoding this eight category variable into a binary 
variable of support for uniform versus different laws for citizens of different religions, 
Christians overwhelmingly said they preferred one set of laws and rights (93.6%).  The 
majority of Muslims also preferred the principle of uniform laws and rights for all 
citizens (69.4%), though Senegalese Muslims seem to disagree more on this question.  
Like support for a secular state, individuals with higher levels of religious engagement 
and lower levels of education appear more likely to prefer pluralism in laws and rights 
than uniform laws and rights.  Table 5.11 shows the distribution of religious engagement 
for Muslim citizens by a recoded binary variable of support for the principle of having 
one set of laws and rights for all citizens.  Again, higher levels of religious engagement 
are associated preferring different laws and rights for different citizens (p=.02).  
However, there is clearly strong support for the principle of legal uniformity across all 
levels of religiosity, suggesting that more citizens may support the idea of legal equality 



















Different laws and 
rights 
 
23.2% 27.9% 26.2% 37.0% 38.0% 
Same laws and 
rights  
 
76.8% 72.1% 73.8% 63.0% 62.0% 
Total 155 136 122 135 137 
N=685.  Cells show the percentage of individuals within each category of religious engagement who 
express support for uniform versus different laws and rights for all citizens. This relationship is significant 
at the p<.05 level (p=.02) 
 
Similarly, there is a strong and positive association between having higher levels of 
education and preferring the principle of legal uniformity for all citizens.  Eighty percent 
of those with a university education support the principle of legal uniformity compared to 
53% of those with no formal education.  However, a majority from the lowest to the 
highest levels of education support the principle of legal equality through uniformity. 
Table 5.12 Education for Muslims, by support for uniformity in laws and rights for all citizens 















46.6% 33.2% 23.7% 17.7% 19.4% 
Same laws and 
rights  
 
53.4% 66.8% 76.3% 82.3% 80.6% 
Total 146 229 135 113 62 
N=685.  Cells show the percentage of individuals within each category of education who express support 
for uniform versus different laws and rights for all citizens.  The bivariate relationship is significant at the 
p<0.001 level (p=.000). 
 
These distributions suggest several relationships.  First, support for a secular state and for 
the principle of legal uniformity are both correlated with opposing an Islamic family law.  
Moreover, higher levels of religious engagement appear to correlate with opposition to 
the secular state and with a preference for different laws for citizens of different 
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religions.  Education, on the other hand, is positively correlated with preferences for a 
secular state and for the principle of one set of laws and rights for all citizens.  However, 
there is widespread support for secularism and the principle of legal uniformity across all 
levels of religious engagement and education.  This suggests that many citizens who 
support Islamic family law also support secularism and legal equality through uniformity 
in laws and rights.   
 
Conclusion: Who supports and opposes an Islamic family law? 
This Chapter described the opinion data used in this study as well as the bivariate 
relationships between key demographic variables and preferences for a state family law 
based on Shari’ah.  So far, Senegalese women express higher levels of support for an 
Islamic family law than men.  Muslims who report higher levels of religious engagement 
are also significantly more likely to support the law, while individuals with higher levels 
of education are more likely to oppose the law.  Education and religious engagement 
appear to push individuals in opposite directions.   
Gender plays a complex but important role along with education and religiosity.  
Women are more likely to be less educated and to report lower levels of religious 
engagement than men.  I argued that gender differences in religious engagement stem 
from well-known difficulties in capturing Muslim women’s religious participation, but 
also from gendered norms of practice at mosques.  This combination of lower religious 
engagement and education means that though education may push citizens to oppose the 
law, and religious engagement pushes citizens to support it, women’s preferences and 
high levels of support may be harder to explain given their underrepresentation in the 
ranks of the highly educated and the highly religiously engaged. 
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Family law preferences do not appear to be related to generational differences, but 
are correlated with exposure to the mass media, political knowledge, and household 
wealth at the bivariate level.  Most Senegalese Christians express opposition, and 
Muslims who do not identify with a Sufi order are also more likely to say they oppose 
such a law than are members of Sufi orders.  Finally, being single or divorced correlates 
negatively with support for an Islamic family law, whereas being in a polygamous 
marriage or having more children correlates positively with support for the law.   
In the next chapter, I analyze the extent to which the major frames in elite 
discourse about Senegalese family law make their way into citizens’ own narratives.  In 
Chapter 7, I evaluate the key demographic differences to address the question of who 
supports and who opposes a state family law based on Shari’ah in a multivariate setting, 
while focusing on the key relationships between gender, education, and religious 




Chapter 6  
Popular Frames:  How Citizens Make Sense of the Islamic Family Law Debate 
 
 As opinion leaders debated Senegal’s family law in the mass media, the debate 
focused on the appropriateness of a law based on Shari’ah that would apply only to 
Muslims in a secular state.  Advocates on both sides of the debate constructed competing 
frames in efforts to persuade the public to take sides for or against a state family law 
based on Shari’ah.  In this Chapter, I analyze the short-answer narratives that citizens 
themselves articulated as they justified and explained their preferences for and against a 
family law that would conform to Shari’ah.  By coding citizen narratives, I am able to 
explore the ways that citizens make sense of debates over the role of Shari’ah as a source 
of state family law in a secular state.  From this data, I am then able to record and 
quantify the range of salient considerations and values that men and women see as 
important as they form their preferences.  I am also able to capture the complicated and 
diverse ways that ordinary men and women negotiate and construct meaning from the 
various frames they may be exposed to throughout these public debates.  Gamson (1992) 
noted that in addition to media discourse, individuals rely on personal experience and 
popular culture as they form opinions.  However, media discourse is an important source 




 My aim in this chapter, then, is twofold.  First, I show the ways that citizens made 
sense of this question about family law and the most important considerations they 
mentioned as they discussed family law.132
I also find that as men and women contemplate Shari’ah as a source of law, they 
articulate their views in terms of what Laura Stoker calls value judgments.  They use the 
“language of morality,” or what they consider good or right, versus what is bad or wrong 
  Second, I show that many of the complicated 
messages that opinion leaders constructed and disseminated in media discourse do indeed 
appear in popular narratives.  Media discourse on family law does shape popular opinion 
as many individuals grapple with the ideas and values found in this elite discourse.  
However, it also shows that elites mobilized ideas that are broadly held across urban 
Dakar, such as secularism, legal equality, and religious predispositions.     
By extensively coding and analyzing citizens’ own voices, I find that debates 
about family law appear to be about the larger principle of enacting a state law that 
claims to conform to Shari’ah.  For many, the religious authority of the Shari’ah is the 
primary reason to support any law that claims to faithfully apply Shari’ah.  Some believe 
that applying Shari’ah will have greater positive benefits for society and for the nation.  
For others, this debate is precisely about the meaning and appropriateness of Senegalese 
secularism and the proper relationship between religion and state.  My evidence 
challenges the assumption that most Muslims see family law as merely a personal and 
private matter of religious belief.  In fact, this issue also represents a political space 
where citizens demand rights.  Others view family law as the foundation of national unity 
and peace between religious communities. 
                                                 
132 Chong and Druckman (2007, 101) describe such considerations as individual “frames in thought,” or 
what an individual “believes to be the most salient aspect of an issue. 
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(2001, 433-434).  As individuals make value judgments, they often emphasize “the 
morally relevant characteristics of the policy, actor or action being judged.”  The question 
of Shari’ah as a source of state law, as well as the question of the secularism of the state, 
both entail value judgments about the best way to organize society.  In Chapter 4, I 
argued that elites framed family law as competition over broad values like religious 
authority, secularism, and equality.  In this chapter, I analyze some of the ways that 
ordinary men and women themselves make value judgments.  I conclude the chapter by 
arguing that though many citizens emphasize religious arguments and values or secular 
arguments or values, a substantial number of citizens’ preferences about Shari’ah and 
secularism are not mutually exclusive.   
 
Explaining Support and Opposition: The Importance of Value Frames and 
Judgments in Citizen Narratives 
 
  What justifications do citizens themselves offer for supporting or opposing a 
state family law based on Shari’ah?  After offering a binary response of support or 
opposition to the question of reforming the Family Code and enacting a family law based 
on Shari’ah, interviewers asked respondents why they felt this way.  As men and women 
discussed their preferences, interviewers wrote their responses word-for-word and 
encouraged them to offer as many explanations and ideas as they could.  These responses 
were then entered into a database and independent coders applied a detailed coding 
scheme capture each idea or statement that the respondent mentioned.133
                                                 
133 Please contact the author for additional details on the coding framework used to create these results.  
This coding scheme was created by first reading through each response in order to capture the complete 
range of themes and individual statements respondents offered.  Coders then categorized statements under 
the major themes.  Then, independent coders read each response individually and checked as many codes 
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Table 6.1 shows the number of items mentioned by respondents.  The mean 
number of considerations individuals expressed was 2.3.  There is no significant 
difference between supporters and opponents of an Islamic family law in the mean 
number of reasons offered.   
Table 6.1 Number of considerations mentioned by respondents in open-ended narratives 
Response 
Counts 
Oppose family law 
based on Shari’ah 
Support family law 
based on Shari’ah 
TOTAL 
One direction 91.3% 94.4% 708 (93%) 
Both directions 8.7% 5.6% 53 (7%) 
 
0 .9% .7% .8% 
1 30.4% 32.8% 31.8% 
2 26.5% 34.0% 30.7% 
3 22.9% 16.2% 19.1% 
4 8.7% 8.4% 8.6% 
5+ 10.5% 8.0% 9.1% 
Mean 2.4 2.2 2.3 
N                     332                     427                 759 
 
However, quite a few respondents give more than three justifications as they discuss their 
preferences: almost 37%.  A substantial number of men and women have much to say as 
they think about the issues at stake in family law reform.  More educated and more 
religiously engaged citizens tend to offer more responses.  Though the difference is 
substantively small, men offer significantly more responses than women (2.5 versus 2.1).  
Christians also offer fewer responses than Muslims, on average (1.9 versus 2.3).  As 
Table 6.1 also shows, most citizens offer considerations that directly support their 
preference rather than mentioning reasons why they might also support the other side.  
For example, if they say they oppose a family law based on Shari’ah, they only offer 
reasons why they oppose such a law.  However, while we only asked respondents to 
explain their preferences, almost 9% of those who oppose and 6% of those who support 
                                                                                                                                                 




mention mixed considerations, meaning that they articulate reasons to support the other 
side as well.  Individuals who offer mixed responses tend to have higher levels of 
education than those who respond in only one direction.  This evidence indicates that at 
least some citizens are aware of and weigh considerations on both sides of the issue as 
they think about Shari’ah as a source of state law.        
Table 6.2 shows the most common explanations men and women offer to justify 
their support for and opposition to a state family law based on Shari’ah.  For men and 
women who support the law, the most frequently expressed reasons include the notion 
that as a Muslim, or as an observant Muslim, they feel a religious obligation to support 
such a law (36.5%).  Many men and women also offer additional religious interpretations 
and arguments to express their support (29.2%).  Others express a desire to improve 
Islamic education for Senegalese Muslims or want to simply develop or advance Islam in 
the country (21.7%).  Some articulate a more general notion that it would be good for the 
country to enact a law based on Shari’ah (18.7%), while others noted that social ills (e.g., 
crime and theft) would be reduced were this law enforced (13.5%).  About 10% of 
respondents mention concerns about legal pluralism, while another 7% mention concerns 
over moral and Islamic values.  A modest 7% of respondents mention the idea of the will 




Table 6.2 Why citizens say they support or oppose a family law based on Shari’ah 
Support a state family law 





Oppose a state family law 





1. Religious obligation, 
Identity 
36.5% 1. Secularism: Senegal 
has a secular state, this 
contradicts secularism  
30.7% 
2. Religious arguments: 
Shari’ah is divine law, 
Divine will, & others  
29.2% 2. Peace & Stability: 
Leave things as they are, 
Will cause problems, 
threaten peace  
29.2% 
3. Advance Islam & 
Education: Improve 
education about and 
knowledge of Islam 
21.7% 3. Respect All Religions, 
Tolerance: more than 
one religion, Senegal 
not a Muslim country  
28.0% 
4. Good for the Country: 
Will bring good , positive 
things 
18.7% 4. Legal System, 
Uniformity & 
Equality: one law for 
all citizens, equality, 
republican, prefer the 
current code 
20.8% 
5. Crime and Punishment: 
Will reduce crime, theft, 
violence 
13.5% 5. Shari’ah Too Severe, 
Bad for the Country 
18.4% 
6. Legal System, Equality 
and Justice:  Muslims 
should have different 
laws 
9.8% 6. Culture & Modernity:  




7. Morality and Culture: 
Protect our moral values, 
Islamic and/or African 
values 
8.9% 7. Religious Freedom: 
cannot impose Shari’ah 
on people, religion is a 
private affair  
12.4% 
8. Muslim Country: 
Muslims are the majority  
7.0% 8. Religious Arguments: 
let God have the final 
judgment, & others 
8.7% 
9. Peace & Stability: will 
maintain peace, reduce 
problems  
6.1% 9. Women’s Rights  4.5% 
10. Women’s Behavior, 
Dress, and Rights 
5.1% 10. Democracy 3.0% 
11. Family, Marriage, 
Divorce 
4.9% 11. Family, Marriage, 
Divorce 
2.4% 
    
N=429 for Support, N=332 for Oppose.  Most men and women offered at least one reason for their support 




Men and women who oppose the law also offer a diverse array of considerations as well.  
The most frequent responses include support for the secular state (30.7%), a concern over 
national unity and peace (29.2%), and religious tolerance (28%).  Others articulate a 
desire to treat all citizens equally under the same laws (20.8%).  Finally, some express 
concern or dislike over the content of Shari’ah and feel that a law based on Shari’ah 
would not be good for the country (18.4%).  Others believe that Senegalese culture and 
modernity render the application of a law based on Shari’ah impossible (17%).  Twelve 
percent argue against such a law on the grounds of religious freedom, while almost 9% 
offer specific religious arguments against a Muslim personal law. 
 
Support for a state family law based on Shari’ah 
 
Statements of religious identity or obligation are the most frequent considerations 
men and women offer as they discuss why they support a family law based on Shari’ah.  
These types of statements range from proclaiming their support because they are Muslim 
or statements of devotion to Islam.  Others note that it is the duty or obligation of all 
Muslims to support such a law and articulate a desire to “observe Islam.”  For these 
individuals, supporting such a law is a question of religious belief and identity.  For 
example, a young 23-year-old male with average religious engagement134
                                                 
134 Throughout this analysis, I use my measure of quintiles of religious engagement discussed in Chapter 5, 
which averages individuals’ frequency of participation in religious associations, Sufi orders, mosques, 
reading religious texts, and socializing at religious associations and mosque contexts.  “Average” religious 
engagement means respondents score a 3, or the middle quintile, on the scale from 1 to 5.  The “lowest” 
religious engagement means respondents fall in the bottom 20%.  “Below average” means a scale of 2 out 
of 5, and “above average” means 4 out of 5.  The “highest religious engagement” means they fall in the top 
20% of religious engagement.  
 and a complete 
primary school education expressed: “All good Muslims have to support the Shari’ah 
because it’s the root of our faith.”  CIRCOFS argued that the Family Code violated the 
very religious beliefs of Senegalese Muslims because it did not conform to Shari’ah 
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principles.  Many ordinary men and women also seem to view such a law as a question of 
religious belief and practice, as suggested by these expressions of religious identity and 
obligation.  For example, this young 22-year-old university educated woman who reports 
the lowest levels of religious engagement specifically views the issue as one of religious 
beliefs: “It’s a great idea to enforce Shari’ah in the family law, especially considering our 
religious beliefs.”  For some, then, ensuring that a state law conforms to Shari’ah is a 
simple question of observing Islam.   
Despite men’s and women’s differences in religious engagement discussed in 
Chapter 5—using standard measures of participation—there are no such gender 
differences when we look at citizens’ own voices.  Men and women are equally likely to 
discuss their preferences in terms of religious identity and obligation.  Among those who 
support the law, individuals across the levels of religious engagement and education are 
as likely to mention identity and obligation as a salient consideration. Notions of religious 
identity and obligation appear to be widely held and articulated across gender, education, 
and religious engagement.  As one 28-year-old, women with a high school education 
noted: “Muslims must refer to the Shari’ah, so we must support the Shari’ah in the 
Family Code.  People have to think of Islam, we have to remember God to be pious and 
to follow his path.”  This woman reported the lowest levels of religious engagement, with 
a score of one out of five; yet clearly, her response suggests that religious considerations 
are critical to her support of a state family law based on Shari’ah.     
CIRCOFS emphasized the religious authority of the Shari’ah as they explained 
why the current Family Code violated Muslims’ core beliefs.  In so doing, they attempted 
to legitimize their law by invoking this authority.  My data shows evidence that citizens 
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who support such a law do so, in large part, because of this claim to religious authority.  
Though the debate in Senegal and the survey question itself asks about family law, most 
citizens’ respond with broad religious justifications for why laws, generally, should 
conform to Shari’ah.  For example, as men and women discussed their support, 29% 
offered detailed religious arguments that highlighted the religious authority of the 
Shari’ah and the primacy of divine law.  These religious arguments capture a broader 
range of detailed religious considerations besides simple statements of identity and 
obligation.135
Table 6.3 Religious arguments offered by supporters of an Islamic family law 
   
Table 6.3 shows the range of religious arguments individuals invoke as they 
explain their support. The most frequent religious argument included a direct reference to 
Shari’ah being the will of God, or divine law or truth.  Forty respondents made direct 
reference to the Qur’an as a source of authority, the Prophet, the Sunnah of the Prophet, 
or the idea that Islam provides clear laws and comprehensive guidance.  Finally, a small 
percentage express allegiance to their religious leaders and say that they will follow their 
guidance.   
 Frequency 
Refers to Shari’ah as God’s Will, Divine Law, Divine Truth 85 (68%) 
Other religious arguments: sources of authority 40 (32%) 
Refers to Qur’an as the source of law / authority 37.5% 
Refers to the Prophet as the direct source of authority & laws 32.5% 
Refers to Islam as providing laws and guidance 17.5% 
Refers to Sunnah of the Prophet 10.0% 
I’ll support what my religious leader says 2.5% 
 N=125 
N=125.  Cells show the distribution of coded narrative responses for men and women who supported a 
family law based on Shari’ah and made a religious argument justifying their support.    
 
                                                 
135 Thirty percent of those who make religious arguments also reference identity or obligation, but 70% of 
those who make religious arguments articulate a separate religious argument.   
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Women are no less likely than men to offer religious arguments to explain why 
they support the law.  There is also no significant difference in religious engagement for 
individuals who offer religious arguments as compared to those who do not.  This finding 
is important because women tend to score lower than men on standard measures of 
religious engagement.  Yet when we look at women’s own voices, they appear no less 
likely than men to articulate strong religious beliefs and preferences.  For example, a 32-
year-old woman with less than average religious engagement and no formal education 
expressed:  “Shari’ah is written in the Qur’an and I approve of everything that God has 
commanded us to do in the Qur’an.”  Another woman with no education, who was 51-
year-old and had above average religious engagement explains her support “because I’m 
Muslim and God recommended everything in the Holy Qur’an.  I have to support this.”  
Similarly, a 40-year-old male with a high school diploma who reports above average 
religious engagement argues for a more comprehensive turning to Shari’ah: “The Qur’an 
is the word of God, it’s the truth.  It regulates everything and we should decide 
everything according to its rules.”  These responses not only refer to the Qur’an as a 
source of law and religious authority, but express a general inclination to turn to the 
Shari’ah as a source of law.  These individuals express a larger desire for laws to conform 
to Shari’ah rather than limiting their views solely to family law.  Individuals who offer 
religious arguments have lower average levels of education, however, compared to those 
who offer other reasons justifying their support (p=.009).   
Others express their support for any law as long as it conforms to the Shari’ah.  
For example, a 36-year-old woman who has attended some primary school and reports 
the lowest level of religious engagement expresses that she would support the law “as 
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long as it’s good and it agrees with the Qur’an.”  Similarly, a 29-year-old man with a 
high school diploma and average religious engagement also stated conditional support for 
any law that is based on the appropriate religious sources:  “I support it if it’s based on 
Islamic principles and the Sunnah of the Prophet, peace be upon him.”  A 39-year-old 
man with a college diploma, who reports the highest level of religious engagement, 
makes a similar, if more detailed, argument:  “God created the Shari’ah, and the Shari’ah 
is found in the Qur’an and the Sunnah.  It’s Islamic law, a Muslim’s law.  It will provide 
for mutual solidarity between people.”  There is broad support for the general idea of 
state laws conforming to Shari’ah among many of these urban citizens.   
The frequency of these kinds of religious arguments suggests that many view 
Islamic law as a clearly identifiable source of state law that could be codified into 
legislation.  As this 39-year-old women with a high school diploma and slightly below 
average religious engagement expresses: “Shari’ah is already written and outlined in the 
Qur’an.  It’s a violation of Islamic law not to follow it.”  This type of response supports 
Brown’s (1997a, 371) discussion of the transformation of popular notions of the Shari’ah 
through colonial legal reforms:  
The Islamic Shari’ah, understood no longer as connected to specific institutions and 
practices, but instead as a set of identifiable rules, has become the most widely 
accepted indicator of the degree to which a society and political system are Islamic.  
Departures from clear Shari’ah-based law are often held to render a social or political 
system both illegitimate and immoral.  …Once Shari’ah has been recast as a set of 
identifiable rules, it becomes difficult to argue that those rules can be violated without 
abandoning Islam.  Thus, there is little direct challenge to the idea that positive 
legislation must be brought into accordance with Shari’ah rules.   
           
For many men and women across education levels and religious engagement, support for 
an Islamic family law stems from a larger idea of religious obligation, identity, and the 
religious authority of the Shari’ah.  By referring to the Qur’an and Sunnah, as well as to 
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God’s will, many appear to view the Shari’ah as a set of identifiable rules that should be 
enforced as state law.  These responses show the broad support base for the principle of 
Shari’ah as state law as well as the likely success that framing any law as conforming to 
Shari’ah will have among certain citizens.  If a law such as the Family Code is said to 
violate Islamic principles, it would be difficult for some citizens to abandon the religious 
authority of the Shari’ah and its clearly articulated guidance.  Indeed, much of the media 
debate did not delve into details on family law and CIRCOFS’ draft law, but instead 
debated general principles behind different laws, including framing the Muslim personal 
law as “the application of Shari’ah.”  Many ordinary citizens’ responses reflect this 
general desire for Shari’ah as the source of law rather than specific arguments for any one 
interpretation.   
Another type of response—offered by almost 22%—tends to view such a law as 
part of a larger goal of advancing Islam and further developing Islamic education and 
knowledge in the country.  These responses include ideas that through further 
development of Islam and improving knowledge of Islam, Muslims will achieve a better 
practice of their religion.  A 57-year-old woman with less than average religious 
engagement and a middle school education argues: “This would be better for the country.  
It would help people to be fair with one another, and it would develop Islam here in 
Senegal.”  A 48-year-old woman who has completed high school and reports above 
average religious engagement argues: “There will be more morality if we will apply the 
Shari’ah.  If we apply the Shari’ah, children will better understand what they should and 
shouldn’t do.  Shari’ah is the heart of every Muslim’s education.  We need to immerse 
ourselves in the Shari’ah so we can educate our kids.”  One 31-year-old man with the 
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highest level of religious engagement and some high school argues:  “Our punishments 
aren’t sufficient in this country, we need to turn to Islamic law.  We have to put religion 
first so that we can practice Islam more completely.”  Another 19% mention more 
general notions that enacting such a law in Senegal would be good for the nation and 
would results in positive benefits for society.  For these latter types of responses, citizens 
tend to articulate a simple value judgment that this is a good thing to do, or is the right 
thing for the country.  There are no significant differences in education or religious 
engagement for individuals who express such considerations.  Women are, again, as 
likely as men to want to develop and advance Islam and improve knowledge of Islam.   
In the eyes of some men and women—roughly 9%—a law based on Shari’ah will 
help to protect Senegal’s cultural values and will encourage morality.  For example, a 
young 19-year-old male who attended Qur’anic school and reports average religious 
engagement remarks: “Islam is a religion of peace and Senegal is a peaceful country.  
And if people would turn more toward religion, all of this bad behavior in society these 
days would stop.  I think a lot of these negative things would stop if we turn to our 
religion more.”  A 25-year-old man with average religious engagement and some high 
school focuses on specific ideas of moral behavior:  “This would help regulate our social 
lives and would reduce things like violence, homosexuality, and a lot of sexual 
promiscuity.” 
 Despite clear arguments for legal pluralism by advocates for an Islamic family 
law, few citizens who support such a law mention considerations of having different laws 
for different religions as compared to religious arguments.  Almost 10% of respondents 
do discuss this precise argument and mention ideas of equality and justice through a 
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system of personal laws rather than a unified law.  Men and women are as likely to 
mention considerations about the legal system, but a key finding is that citizens who 
mention specific considerations about the legal system have higher mean levels of 
education than those supporters who do not (p=.02).  Moreover, they have higher mean 
levels of religious engagement than those supporters who do not mention such 
considerations (p=.02).   I argue that this difference in education suggests a greater 
awareness of elite debates about the personal status law.  These individuals demonstrate 
awareness that the debate entailed issues of legal pluralism versus uniformity.  Their 
higher religious engagement may explain why they support different laws for different 
religions, but their higher education explains why they are aware of this aspect of the 
debate.   
For example, one 44-year-old man with a university diploma and who reports the 
highest levels of religious engagement explains his support as follows:  “Above all, I’m a 
Muslim.  We have to support what’s in the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet.  The state is 
secular, but we should let people practice Islamic traditions like marriage, death, all the 
personal status issues.  Each religious community—both Christians and Muslims—
should apply its own religious law.”  Similarly a 32-year-old woman with some high 
school education and the highest religious engagement mentions simply that “Each 
individual should be judged according to his or her religion.”  More educated individuals 
are most likely to mention this idea of legal pluralism as linked to religious freedom and 
different laws for different religions. 
CIRCOFS also attempted to frame the debate as a question of the will of the 
Muslim majority.  Indeed, a small percentage of citizens mention Senegal’s status as a 
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majority-Muslim country.  Men and women are equally likely to mention the idea of 
majority rule or of Senegal as a Muslim country.  As with the specific frame of legal 
pluralism, these individuals have significantly higher mean levels of education (p=.000).  
As this 62-year-old man with a primary school education and above average religious 
engagement explains:  “Muslims are the majority, we make up 95% of this country.  We 
depend on what the Qur’an says and we must apply Shari’ah if we are truly good 
Muslims.  To do otherwise is to violate God’s law.”  A 27-year-old woman with a high 
school diploma and below average religious engagement notes: “I support it because 
we’re the majority.  The judgment of the Shari’ah is more certain—Islam is our religion 
and our reference.  I support anything that helps us to know Islam better.  I completely 
agree.”  Similarly, a young 21-year-old man with average religious engagement and some 
high school education argues: “because Senegal is a Muslim country, the majority is 
Muslim.  I think this law will reduce a lot of bad things.  It would improve our lives as 
Muslims.”    
 Finally, while media debates mention the rights of women, I argue that this issue 
was less salient to this most recent debate on family law.  Most individuals discuss their 
support for the law as a question of the larger principle of whether Senegal’s state law 
should conform to Shari’ah principles, rather than mention women.  However, a small 
proportion of individuals do specifically discuss issues of women and the family.  Like 
the frame of legal pluralism and the principle of majority rule, men and women for whom 
specific issues of women’s rights and the family are salient tend to have higher average 
levels of education (p=.000).  I suggest that their higher levels of education indicate 
greater awareness that family and women’s rights are specifically implicated in this 
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debate.  Note that there is no significant difference in levels of religious engagement or 
gender for individuals who mention women’s issues.   
Many such responses tend to focus on women’s dress and behavior as well as 
ideas of family structure, marriage, and divorce.  One young 22-year-old woman with 
above average religious engagement and an incomplete university education explains:  “It 
would be good for us to apply Shari’ah.  This would help girls to dress more modestly 
and to stop copying European styles.  If we enforce Shari’ah, women will be better 
educated and will have closer relationships with God.”  A 36-year-old woman with less 
than average religious engagement a university degree argues: “Because of what we see 
today with women’s dress.  Girls are adopting European dress and behavior, which isn’t 
right.”  Some specifically discuss women wearing a head covering.     
Others focus on Islamic education for women and within families.  According to a 
37-year-old woman with some college education and the lowest religious engagement: “I 
support this because it will help us to apply Shari’ah in Muslim families, especially as we 
raise our children.”  Another 38-year-old woman with a high school diploma and less 
than average religious engagement expresses her support in terms of women’s education: 
“Enforcing Shari’ah will help us provide a better education for girls.  Also, it will help to 
avoid pre-marital pregnancies, prostitution, and juvenile delinquency.”  Other women 
express a desire to simply improve their knowledge of Islam.  A 38-year-old with a 
primary school education and less than average religious engagement argues: “this will 
allow women to know their religion better.”   
Men are also concerned with women’s dress and education.  A 26-year-old man 
with some primary school education and the highest religious engagement states: “If the 
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Shari’ah is enforced, women will dress more modestly and will be more interested in 
religion, especially reading the Qur’an and getting close to God.”  Men who mention 
family issues tend to be more concerned about their marital situation, however.   A 47-
year-old man with a high school diploma and above average religious engagement 
explains: “Our laws used to agree with the Shari’ah.  If we could go back, we could 
resolve a lot of problems.  With the Shari’ah there would be fewer divorces.”  A 31-year-
old man with above average religious engagement and a university diploma argues: 
“Since colonization, the base of the family has been dislocated, and religion helps us to 
redevelop family relations.  I think that hierarchy within the family, respect, and proper 
behavior holds up society.  Enforcing Shari’ah doesn’t mean ending individual liberties.”  
Knowing details about the family code is not the exclusive terrain of the highly educated, 
however.  A 66-year-old man who completed primary school and reports the highest 
religious engagement says: “I support it because there are a lot of things we need to 
revisit in the Family Code.  For example in Senegal there are so many rights—rights of 
children and rights of women.  And there are a lot of divorces.  All of this is because of 
the Family Code.  I hope it’s better with Shari’ah.”   
 As these responses from a broad cross-section of urban Muslims shows, men and 
women contemplate a wide variety of considerations as they think about whether or not 
state family law should conform to Shari’ah.  As I described in Chapter 5, the survey 
question wording intentionally avoided highlighting any of the major frames in the debate 
over family law.  Yet many of the key themes of the elite debate appear in citizens’ 
statements of support: the religious authority of the Shari’ah, the importance of religious 
belief, as well as the principle of legal pluralism, Senegal as a Muslim country, and issues 
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of women and family structure.  Other desires include widely held ideas of religious 
identity and obligation, and a desire to advance and develop Islam and Islamic education.  
Most of these reasons are broadly distributed across levels of education and religious 
engagement.  However, those with higher average levels of education more frequently 
mention the key issues found in media debates—namely legal pluralism, the principle of 
majority rule, and specific ideas of women and the family.  I have suggested that citizens 
who mention these types of frames are more likely to do so elite discourse framed which 
issues are at stake.  I now turn to a deeper investigation of the reasons ordinary men and 
women oppose a state family law based on Shari’ah.   
 
Opposition to a state family law based on Shari’ah 
 
Table 6.2 shows that almost 31% of respondents who opposed the law explicitly 
mentioned the secular state or the principles of secularism (état laïc or laïcité), as among 
their primary reasons for opposing the law.  These narratives offer evidence that framing 
family law as a question of the secularism of the state resonates with many citizens and 
has shaped popular preferences.  In what ways do citizens understand secularism to be at 
odds with a state family law based on Shari’ah?  In Table 6.4, I delve deeper into how 
ordinary men and women discuss secularism by further coding each response that 





Table 6.4 Meanings of secularism for opponents of an Islamic family law 
 Frequency 
Institutional separation: A secular state can’t enforce religious laws and  
can’t privilege any religion 
25.1% 
Religious diversity: Secularism manages religious diversity and toleration  
in Senegal 
21.6% 
Secular culture: Secularism is part of our culture, values secularism in and  
of itself  
18.0% 
Freedom of religion: Secularism associated with freedom of religion, not  
imposing one interpretation on Muslims or members of any other religion 
16.8% 
Legal equality: Secularism means the same laws for all citizen, it means  
equality in the law for all  
13.2% 
Democracy: Secularism is associated with being a democracy 3.6% 
Women’s rights: Secularism is better for women 1.8% 
 100% 
 
Men and women are most likely to focus on the institutional relationship between 
state and religion, namely that a secular state cannot enforce religious laws or privilege 
any particular religion.  Enacting a state law based on Shari’ah would be a clear violation 
of the secularism of the state.  For example, a 56-year-old Muslim man with a university 
diploma and the highest religious engagement argues: “I oppose this because we live in a 
secular country, so we can’t privilege one religious group or one kind of religious belief 
or practice.”  A 46-year-old woman with a graduate degree and the lowest religious 
engagement notes: “We’re in a secular country, the constitution has nothing to do with 
religion.  I’m against mixing religion in our political institutions.”   Another 57-year-old 
man with a university diploma and the lowest level of religious engagement expresses: 
“We must separate religion and the state.  I’m for secularism.”  A 30-year-old woman 
with below average religious engagement and a high school degree suggests that such a 
law would violate the secular constitution:  “We’re in a secular country and we have to 
respect the constitution.”   Others clearly believe that such a law is simply incompatible 
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with secularism.  A 38-year-old woman who attended vocational high school and reports 
average religiosity notes: “because we shouldn’t apply the Shari’ah in a secular country.”  
For many ordinary Muslims, being a secular state means an institutional separation of 
religion and state and this law violates Senegal’s secular constitution.     
Others place a high value on religious diversity and tolerance in Senegal and view 
secularism as vital to managing and respecting this diversity.  For example, a 24-year-old 
Muslim male with below average religious engagement and a middle school education 
opposes the law “because we’re in a secular country.  Also, we’re all Senegalese.  
Whether we’re Muslim or Catholic, we have to try to live together peacefully.”  A 32-
year-old Muslim woman with below average religious engagement and some vocational 
high school expresses concern about the relationship between religions: “This law will 
create religious divisions in a secular country.  We will have problems like in Nigeria.” 
Almost eighteen percent simply discuss secularism as a good thing in and of 
itself.  These responses tend to view secularism itself as a value and as a culture.   Almost 
as many associate secularism with religious freedom—a state family law based on 
Shari’ah would impose on Muslims a particular interpretation of Islam.   
Finally, some argue that secularism means that all citizens should be subject to the 
same law.  As such, they view secularism as necessary for the protection of legal 
equality, which they articulate as uniformity in law.  A 45-year-old Muslim man with 
average religious engagement and a university degree expresses: “This is a secular 
country, I prefer secularism.  I’m against the kind of discrimination that would apply 
some laws to one group and other laws to another group.  I think this would create 
problems for the Senegalese nation, for our national unity.”  A 26-year-old woman with 
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an incomplete high school education and below average religious engagement invokes 
the idea of the secular state and connects this with protecting minority rights:  “Because 
we’re in a democratic and a secular country, and even religious minorities have their 
rights.”   For some, secularism means legal equality and one law for all citizens.   
Among these opponents of a Muslim personal law, Christians and Muslims are as 
likely to mention secularism as a consideration.  Individuals who mention secularism are 
also no different in their level of religious engagement from those who do not.  Women 
are, however, less likely to mention secularism (p=.01).  As noted in Chapter 5, 
individuals who oppose a law based on Shari’ah have higher mean levels of education 
compared to those who support the law.  It is equally important to note, though, that 
within this group of more educated citizens who oppose the law, individuals who 
specifically mention secularism as a salient consideration have higher mean levels of 
education that those who do not (p=.000).  This suggests that those who are aware of and 
mobilize the secular frame—without any prompting in the question wording—tend to 
have higher levels of education.  They also report higher mean levels of media exposure 
(p=.000).   These higher mean levels of media exposure and education suggest indicate a 
greater awareness of elite discourse surrounding the issue of family law reform.  They are 
more likely to connect their support for the principle of secularism to their views on 
family law.   
In addition to directly discussing the secularism of the state, Table 6.2 shows that 
men and women frequently mention considerations of peace and stability in the country 
(29%) and believe that enacting a law based on Shari’ah could create new problems in 
the country.  Among these responses, some prefer the status quo and argue that Senegal 
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already enjoys peace and stability, so why change something that seems to work 
relatively well?  Others mention religious diversity and tolerance (28%), often 
mentioning that Senegal has more than one religion in the country or is not a Muslim 
country.136
Some men and women focus specifically on problems between Muslims and 
Christians.  A 34-year-old Muslim woman with a high school degree and the lowest 
religious engagement opposes the law “to protect our social peace, so that there aren’t 
problems between Muslims and Christians in Senegal.”  Others, like this 33-year-old 
Muslim woman with the highest religious engagement and some middle school, worries 
about creating problems between Muslims themselves if such a law were enacted.  This 
law “risks creating problems within the Muslim community.”  Similarly, a 23-year-old 
male with an incomplete middle school and below average religious engagement 
  For example, a 49-year-old Muslim man of average religious engagement 
and a university diploma expresses: “For me, this kind of family law reform is impossible 
in our country.  Senegal is a country of dialogue, of tolerance, of solidarity.  We’re better 
off without these reforms, without Shari’ah.”  A 36-year-old Muslim man with above 
average religious engagement explains his opposition “for peace between Muslims and 
Christians.  The situation that we’re in right now doesn’t harm anyone.  We live in 
perfect harmony.”  A 19-year-old woman with a primary school education and above 
average religious engagement notes: “We’re Muslims, but there are other people who 
aren’t.  There will be more peace this way.”  A 21-year-old man with a middle school 
education and the highest religious engagement argues: “I oppose it because it will create 
a lot of problems.  I think it’s best to leave things as they are.”   
                                                 
136 Almost 37% of those who mentioned religious diversity or the existence of more than one religion in the 




expresses his desire to leave well-enough alone: “because with modernization, I think we 
should leave things alone.  It’s going to create a lot of problems between people.  I want 
to avoid problems between Senegalese.”   
As mentioned, individuals who oppose the law because they value religious 
diversity are more likely to have higher levels of education than those who support a 
Muslim personal law.  However, within this group of more educated and aware citizens, 
the frame of religious diversity appears more easily accessible across education groups.  
There are no differences in education or religiosity for men and women who mention this 
frame.   
Legal equality is also a popular reason to oppose the law, and most citizens 
discuss legal equality in terms of legal uniformity.  About 21% of explanations include 
some reference to preferring one law for all citizens in a republic, rather than having 
different laws for different religions.  For example, a 35-year-old woman with some 
college and the lowest religious engagement argues: “I oppose this because we shouldn’t 
have differences in our laws.  Having a single law for everyone is better.”  A young 20-
year-old Muslim woman with some high school and the lowest religious engagement 
notes: “This isn’t right, we’re all equal and we should be judged by one law, by the same 
law.”  A 46-year-old man with a graduate degree and average religiosity explains: “We’re 
in a Republic, so the laws can’t be applied to only one part of the population.  The law is 
for everyone.  We shouldn’t even be having this debate, unless we were talking about 
applying Shari’ah completely and to all people.”   A 28-year-old male with a middle 
school education expresses: “We have to have the same laws for everyone and judge 
people in the same way.  If we had different laws for different religions we’d have to start 
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regulating religion.  There are a lot of religions in the country and I think this would 
create problems between them.”  Individuals who mention the principle of one law for all 
citizens of the nation have higher average levels of education than those who do not 
mention this consideration (p=.002).  Women are also less likely to mention such 
concerns than men, but there are no significant differences in religious engagement.  As 
with secularism, opponents of the law with the highest levels of education appear more 
likely to mention this critical frame of legal equality through uniformity in law. 
Another 18% of respondents critique the content of Shari’ah itself and oppose the 
basic principle of a law based on Shari’ah.  Included in these responses are those who say 
that enacting Shari’ah will be bad for society and the country.  An example of such a 
response comes from this 34-year-old Muslim woman of average religious engagement, 
who has completed primary school:  “I oppose this because the laws of the Shari’ah are 
too rigorous and applying them to Muslims would be very difficult.”  A 72-year-old male 
with above average religious engagement and some primary school notes: “No, because it 
would be difficult to apply the Shari’ah in Senegal.  The Senegalese would not be able to 
handle the rigor of the Shari’ah.”  Similarly, a 29-year-old male with some primary 
school and above average religious engagement expresses: “even the religious leaders 
can’t fully live according to Shari’ah.  The Shari’ah is too heavy handed and no one is 
without sin.”  There are no significant differences in education, gender, or religious 
engagement for individuals who mention this type of response.   
Some responses believe that Senegalese culture and modern life are incompatible 
with enforcing Shari’ah.  According to some, society and norms have changed too much 
since the time of the Prophet, while others note differences between African and Middle 
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Eastern Islam.  This 55-year-old Muslim woman with the lowest religious engagement 
and a high school diploma argues against the law because “the Shari’ah is too difficult, it 
doesn’t fit with our cultural values.”  A 44-year-old man with above average religious 
engagement and some high school argues: “The Shari’ah is difficult to uphold because 
people’s mentalities have changed so much over time.”  A 35-year-old woman with a 
graduate degree and the lowest religiosity expresses: “We live in a complicated and 
modern world.  The Shari’ah isn’t compatible with modern realities.  Times have 
changed.”   
Finally, Table 6.2 notes other considerations in addition to those discussed here, 
such as concerns over freedom of religion (12.4%) and religious arguments why a state 
cannot enact a law based on Shari’ah (8.7%).  Some individuals argue against the state 
imposing Shari’ah on people, like this 20-year-old male with average religious 
engagement and some middle school: “It’s not worth enforcing Shari’ah.  We have to 
find people who can talk to us, convince us to change our behavior voluntarily.  We need 
to discuss these things, not enforce it through a law.”  Others have clear religious reasons 
for opposing the law, such as this 55-year-old woman with the lowest religious 
engagement who argues on religious grounds: “Let’s let God be the judge of humans, 
let’s leave all judgment to God.”  A 42-year-old male with some primary school argues 
similarly:  “We should let God decide, because He can change everything if He wills it.  
We all sow what we reap.  We shouldn’t force people to apply laws that they don’t want 
to apply.”  A 50-year-old man with above average religious engagement and a high 
school diploma articulates: “It’s not up to religious leaders to decide how people live.  
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Religious leaders shouldn’t get involved in every detail of our lives, they should rethink 
how they lead the faithful.  God belongs to all of us.”    
As with supporters of the law, a small percentage of individuals also highlight 
concerns about women’s rights and the family.  These individuals tend to have higher 
average levels of education.  For example, this 19-year-old woman with less than average 
religious engagement and a high school diploma says simply that: “The current Family 
Code is better for women.”  Others focus more explicitly on the concept of women’s 
rights, like this 42 -year-old woman with a university degree who believes that a law 
based on Shari’ah “would reduce women’s rights in society and the family.”  A 66 -year-
old Muslim man with a university diploma and above average religious engagement 
argues that “All human beings, man and woman, enjoy the same rights and have to 
submit to the same laws.  Same rights, same obligations, same status.”  
 
Senegalese Christians 
So far, I have only discussed the preferences of Senegalese Muslims, but 
Christians express overwhelming opposition to a state family law based on Shari’ah.  The 
sample size of Christians is relatively modest given their status as religious minorities, 
yet Table 6.5 recalculates the frequency of considerations offered by Christians and 
Muslims who opposed the law for the sake of comparison.  For the most part, Muslims 
and Christians do not differ in their likelihood of mentioning each type of consideration.  
The major exception is that Muslims are more likely to make cultural arguments that 
Shari’ah principles would be difficult to apply in modern times and that Senegalese 
culture is different from other countries where Shari’ah is applied.  However, general 
considerations about the secularism of the state, religious diversity, and peace and 
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stability, for example, are mentioned as often by Christians and Muslims who oppose the 
law.  The ways that Christians and Muslims articulate their responses is also quite 
similar.  This suggests that the values Christians and Muslims invoke—such as 
secularism, religious tolerance, and peace—belong to a larger, broadly held cultural 
discourse.  For example, a 21-year-old Christian woman with some primary school and 
the lowest religiosity expresses her concern for religious diversity and peace in a similar 
way:  “I oppose it because the country belongs to everyone.  Nobody has more rights than 
anyone else.  We should leave things as they are because right now we live in peace.”  
Another 26-year-old Christian man expresses his concern for the religious freedom of 
Muslims and his desire for peace:  “This is a way to impose Islam on Muslims.  It doesn’t 
bode well for everyone else either.  We always have to take everyone’s views into 















1. Secularism: Senegal has 
a secular state, this 
contradicts secularism  
32.4% 1. Respect All Religions, 
Tolerance: more than 
one religion, Senegal 
not a Muslim country  
32.9% 
2. Peace & Stability: 
Leave things as they are, 
Will cause problems, 
threaten peace 
29.2% 2. Peace & Stability: 
Leave things as they are, 
Will cause problems, 
threaten peace 
29.3% 
3. Respect All Religions, 
Tolerance: more than 
one religion, Senegal not 
a Muslim country  
26.4% 3. Secularism: Senegal 
has a secular state, this 
contradicts secularism 
25.6% 
4. Shari’ah Too Severe, 
Bad for the Country 
19.6% 4. Legal System, 
Uniformity & 
Equality: one law for 
all citizens, equality, 
prefer the current code 
17.1% 
5. Culture & Modernity:  
not possible in Senegal, 
Senegalese culture, 
modernity 
18.8% 5. Shari’ah Too Severe, 
Bad for the Country  
14.6% 
6. Legal System, 
Uniformity & Equality: 
one law for all citizens, 
equality, prefer the 
current code  
16.8% 6. Religious Freedom: 
cannot impose Shari’ah 
on people, religion is a 
private affair  
12.2% 
7. Religious Freedom: 
cannot impose Shari’ah 
on people, religion is a 
private affair  
12.4% 7. Culture & Modernity:  




8. Religious Arguments: 
let God have the final 
judgment  
9.6% 8. Religious Arguments: 
let God have the final 
judgment  
6.1% 
9. Republic and/or 
Democracy 
8.0% 9. Women’s issues and 
rights  
4.9% 
10. Women’s issues and 
rights 
4.4% 10. Republic and/or 
Democracy 
2.4% 
11. Family, Marriage, 
Divorce 
2.4% 11. Family, Marriage, 
Divorce 
2.4% 
N=250 for Muslim who oppose, N=82 for Christians who oppose.  Cells show the percentage of men and 





Similarly, Christians discuss secularism and legal equality in similar ways to 
Senegalese Muslims.  A 44-year-old Christian man with a high school diploma and 
average religiosity notes:  “I want to guarantee a certain equality between people.  I think 
secularism is the only thing that will guarantee the unity of the nation.  Religion is a 
personal and private affair.  The law has to be the same for everyone.  Even if we apply 
Shari’ah to Muslims it will still discriminate against some people.”  Another 45 -year-old 
Christian man with some college says:  “If we do this, it will have repercussions for the 
minority and we shouldn’t marginalize minority groups.”  A 22-year-old Muslim male 
with some high school and the highest religious engagement expresses a similar concern 
over the rights of the minority: “It’s a problem because we’re not all Muslims.  We have 
to respect the decision of the minority.  If we were all Muslims, I would probably support 
the reforms.”   
 
Elite Discourse and Value Frames   
My discussion of media frames in Chapter 4 suggests that elites discussed family 
law in terms of relatively abstract, general values rather than highlighting specific details 
about family law or Islamic law.  Citizens, for their part, also discuss their preferences in 
terms of more general value judgments.  In debates over family law reform, then, general 
values, desires, and expectations were mobilized by both sides to describe competing 
visions what was good or right in society.  Not all frames are mentioned as frequently as 
others, though.  To differentiate between the types of considerations and values 
individuals mention, I return to Zaller’s (1992) important emphasis on the role of 
contextual information about elite discourse.  Taking education as an indicator of 
137 
 
information and awareness of elite discourse, Table 6.6 shows that the major frames of 
media discourse about family law—secularism, preferences for having one versus 
different laws for citizens of different religions, valuing the principle of majority rule 
versus highlighting Senegal’s religious diversity, as well as concerns about peace and 
stability, all tend to be mentioned by individuals with higher mean levels of education.  
Education, rather than gender or religious engagement, differentiates between citizens 
who are aware of and mobilize the value frames emphasized by elites as they discuss 
their own preferences for state family law. 
Table 6.6 Mean education for individuals who mention frames in media discourse 






Secularism     
Mentioned 9.0***  9.0*** 
Not Mentioned 5.5  6.7 
N 104  102 
Legal Frames: Uniformity in Laws versus 
Pluralism 
   
Mentioned 7.6*** 6.0* 8.6** 
Not Mentioned 5.7 4.8 7.1 
N 114 42 69 
Muslim Majority Country vs. More Than One 
Religion in the Country 
   
Mentioned 7.4*** 6.9*** 7.6 
Not Mentioned 5.7 4.8 7.4 
N 131 30 93 
Family or Women’s Rights     
Mentioned 7.6*** 6.8*** 9.3** 
Not Mentioned 5.9 4.7 7.3 
N 65 39 22 
Religious Arguments For or Against    
Mentioned 4.9*** 4.3** 7.4 
Not Mentioned 6.3 5.2 7.4 
N 158 125 32 
Concern for Peace & Stability     
Mentioned 6.8** 4.9 7.2 
Not Mentioned 5.8 4.9 7.5 
N 132 26 97 
    
Cells show mean education for individuals who mentioned and did not mention these themes in their 




Table 6.6 offers evidence that elite discourse shapes how citizens come to 
understand what is at stake in debates about family law.  Certainly, personal experience, 
predispositions, and other venues for information besides media discourse (such as social 
influence) play a role.  However, individuals with higher levels of education are the most 
likely to mention the key frames of media discourse—secularism, legal uniformity versus 
pluralism, peace and stability, religious diversity, and concerns about women’s rights or 
issues about the family, for example.  Table 6.6 also suggests that while awareness of 
elite discourse helps individuals to mobilize these key media frames in support of their 
arguments, some frames may be more accessible to citizens than others.  Those with 
higher levels of education regularly mention frames such as peace and stability and 
religious diversity.  Yet when comparing levels of education within supporters of a 
Muslim personal law, individuals for whom peace and stability are salient considerations 
are no more nor less likely to differ in terms of education.  This is true for opponents of a 
Muslim personal law as well.  When comparing the education levels of opponents of a 
Muslim personal law, individuals with the lowest levels of education mentioned religious 
diversity as often those with the highest education.   
In summary, analyzing citizens own voices sheds light on the kinds of 
considerations and values that are important to ordinary men and women as they make 
sense of debates over family law and Shari’ah as a source of law.  This chapter shows 
evidence that ideas in media discourse do make their way into popular discourse.  Elite 
discourse seems to play an important role in shaping what citizens come to see as 
important about family law.  At the same time, it also reflects popular culture as 
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journalists and activists attempt to mobilize popular cultural principles as they construct 
frames aimed at persuading the public.   
Mutually Exclusive Preferences? 
As these narrative responses suggest, men and women who oppose a Muslim 
personal law often do so because of secular predispositions, and men and women who 
support a personal law do so based on religious predispositions.  To what extent does this 
suggest that citizens’ preferences for secularism and Shari’ah as state law are mutually 
exclusive?  Table 6.7 shows the distribution of preferences for and against a state family 
law based on Shari’ah by citizens’ preferences for and against the secularism of the state.  
As described in Chapter 5, support for secularism was measured with a closed-ended 
survey item that provided a simple definition for respondents who might not understand 
the term secular.137
Table 6.7 Support and opposition to a secular state, by views on Islamic Family Law 
  Recoding this into a binary variable of support and opposition, the 
results of this closed ended survey item indicates a significant bivariate relationship 
between supporting a secular state and opposing a family law based on Shari’ah (p<.001).  
Of those who oppose a secular state, 77% say they support a state family law based on 
Shari’ah.   
 Support Islamic family law  Oppose Islamic family law Total 
Oppose Secular State 76.6% 23.5% 145 
Support Secular State  51.5% 48.5% 610 
N=755.  The results are similar when excluding Christians from the sample.  Of those who oppose a secular 
state, 22.1% oppose an Islamic family law and 77.9% support it.  Of those who support the secular state, 
58.3% support Islamic family law and 41.7% oppose it.  This relationship is significant at the p<.001 level. 
 
                                                 
137 “Do you think that Senegal should be a secular country, where there is no legal or official relationship 
between religion and the state?”  Responses ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree.   
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Combined with the coded narratives from citizens themselves, this simple cross-
tabulation provides additional evidence that framing family law as a question of 
secularism resonates with popular preferences on this issue.  However, a closer reading of 
Table 6.7 also shows more complexity in public opinion.  Though there is clearly a strong 
relationship between views on secularism and for Shari’ah as state law, support for a 
secular state is widespread in Senegal.  Among Senegalese Muslims, 54% strongly 
support a secular state and 25% somewhat support such a state.  Christians 
overwhelmingly offer support for a secular state: 81% strongly agree and 15% somewhat 
agree.  The most interesting observation in Table 6.7 is that citizens who support the 
secular state are almost evenly divided on the issue of Shari’ah as a source of state law.  
Indeed, among supporters of a secular state, 51.5% support an Islamic family law while 
the remaining 49.5% oppose such a law. 
In Chapter 3, I argue that the main reason that some citizens view secularism and 
a state law based on Shari’ah as incompatible is that they are more aware of elite 
discourse that frames these debates in oppositional terms.  This helps to explain why 
education is so strongly correlated with opposition to a Muslim personal law.  It also 
helps to explain why individuals who mention secularism as a reason to oppose the law 
tend to have higher levels of education, even though most Senegalese citizens support a 
secular state.  Awareness of elite discourse helps to explain why so many citizens say 
they support a secular state and a state family law based on Shari’ah.  When asked about 
Shari’ah, their religious predispositions are activated and they support the law.  When 
asked about a secular state, their secular predispositions are activated and they support 
political secularism.  Connecting the issues of state family law, Shari’ah, and secularism 
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requires citizens to make connections between their predispositions on their own, or to 
know something about the elite debate surrounding the issue.  To illustrate this point, 
Table 6.8 shows the results of coded narrative responses for men and women who 
actually mentioned “secularism” or “secular state” as a reason for opposing an Islamic 
family law for Muslim citizens.  As stated, these individuals are disproportionately from 
the highest education levels.   
 
Table 6.8 Education levels for respondents who mention secularism 
















0% 78% 73% 58% 49% 
Mentions 
secularism 
0% 22% 27% 43% 51% 
N=332, Cells show the percentage of men and women who mention laïcité or état laic in their open-ended 
narratives as among the reasons they oppose a personal status law based on Shari’ah.  Cells show column 
percentage for each level of education.  When excluding Christians in the sample, which results in a sample 
size of 250, the results are roughly similar: No respondents mention secularism who have no formal 
education, 21% mention secularism with a primary school education, 29% with middle school level, 47% 
with a high school diploma, and 53% of those with at least a college degree.   
 
Moreover, Table 6.1 noted that individuals who offer mixed responses that 
support both sides of the debate tend to have higher levels of education.  Those who 
oppose a Muslim personal law but state mixed feelings in their narrative responses tend 
to express that they believe Shari’ah has ultimate religious authority, but they defer to the 
principle of secularism.  Likewise, those who support a Muslim personal law but offer 
mixed feelings tend to be aware that secularism is an issue, but they opt for a family law 
based on Shari’ah and explain why they do so.  Men and women who have higher levels 
of education also tend to more aware of the multiple values at stake in the issue.   
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Table shows 6.9 shows a similar pattern in preferences for the principle of one 
law for all citizens, or legal uniformity.  Of those who support the principle of different 
laws for different religions, 87.5% also say they also support an Islamic family law that 
would apply only to Muslims.  In contrast, men and women who support the principle of 
one law for all citizens are much more divided on the question of Islamic family law.  Of 
those who support a family law that would apply only to Muslims, over half (57%) also 
want all citizens to be subject to the same laws regardless of religion at the same time. 
Table 6.9 Support for legal uniformity, by support for an Islamic family law 
 Oppose Islamic 







Laws for Different Religions 
12.5% 87.5% 208 
Same Laws for All Religions  55.6% 44.4% 550 
N=758.  Cells show attitudes toward Islamic family law by support for  uniformity and equality in law.  
The results are nearly identical when excluding Christians from the sample.  49% of those who want the 
same laws for all citizens oppose the law, while 51% support the law.   
 
The cross-tabulation of closed ended survey items suggests that some men and 
women view the secularism of the state, the idea of legal uniformity, and opposition to an 
Islamic family law as part of a package of connected preferences.  These citizens may 
respond to each of the questions in the direction of the secular interpretive package about 
the Family Code.  Others respond consistently in the other direction—they oppose a 
secular state, want different laws for different citizens, and as such favor a law based on 
Shari’ah.  However, many citizens, in principle, support the idea uniform laws for all 
citizens, a secular state, and a family law that would apply Shari’ah to some citizens and 





In this chapter, I attempted to capture and record the range of considerations that 
were salient to respondents as they discussed their views on family law and Shari’ah as a 
source of law.  By recording and coding respondents’ own words, the narrative open-
ended format of the question allows citizens to articulate their preferences in a way that 
closed-ended survey responses and measures of intensity do not.138
By detailing the incredible diversity and range of responses ordinary citizens 
articulate as they negotiate this question of law, religion, and state, I highlight the 
complex ways that men and women discuss their preferences.  I also highlight the 
important role that value judgments play as men and women articulate their preferences 
for family law.  Men and women across levels of religious engagement and education 
have multifaceted desires, values, and hopes.  Though this debate focused on family law, 
media discourse and citizens’ own narratives suggest that the issue is a larger deliberation 
about values and the best way to live and organize society, including the proper 
relationship between religion and state.  Many men and women who support a Muslim 
personal law justify their position by referring to a vision of a world which is governed 
according to a moral order which will help individuals to live uprightly, and will advance 
Islamic education and develop Islam in the country.  Others who oppose the law 
  Though in-depth, 
unstructured interviews would provide even more detail, the open-ended format of these 
responses offers the benefit of large sample size and random selection that allows for 
greater comparisons across the key demographic groups of interest, namely, gender, 
education, and religiosity.   
                                                 
138 As others have noted, individuals may give different answers to open-ended questions than to questions 
with pre-specified options (Schuman and Scott 1987).   
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emphasize secular values in which citizens are equal before the law, law is impersonal, 
and in which citizens of different religions live in peace and tolerance.  Both kinds of 
responses emphasize what individuals believe to be good and right.  Others articulate 
their preferences by emphasizing what is or might be bad or harmful and argue that a law 
based on Shari’ah would have harmful effects for the country or for the relations between 
citizens.     
 This chapter also finds evidence that citizens who invoke many of the major 
frames in elite debate tend to have higher average levels of education.  Education, rather 
than religious engagement, appears to identify individuals who are most likely to discuss 
family law in the terms of elite discourse.  I conclude the chapter by arguing that not 
mentioning a particular value or frame does not mean that one opposes that value or 
rejects that frame.  In fact, the vast majority of all citizens hold similar values in closed-
ended responses.  However, those with higher levels of education were more likely to 
directly mention the specific frames of media discourse than those with lower levels of 
education.  This suggests that education indicates greater awareness that these issues are 
at stake in the debate about family law.  This analysis, then, raises the question of why 
some individuals who support secular principles oppose the law, but others who support 
the same principles oppose it.  To address this question, I evaluate the importance of 
gender, education, and religious and secular predispositions in a multivariate setting in 
chapter 8.  In Chapter 8, I take up the final question of why some citizens view Shari’ah 




Chapter 7  
Taking Sides on Shari’ah:  The Roots of Popular Support and Opposition 
 
By citizen’s own accounts, preferences for a secular state play an important role 
in explaining opposition to a family law based on Shari’ah.  Sincere religious 
commitments and beliefs also explain why many men and women prefer a law based on 
Shari’ah.  In this chapter, I explore the roots of popular support and opposition to a state 
family law based on Shari’ah in an ordered logit model that estimates the impact of 
gender, education, and religious differences on the intensity of one’s support or 
opposition after controlling for important demographic differences in the population.  
Finally, I evaluate if one’s preference for a secular state does indeed impact preferences 
for family law reform.  I demonstrate that ordinary men’s and women’s levels of 
education, as well as religious and secular predispositions, do strongly shape preferences 
for state laws based on Shari’ah.   
 
Who Supports and Opposes an Islamic Family Law? 
As discussed in Chapter 5, simple bivariate analyses show that Senegalese women 
are more likely to support an Islamic family law than men.  Likewise, Muslims who 
report higher levels of religious engagement are also significantly more likely to support 
the law.  Individuals who are more educated, more exposed to the mass media, and who 
live in wealthier households may also be more likely to say they oppose a law based on 
146 
 
Shari’ah.  Senegalese Christians overwhelmingly oppose the law, however at a bivariate 
level there are no differences between members of the Murid, Tijani, Layene or 
Qadiriyya Sufi orders.  Muslims who do not identify with any Sufi tariqa also report 
higher levels of opposition.  Finally, marital status and family size appear significantly 
related to family law preferences.     
In this chapter, I estimate the impact of each of these important demographic 
categories in a multivariate ordered logit model predicting the intensity of support and 
opposition to a family law based on Shari’ah.  I am most interested in evaluating and 
estimating the impact of gender, religious engagement, and education.   Chapter 5 
suggested that education is positively correlated with opposition to the law, and religious 
engagement is positively correlated with support for the law.  There is also a significant 
gender gap between men’s and women’s support, as women are significantly more likely 
than men to support a family law based on Shari’ah.  In a multivariate setting, then, how 
do education, religious engagement, and gender predict preferences for family law? 
Women’s higher levels of support may be due in part to the significant gender gap 
in educational achievement.  There is no significant difference in the percentage of men 
and women who oppose the law within each level of educational achievement, for 
example, which suggests that there is a similarly strong relationship between education 
and family law preferences for both men and women.  I suggest that in a multivariate 
model, education may mediate the impact of gender on family law preferences.139
Importantly, however, there is no bivariate relationship between education and 
religious engagement; individuals with a university diploma, for example, are roughly 
   
                                                 
139 If there is mediation, we should no longer see any significant gender effects once we take one’s level of 




equally distributed across the quintiles of religious engagement.  Will education predict 
opposition to the law when we control for religious engagement?   Similarly, are 
individuals who report higher levels of engagement in religious activities—including 
reading religious texts, as well as socializing at and participating in the activities of 
religious associations, Sufi orders, and mosques—more likely to support an Islamic 
family law when we control for education and other demographic traits?  Sincerely held 
religious convictions and commitments may lead many Muslims to support state 
legislation based on Shari’ah, as Chapter 6 suggested, but it is not clear from these 
statements alone that citizens who oppose such legislation are any less religiously 
committed.  Indeed, some opinion leaders who expressed opposition to CIRCOFS’ 
personal status law grounded their arguments in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence 
and argued on religious grounds (Gaye and Dramé 2004).  Accordingly, I evaluate if 
levels of religious engagement do indeed predict an individual’s preferences after 
controlling for education and other demographic covariates. 
Gender may also play a role in estimating the impact of religiosity.  Citizen 
narratives in Chapter 6 showed that women are as likely as men to express their support 
by sharing deeply held religious convictions and a desire for laws that conform to divine 
law.  Chapter 5, however, showed that individuals with high levels of religious 
engagement appear more likely to support the law, yet women score lower on religious 
engagement due to measurement difficulty and norms of practice.140
                                                 
140 In particular, though men and women report similar levels of engagement in the activities of the Sufi 
orders, women’s participation at mosques and frequency of reading the Qur’an are slightly lower than 
men’s levels.  As the distribution of self-reported religious engagement showed, women do report attending 
mosque and reading the Qur’an and there are no significant age differences in these reported levels.  On 
average, though, women report performing these activities less frequently.   
  As a result, I argue 
that when using standard measures of religious engagement, the magnitude of its impact 
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may differ for Muslim men and women.  Though women are less frequent participants in 
certain religious activities, they should not be viewed as less “religious” than Muslim 
men.  Rather, I expect that the direction of the effect of men’s and women’s religious 
engagement will be the same, but the magnitude of the effect may differ to reflect gender 
differences in religious norms of engagement.  To estimate these potential differences, I 
include an interaction term that will more accurately estimate the effect of religious 
engagement for Muslim men as compared to women. 
Does religious affiliation predict preferences for state laws based on Shari’ah?  
Chapter 5 showed that 89% of Senegalese Christians in the sample oppose or strongly 
oppose a state family law based on Shari’ah, even though advocates for the law sought to 
apply Shari’ah to Muslims.  I suggest here that the overwhelming opposition of 
Senegalese Christians can be explained as a group identity effect—not as the effect of 
being Christian per se, but as the effect of living as religious minorities.  Christians may 
fear that any legislation that appears to weaken the secularism of the state—according to 
the dominant interpretive package offered by elite discourse—could impact their status as 
equal citizens.  As Chapter 5 also showed, Christians who oppose the law report feeling 
significantly more fear and anger over the possibility that Senegal might enact a family 
law based on Shari’ah than do Muslims who oppose the law.  This negative emotional 
response offers additional support that Christians view the law as a greater threat given 
their status as religious minorities.  In the model, I include an indicator variable for the 
effect of being Christian on the intensity of one’s support or opposition.  I also include an 
indicator variable for Muslim members of the tariqa Murid as compared to any other Sufi 
tariqa, as well as for Muslims who do not identify with any of the Sufi orders, to estimate 
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if there are significant differences between Muslims based on religious affiliation when 
we control for other covariates.   
Finally, I include control variables measuring age, household wealth, frequency of 
exposure to the mass media, and marital status and number of children.   Media exposure 
captures an average level of exposure to mass media through television, radio, and print 
media, which may indicate how likely individuals were to be exposed to the media 
discourse discussed in Chapter 4.141
After evaluating the impact of gender, education, and religious engagement, 
including the interactive effects of gender and religious engagement, on preferences for a 
state law based on Shari’ah, the second half of this chapter evaluates the impact of 
individual orientations toward the secularism of the state on individual’s preferences.  
Media discourse about family law reform framed the issue as threatening the secularism 
of the state.  However, does an individual’s preference for or against the secularism of the 
state indeed shape preferences for state laws based on Shari’ah when controlling for 
religious engagement and education?  I argue that support for a secular state will have a 
direct effect on one’s preferences.  Finally, I end the chapter by evaluating the impact of 
other orientations that were discussed in media discourse about family law reform, 
  Marital status may play a role in shaping 
individuals’ preferences for family law. 
                                                 
141 Note that I do not include political knowledge in this analysis.  Education and political knowledge are 
very highly correlated (r=.59), and this makes it difficult to accurately estimate the impact of political 
knowledge.  In analyses I do not show here, I did also include political knowledge, but education is 
uniformly the strongest predictor of all of the knowledge variables.  I include media exposure over political 
knowledge because of my focus on the importance of media discourse in shaping how the public 
understands the issue of family law reform.  Moreover, as noted in Chapter 5, studies that prefer political 
knowledge as a measure of information have taken place in the US, where there are fewer differences 
between most citizens in levels of education, and where education levels are skewed toward the upper 
levels (Zaller 1992, 1990).  My measure of political knowledge is also skewed toward higher levels of 
knowledge (the mean is 3.6 out of a total of 6), suggesting that these questions lacked may have lacked 
sufficient difficulty to be able to distinguish between those at moderate and high levels of information. 
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including preferences for the principle of uniform laws and rights for all citizens.  This 
chapter sets the stage for Chapter 8, where I address the question of whether or not, as 
well as which, citizens view Shari’ah as a source of state family law and secularism as 
mutually exclusive preferences.   
Table 7.1 shows the results of two ordered logit models predicting the intensity of 
support or opposition to a state family law based on Shari’ah.  On the left, the model 
estimates the impact of each of the demographic variables discussed for the full sample of 
Muslims and Christians.  As the estimated coefficients in the left hand column of Table 
7.1 show, Christians are significantly and substantially more likely to respond in the 
direction of strongly opposing a family law based on Shari’ah.  The right hand column of 
Table 7.1 shows a reestimated model for the sample population of Senegalese Muslims.  
The size of each estimated coefficient and its standard error are almost identical to the 






Table 7.1 Popular support and opposition to Islamic family law 
Ordinal Logit Results 
1=Strongly Support, 4=Strongly Oppose 
Full Sample Reduced Sample, 
Muslim Citizens Only 
   
Age .009 .008 
 (.008) (.008) 
Household wealth  .037 .037 
 (.035) (.038) 
Education .151*** .155*** 
 (.027) (.029) 
Divorced .317 .438 
 (.359) (.371) 
Single .276 .266 
 (.221) (.232) 
Polygamous marriage -.588* -.574* 
 (.261) (.267) 
Number of children .037 .035 
 (.049) (.053) 
Female (1=female) -.862** -.916** 
 (.281) (.289) 
Female X Religious Engagement .252* .288* 
 (.118) (.1240 
Religious Engagement  -.451*** -.485*** 
 (.090) (.093) 
Christian  2.073*** — 
 (.274)  
Member of Tariqa Murid  .062 .076 
 (.176) (.177) 
Muslims without Sufi tariqa .187 .159 
 (.275) (.274) 
Media exposure .184 .199* 
 (.088) (.093) 
Observations 691 614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
To demonstrate the substantial effect of living as a religious minority on 
individual preferences, Table 7.2 calculates the predicted probabilities of support and 
opposition for Christians and Muslims.  For Senegalese men of average religious 
engagement, average education, and holding all other variables at their means, an average 
Christian male’s predicated probability of strongly opposing the law is .69 on a scale of 
zero to one, as compared to .22 for an average Muslim man—a substantial difference of 
.47.  An average Christian woman’s predicted probability of strongly opposing the law is 
.60 on a scale of zero to one, as compared to 0.16 for an average Muslim woman—a 
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substantial difference of 0.44.   As Table 7.2 shows, Christians have a very low 
probability of supporting the law compared to Muslims.  I argue that it is the simple fact 
of living as a religious minority that differentiates Senegalese Christians from Muslims 
and explains why Senegalese Christians overwhelmingly oppose such a family law.   As a 
religious minority, Christians appear to feel threatened by a law that claims to enforce 
Shari’ah and that differentiates between citizens based on religious affiliation.  Clearly, 
most of the variation in responses comes from Senegalese Muslims, and the remaining 
analysis in this chapter focuses on this reduced sample so that I may more precisely 
address the question of who supports and opposes a state family law based on Shari’ah.  
The rest of this chapter focuses on addressing the question of why Senegalese Muslims 
disagree about the place of Shari’ah in state family law.   
Table 7.2 Predicted probabilities of supporting and opposing an Islamic family law 
 Strongly 
Support 
Support Oppose Support 
Oppose 
Men     
Christian  .07 .07 .17 .69 
Muslim .39 .19 .21 .22 
Difference -.32 -.12 -.04 .47 
     
Women     
Christian  .10 .09 .20 .60 
Muslim .48 .19 .18 .16 
Difference -.37 -.09 .02 .44 
Cells show the predicted probabilities of responses for Christian and Muslim men and women using the 
estimated coefficients from the full sample model of Table 7.1, and holding all other variables at their mean 
levels. 
 
   Returning to the original question of who supports and who opposes a state family 
law based on Shari’ah, what role do gender, religious engagement, and education play in 
shaping preferences?  Table 7.1 demonstrates that levels of education and religious 
engagement do significantly shape individual preferences.  After controlling for other 
covariates, higher levels of formal education appear to push men and women to oppose 
the law.  I have suggested that because women are significantly less likely to obtain 
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higher levels of formal education in Senegal, education may mediate the effect of gender.  
In a separate analysis of mediation, the size of the coefficient estimating the impact of 
gender is reduced when education is included in the model, but it remains substantial and 
significant.142  These results suggest that education partially mediates gender effects.143
Finally, the right hand column of Table 7.1 shows that several other covariates 
significantly impact preferences.  Being in a polygamous marriage as opposed to a 
monogamous marriage pushes respondents to support the law.  Of particular note, there 
appear to be no significant differences between members of the different Sufi orders.  
More precisely, members of the Murid Sufi order respond similarly when compared to 
members of the Tijaniyya, Layene, or Qadiriyya orders.  Moreover, Muslims who claim 
    
Higher engagement in religious activities also pushes individuals to support such 
a law and to do so more intensely.  I have also discussed how the magnitude of the effect 
of religiosity on the intensity of men’s and women’s preferences may differ for Muslim 
men versus women.  Indeed, the right hand column of Table 7.1 suggests that religious 
engagement is significant for both men and women and pushes individuals to support the 
law.  The size of the coefficients, however, indicate that the impact of religious 
engagement is more substantial for men than women.  This provides additional evidence 
that it is more difficult to identify and measure Muslim women’s religious engagement 
than Muslim men’s religiosity.    
                                                 
142 Were perfect mediation to occur, the estimated coefficient for gender would approximate zero after 
taking education into account 
143 Were I to ignore the potential interactive effects for men’s and women’s religiosity and only include a 
main effect for gender, then the impact of gender is substantially reduced and only moderately statistically 
significant (p=.045) after taking education into account.  However, I attempt to more precisely estimate the 
impact of religiosity for men and women through an interaction term. When modeling the interactive 
effects of gender and religiosity, the coefficient on gender is substantially larger and statistically significant 
as compared to an identical model that does not include an interaction effect.  This is likely to occur 




no affiliation with any of Sufi order no longer appear significantly different after 
controlling for other covariates.   Finally, more frequent exposure to the mass media does 
increase one’s likelihood of opposing the law. 
 If gender, education, and religious engagement all shape preferences, how do 
more educated men and women who are also highly religiously engaged respond when 
the effects of education and religiosity work in opposition directions?  How do these 
individuals differ from those who are highly religiously engaged but less educated, or 
highly educated but less religiously engaged?   Coefficients from an ordered logit model 
are not easily interpreted.  To more clearly discuss the ways that Senegalese men and 
women differ, I calculate the predicted probability of strongly supporting and strongly 
opposing the law across various levels of education and religious engagement.  Table 7.3 
estimates predicted probabilities for men and women across various levels of education 
and religiosity to paint a clearer picture of who supports and who opposes a state family 
law based on Shari’ah, while holding other variables at their mean level.  As Table 7.3 
shows, men and women who report the lowest levels of religious engagement are 
substantially less likely to say they strongly support the law than are men and women 
who report higher levels of religious engagement.  For example, holding all other 
variables at their means, a woman without any education and who reports the lowest level 
of religious activity has a predicted probability of strongly supporting the law of .57.  As 
her religious engagement increases to the mean level, her probability of strong support 
increases to .66, and again to .75 were she to report the highest level of religious 
engagement.  Moving from the lowest to the highest level of religious engagement 
increases her estimated probability of strongly supporting the law almost 32%.  Across 
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each level of education, increasing religiosity increases men’s and women’s probability 
of expressing strong support and reduces their probability of expressing strong 
opposition.    
As Table 7.3 also shows, the impact of increasing levels of education also 
substantially shapes preferences, and does so across levels of religiosity.  An average 
woman with the lowest religious engagement and with no formal education has a 
probability of saying she strongly supports the law of .57, as compared to .19 for an 
identical woman yet with a college education.  Her probability of saying she strongly 
supports the law decreases almost 67% as she moves from no education to a college 
degree.  The impact of education is similar for men.  An average man with the lowest 
religious engagement and no education has a probability of saying he strongly supports 
the law of .35.  This decreases 74%, to .09, as he moves to a college level education.  
Across each level of reported religiosity, an individual’s probability of expressing strong 
opposition increases as education increases, and her probability of expressing strong 





Table 7.3 Predicted probabilities of responding with strong support and strong opposition to an 
Islamic family law across levels of religious engagement and education 



















No education       
Women .57 .12 .66 .09 .75 .06 
Men .35 .26 .58 .12 .79 .05 
Difference .22 -.14 .08 -.03 -.04 .01 
       
Primary School       
Women .46 .18 .55 .13 .65 .09 
Men .25 .36 .47 .17 .70 .07 
Difference .21 -.18 .08 -.04 -.05 .02 






Women .38 .23 .48 .17 .58 .12 
Men .20 .43 .39 .22 .63 .10 
Difference .18 -.20 .09 -.05 -.05 .02 
       
High School       
Women .25 .36 .33 .27 .42 .20 
Men .12 .58 .26 .35 .48 .17 
Difference .13 -.22 .07 -.08 -.06 .03 
       
College Education       
Women .19 .43 .26 .34 .34 .26 
Men .09 .66 .20 .42 .40 .22 
Difference .10 -.23 .06 -.08 -.06 .04 
       
Cells show the predicted probabilities of strongly supporting and strongly opposing the law for Muslim for 
men and women, using the estimated coefficients for Muslims in the right hand column of Table 7.1, while 
varying levels of religious engagement and education.  All other variables are held at their means. 
 
These predicted probabilities in Table 7.3 also show that the effect of increasing 
levels of religious engagement works in the same direction for men and women, but the 
magnitude is larger for men than women.  Whereas women are more likely than men to 
report supporting the law at lower levels of religiosity, women are now slightly more 
likely to oppose the law when we compare citizens who report the highest level of 
religious activities.  This is true across all education levels.  For example, a man who has 
average levels on all variables and no education increases his predicted probability of 
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saying he strongly supports the law almost 126% as he moves from lowest to highest 
religious engagement (from a probability of .35 to .79).  An average woman with no 
education increases her probability of strong support almost 32% as she moves from the 
lowest to the highest religiosity (from a probability of .57 to .75). 
The difference in predicted probabilities between men and women is largest for 
individuals who report the lowest levels of religious engagement rather than the highest 
levels.  This may reflect the difficulty of measuring Muslim women’s religiosity, which 
is why Muslim women are most likely to fall into this category of lowest religiosity.  For 
example, holding education and other demographic traits at their mean levels, an 
“average” Muslim woman who reports the lowest level of religiosity has a predicted 
probability of strong support of 0.38, compared to 0.20 for a similarly situated “average 
man,” or a difference of .18.  However, the absolute estimated difference between men 
and women in their predicted probability of expressing strong support shrinks to .09 if 
they both report average religious engagement, and to .05 if they report the highest 
religious engagement.     
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 graph the predicted probabilities of strong support and strong 
opposition for men and women with average levels of all covariates, including education, 
while allowing religiosity to increase from the lowest to the highest level.  The impact of 
religiosity on preferences is indeed more dramatic for men than women.  As Figure 7.1 
shows, men at the lowest level of religious engagement are substantially less likely than 
women to strongly support the law, whereas men who are most engaged in religious 
activities become more likely than women to report strong support.  The difference 





Figure 7.1 Impact of changing religious engagement on probability of strong support for an Islamic family law 
 
 
Similarly, Figure 7.2 shows that at the same low level of religiosity and mean 
education, men are much more likely to respond with strong opposition than women.   
Their probability of strong opposition, however, decreases substantially as they become 
more engaged in religious activities.  At the highest level of religiosity women become 
more likely to report strong opposition, and the difference between men and women is 

























Figure 7.2 Impact of changing religious engagement on probability of strong opposition to an Islamic family law 
 
 
Table 7.4 shows the percentage change in the probability of strong support as 
religiosity increases for men and women across various education levels.  For men and 
women at all levels of education, the magnitude of the impact of moving from lowest to 
highest religiosity is higher for men than women.   
Table 7.4 Percentage change in predicted probabilities of strongly supporting an Islamic family law 
moving from lowest to highest religious engagement, across levels of education 
  Percentage Increase in Probability of Strong Support 
  
 Moving from Lowest to Highest Religious Engagement 












Cells show the percentage change in the predicted probabilities of strongly supporting an Islamic family 
law for Muslim for men and women who move from lowest to highest religious engagement, across levels 
of education.  This table uses the estimated coefficients for Muslims in the right hand column of Table 7.1 




























In addition, Table 7.3 showed that because religiosity and education push in 
opposite directions, individuals with low education and high religiosity have the highest 
probability of strong support; likewise, individuals with high education and low 
religiosity have the highest probability of strong opposition.  However, how do 
individuals with high education and high religiosity respond?  As Table 7.3 and 7.4 show, 
a college educated man with the lowest religious engagement has a probability of 
expressing strong support of .09 and a probability of expressing strong opposition of .66.  
His probability of strong support increases to .40 if he instead reports the highest 
religious engagement (an increase of 344%) and his probability of strong opposition 
decreases to .22 (a decrease of 67%).  Having a college level education and high religious 
engagement still results in a substantially lower probability of expressing strong support 
(.40) than a man with high religiosity and no education—who has a probability of strong 
support of .79.  However, it would appear that the impact of increasing religiosity is 
greater for individuals when their education levels strongly predict a response in the 
opposition direction.  In other words, the impact of increasing religiosity on the 
probability of support is largest for the college educated, even if they are still less likely 
to say they support the law than those with lower levels of education.   
Similarly, the magnitude of the impact of increasing levels of higher education 
appears largest for individuals whose religious engagement pushes them in the opposite 
direction than education.  Table 7.5 shows the percentage change for men and women 
moving from no formal education to a college diploma, across the lowest, mean and 
highest levels of religious engagement.  A woman with no education and the highest 
religiosity has a probability of strongly opposing the law of .06, which increases to .26 if 
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she reports having a college education, or a percentage increase in the probability of 
strong opposition of 333%.  This high education, high religiosity woman has a 
substantially lower probability of strong support than a high education, low religiosity 
woman (with a probability of strong opposition of .43), but education appears to have a 
larger impact on this high religiosity woman.  The impact of education on the probability 
of strong opposition appears largest for individuals at the highest level of religiosity.  
Table 7.5 Percentage change in predicted probabilities of strongly opposing an Islamic family law 
moving from lowest to highest education, across levels of religious engagement 
 Percentage Increase in Probability of Strong Opposition 
  
 Moving from no education to college diploma 












Cells show the percentage change in the predicted probabilities of strongly opposing an Islamic family law 
for Muslim for men and women who move from lowest to highest education, across levels of religious 
engagement.  This table uses the estimated coefficients for Muslims in the right hand column of Table 7.1 
and holds all other variables at their means. 
 
Education, religious engagement, and gender account for differences between 
citizens in their likelihood of supporting or opposing a state family law based on 
Shari’ah.  However, media debates about family law reform framed the issue as a 
question of secularism and the secularism of the state.  In the second half of this chapter, 
I ask if an individual’s preference for or against the secularism of the state does indeed 
shape preferences for state laws based on Shari’ah, controlling for other covariates.  
Moreover, do other elements of the media discourse shape preferences, such as tolerance, 
legal uniformity versus pluralism, and attitudes toward women?   
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Shari’ah as a Source of Law in a Secular State 
At the bivariate level, citizens who support a secular state in Senegal appear more 
likely to oppose a personal status law for Muslims.  Similarly, Chapter 6 showed that 
men and women themselves discuss their opposition to a state law that claims to conform 
to Shari’ah as a question of secularism.  However, not mentioning secularism as a salient 
consideration does not indicate opposition to a secular state.  Some individuals who want 
Shari’ah as a source of state law may oppose the secular state.  However, other citizens 
may simply be unaware that the issue of family law was framed as a question of 
secularism, and thus the construct of secularism was not salient for them as they thought 
about and responded to the survey question.   
 In the remaining analysis, I evaluate three additional models.  Table 7.6 shows 
the results of each of the multivariate ordered logit models.   Model 1 reprints the model 
from Table 1 that estimates the impact of key demographic variables on intensity of 
support and opposition for Senegalese Muslims.  Model 2 estimates the impact of support 
for a secular state on family law preferences in a multivariate setting.  In Model 3, I 
evaluate if preferences for the principle of uniformity in laws and rights—which I argue 
was central to the secular interpretive package constructed in Senegalese media discourse 
in Chapter 4—also predicts family law preferences.  Finally, Model 4 estimates the 
impact of citizens’ views on other elements of the debate mentioned in media 
discourse—namely measures that capture citizens’ views on equal political rights for 
non-Muslims in Islam, the legitimacy of democratic laws based on the will of the people, 
attitudes toward women in Islam, and tolerance—shape preferences for Shari’ah as a 
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source of state family law.144   In each of these models, I also include a variable 
measuring citizens’ views on the level of corruption in society, particularly because so 
many citizens who supported Shari’ah in their narratives discussed the ills of society and 
viewed Shari’ah as a means to reduce these problems.145
                                                 
144Measures are discussed in the Appendix.  
145Respondents were asked: A lot of people also talk about corruption today in Senegal.  When you think 
about society today compared to five years ago, do you think there is much more corruption today, a little 
more corruption, about the same amount of corruption, a little less corruption, or much less corruption?  
Note that in an additional analysis, I also included two measures of evaluations for the performance of 
religious and political leaders, as well as the performance of the President, given that his opposition was 
often cited in media reports.  Evaluations of religious and political leaders are not significant in any 
analyses, but the direction of causation is not necessarily clear if they were significant.  It is possible that 
individuals might disapprove more of the President upon hearing that he opposed this law, for example.  I 
also include a measure of one’s standard of living today versus five years ago, which was not a significant 
predictor of preferences for state family law. 
    
Of particular note is that in each of the models in Table 7.6, the key demographic 
variables of interest remain significant—gender, religious engagement, and education—
and work in the same direction.  Model 2 shows that views on the secularism of the state 
do impact preferences for state family law based on Shari’ah.  As Chapter 4 argued, 
family law reform was debated as a question of Senegalese secularism.  Indeed, as 
citizens increase the intensity of their support for a secular state, they are more likely to 
strongly oppose a personal status law for Muslims. 
Using the estimated coefficients in Model 2, a Muslim woman who has average 
levels of each variable in the model but who strongly opposes a secular state has a 
predicted probability of strongly supporting an Islamic family law of .66.  A similar 
woman who strongly supports a secular state has a substantially lower probability of 
strongly supporting the law of .40, or a reduction of .26.  A similar man who is “average” 
on all other variables reduces his probability of strong support by .25, moving from a 
probability of strong support of .59 to a probability of .34.   
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Model 3 estimates the impact of citizen’s orientations toward the secular state and 
adds an additional survey item measuring preferences for legal uniformity versus 
pluralism, which was discussed in Chapter 5.  In media debates, the interpretive frame of 
the secularism connected secularism to the principle of one nation/one law.  An Islamic 
personal status law would subject citizens to a “two-tiered” system of justice.146
                                                 
146 Views on the secularism of the state and legal uniformity have a bivariate correlation of .26. 
  Model 2 
shows that both variables are substantively strong predictors of preferences for family 
law.  Supporting a secular state and one set of laws for all citizens pushes respondents to 
oppose a family law based on Shari’ah, while opposing a secular state and wanting 
different laws for citizens of different religions pushes toward support for an Islamic 
family law.  An average woman who moves from the extreme “anti-secular” to the 
extreme “pro-secular” position on both variables increases her estimated probability of 
strongly opposing the law from .03 to .28, or an increase in .25.  An average man 
increases his probability from .04 to .31, or .28.  The substantive and statistical 
significance of both survey items suggests that these secular predispositions strongly 
shape preferences for family law, and that values of secularism and legal uniformity have 
strongly resonate with the general public.  Men and women who prefer one set of laws 
and rights for citizens of all religions and support a secular state are significantly more 
likely to report strongly opposing a family law based on Shari’ah.  Citizens who say they 
want different laws for citizens of different religions and oppose a secular state are 




Table 7.6 Popular support for and opposition to Islamic family law for Senegalese Muslims 
Ordinal Logit Results 




Model 2,  
Secular State 
Model 3,  
Secular State and 
Legal Uniformity  
Model 4,  
Other Elements 
of the Debate 
     
Age .008 .007 .008 .008 
 (.008) (.009) (.010) (.010) 
Household wealth  .037 .034 .012 .009 
 (.038) (.038) (.039) (.040) 
Education .155*** .145*** .134*** .123*** 
 (.029) (.029) (.030) (.031) 
Divorced .438 .387 .516 .367 
 (.371) (.383) (.395) (.391) 
Single .266 .270 .348 .301 
 (.232) (.232) (.249) (.254) 
Polygamous marriage -.574* -.553* -.675* -.692* 
 (.267) (.269) (.271) (.278) 
Number of children .035 .047 .041 .027 
 (.053) (.053) (.057) (.058) 
Female (1=female) -.916** -.824** -.668* -.624* 
 (.289) (.287) (.292) (.294) 
Female X Religious 
Engagement .288* .265* .267* .239 
 (.1240 (.125) (.130) (.132) 
Religious Engagement  -.485*** -.431*** -.375*** -.363*** 
 (.093) (.094) (.097) (.096) 
Tariqa Murid  .076 .110 .056 .079 
 (.177) (.177) (.186) (.191) 
No Sufi tariqa .159 .193 .273 .237 
 (.274) (.271) (.273) (.275) 
Media exposure .199* .167 .158 .139 
 .093 (.096) (.095) (.095) 
Levels of Corruption   .078 .082 .067 
  (.063) (.067) (.069) 
Support for a secular 
state 
 
.340*** .228* .202* 
  (.093) (.096) (.095) 
Uniformity in laws and 
rights  
 
— .265*** .261*** 
   (.032) (.033) 
Democratic legitimacy 
of  laws 
 
— — .240*** 
    (.063) 
Political tolerance  — — .072 
    (.073) 
Permissive 
interpretations toward 
women in Islam 
 
— — .101 
    (.076) 
Inferior political rights 
for non-Muslims in 
Islam 
 
— — .161* 
    (.072) 
 614 614 614 614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.   Note that these analyses only 
include Senegalese Muslims.  The results of each model are nearly identical when Senegalese Christians 




The results of Model 4 add additional survey items tapping a broader range of 
themes mentioned in the family law debates—namely measures that capture citizens’ 
views on equal political rights for non-Muslims in Islam, the legitimacy of democratic 
laws based on the will of the people, attitudes toward women in Islam, and tolerance.  I 
add these items to evaluate the larger argument that ways elites discuss Shari’ah as a 
source of state law plays a role in shaping what citizens see as important to the debate.  I 
have argued that the key frame was the secularism of the state and the related idea that 
secularism, ideally, promoted uniformity in the legal system and laws in order to 
guarantee equality for all citizens.  However, I include these other variables to offer 
evidence that these are not the only variables that are important in this debate.  Moreover, 
I attempt to show that we should not expect these items to be seen as part of a coherent 
whole by citizens, who may not see these preferences as related at all.   
I argue that each of the additional variables in Model 4 taps into a separate issue 
and that there are theoretical and empirical reasons why these survey items are not 
tapping the same construct of secularism.  For example, Models 3 and 4 estimate the 
impact of preferring legal uniformity versus pluralism on individuals’ preferences for 
family law—a major element of the most recent media debates about family law in 
Senegal.  However, Model 4 includes an additional item that asks respondents whether or 
not they agree with the interpretation that in Islam, non-Muslims in a Muslim country 
have inferior political rights to Muslims.147
                                                 
147 This survey item comes from a series of religious interpretation questions that has been included in the 
World Values Surveys.  Respondents were asked:  Today as in the past, Muslim scholars and jurists 
sometimes disagree about the proper interpretation of Islam in response to present-day issues. For each of 
the statements listed below, would you please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, are neutral, 
disagree, or disagree strongly with the interpretation of Islam that is presented? “Islam requires that in a 
Muslim country, the political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those of Muslims.” 
  Media discourse did highlight equality in 
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laws and rights, but there were no strong voices emphasizing that Muslims in Senegal 
should have inferior political rights.  Likewise, preferring the principle of pluralism in 
laws and rights versus uniformity for all religions does not imply that one believes the 
rights of Muslims to be superior to those of Christians in a Muslim country.  Indeed, by 
applying Shari’ah principles only to Muslims, CIRCOFS argued that it did not seek to 
impose Islamic principles on Christians.  Legal scholars also debate the merits of legal 
pluralism versus uniformity as a means to protecting equal rights for all citizens (Jackson 
2006; Rudolph and Rudolph 2001).  Therefore, the principles of legal uniformity versus 
pluralism do not indicate views about the inferiority or superiority of Muslims and non-
Muslims.  I include this additional item to estimate if, for some citizens, holding this 
more conservative interpretation of Islam does lead them toward one side of the family 
law debate.   
Women’s rights did not play a major role in this most recent debate about family 
law, but historically elites have discussed family law in terms of the rights of women.  
The few citizens in Chapter 6 who did discuss family law in terms of women often 
mentioned issues of women’s dress and morality.  As a result, I include an index 
measuring preferences for more versus less permissive interpretations toward women in 
Islam.148
One frame that did play a larger role in the family law debate was democracy, 
though there was competition over its meaning.  CIRCOFS argued that the current law 
violated the religious beliefs of the majority and relied on the idea of majority rule; they 
     
                                                 
148 These two survey items come from the same series about interpretations of Islam:   
(1) “Islam requires that a women dress modestly, but does not require that she cover her head with a veil,” 
and (2) “By requiring a man to treat all of his wives equally, the true intent of Islam is to discourage a man 
from taking more than one wife.”   
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argued further that Muslims rejected the current law.  Their argument rested, therefore, 
on both democratic and Islamic legitimacy.  However, advocates for the current Family 
Code also argued that secularism was tied to Senegal’s democratic gains, and 
furthermore, that the majority of the people rejected Islamic extremism.  Others argued 
against the idea of the will of the majority by emphasizing the legal equality of all 
citizens, including minorities.  I include a survey item asking citizens whether or not the 
only legitimate laws represent the will of the people and are enacted by elected 
representatives. 149
Finally, as elites debated family law, the value of tolerance was often included as 
a reason to oppose the personal status law.  Which side was more “tolerant,” however, 
was also contested.  Opponents of CIRCOFS often asserted that Senegal is a tolerant 
country.  Some advocates of CIRCOFS argued that their opponents were “intolerant” 
secularists.  As such, I evaluate if citizens score higher on measures of political tolerance 
are indeed more or less likely to support or oppose the proposed law.  There is good 
reason to think that tolerance will not necessarily go hand-in-hand with supporting 
secularism.  One might support a secular state and favor equality for all religious groups, 
yet grant very few rights to groups one dislikes, especially if these disliked groups are not 
mainstream religious groups.
     
150
                                                 
149 Now I would like to know your views about the legitimacy of laws.  In your opinion, do you strongly 
agree, approve, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following three principles as a guide for making the 
legitimate laws of our country?    Only laws that are written by representatives elected by the people, and 
that represent the will of the people, are legitimate and should be obeyed. 
  
150 This study measures tolerance using the Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982, 23) “content-controlled” 
or “least-liked group” approach, because tolerance “implies a willingness to permit the expression of those 
ideas or interests that one opposes; it thus presumes opposition.”  First, I asked respondents to name the 
group that they liked the least out of a list of groups.  Then, I asked a series of four of questions in which 
respondents could grant or deny civil liberties to members of their least-liked group.  The questions 
measured whether the respondent would grant the right to be elected President of the Republic of Senegal, 
to teach in the public schools, to demonstrate in public, and to give a speech in the city.  Using this 
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I argue that each of these survey items taps an important and unique construct and 
that we should not expect citizens view these items as interconnected.  To support this 
empirically, as well, each of these items—support for a secular state, legal uniformity, 
inferiority of non-Muslim political rights in Islam, the democratic legitimacy of laws, 
permissive attitudes toward women in Islam, and tolerance have a low Cronbach’s alpha 
score of .31.   
As Table 7.6 shows, the estimated coefficients in Model 4 do not change the 
significant of either the importance of the secular state or of the principle of legal 
uniformity for all citizens.  However, several additional variables also impact preferences 
for family law.  Citizens who disagree with the statement that only laws that represent the 
will of the people are legitimate are more likely the support a law based on Shari’ah, and 
vice versa.  Those who interpret Islam as granting non-Muslims inferior political rights 
are also more likely to support a law based on Shari’ah, and vice versa.  Interpretations 
toward women in Islam and political tolerance are not significant predictors of 
preferences for family law.151
                                                                                                                                                 
measure, levels of intolerance are high, as they are in other countries, despite the discourse on tolerance: 
about 54% of respondents grant no rights to their least-liked group.  
151 Of particular interest is that political tolerance is not significantly related to preferences for family law.  
The measure of tolerance used in this study requires individuals to grant rights to groups they dislike.  
Thus, while there is a strong discourse of religious toleration in Senegal, this discourse tends to focus on 
the rights of all religions to coexist and practice their religion freely.  This discourse does not necessarily 
translate into tolerating disliked groups such as atheists and those who support abortion rights, the two most 
disliked groups in the sample. 
  These results offer additional evidence that both items 
tapping the major frame in the debate—secularism and the principle of uniformity in laws 
and rights—do help to explain family law preferences.  Moreover, views about the will of 
the people as the only legitimate source of laws appears important as well.  The effect of 
this variable works in the opposite direction of the CIRCOFS frame, however.  Citizens 
who agree that only laws from the people are legitimate are more likely to oppose a 
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family law based on Shari’ah.  This suggests that though CIRCOFS attempted to frame 
their demands in terms of democratic and religious authority, the primary justification of 
the CIRCOFS proposal was that Shari’ah had religious authority as divine law.   
Even after taking these other views into account, views toward the secular state 
are significantly associated with preferences for family law.   Table 7.7 shows the 
predicted probabilities for Senegalese Muslims who have average values on all variables 
in Model 4, but who vary in education, religious engagement, and orientations toward the 
secular state.  In Table 7.7.A, education and religiosity work in the same direction, but 
orientations toward the secular state also matter.  For example, men and women who 
report the lowest levels of education and religious engagement and who strongly oppose 
a secular state are predicted to strongly support an Islamic family law with a probability 
of .65.  This is substantially higher than those who prefer a secular state, who are 
predicted to strongly support such a law with a probability of .50 (a difference of .15).   
Table 7.7.B shows predicted probabilities for individuals who report the highest 
level of religiosity.  For high religious engagement men and women with average levels 
on all other variables, and across each level of education, moving from an anti- to a pro-
secular state orientation substantially reduces one’s predicted probability of strongly 





Table 7.7 Predicted probabilities of strong support and strong opposition for individuals who oppose 
and who support a secular state, across education and religious engagement 
A. Lowest religious engagement 
 Probability of Strongly Supporting 
an Islamic family law 
Probability of Strongly Opposing 
an Islamic family law 














No education       
Women .65 .50 -.15 .07 .12 .05 
Men .50 .35 -.15 .13 .21 .08 
       
Mean Education        
Women .51 .35 -.15 .13 .21 .08 
Men .35 .23 -.12 .21 .33 .12 
       
College Education       
Women .32 .21 -.12 .23 .36 .13 
Men .20 .12 -.08 .36 .51 .15 
       
B. Highest religious engagement 














No education       
Women .75 .62 -.13 .05 .08 .04 
Men .81 .70 -.11 .03 .06 .03 
       
Mean Education        
Women .62 .47 -.15 .08 .14 .06 
Men .70 .56 -.14 .06 .10 .04 
       
College Education       
Women .44 .30 -.14 .16 .25 .09 
Men .52 .37 -.15 .12 .19 .08 
       
Cells show the predicted probabilities of strongly supporting and strongly opposing the law for Muslim 
men and women, using the estimated coefficients for Muslims in Model 4, while varying levels of religious 
engagement and education.  All other variables are held at their means. 
 
The second half of this chapter finds strong evidence that views on the secularism 
of the state do shape preferences for family law in the ways suggested by elites who 
opposed CIRCOFS’ proposal.  In particular, individuals who support the secular state are 
more likely to oppose a family law based on Shari’ah.  Also among citizens’ primary 
concerns is that Senegalese law is applied equally and uniformly to all citizens regardless 
of religious affiliation.  Views on the democratic legitimacy of laws are also important.  
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Citizens who agree that only such laws are legitimate are more likely to oppose a law 
based on Shari’ah, despite the fact that CIRCOFS argued that their proposal had popular 
legitimacy.  Of note, political tolerance and permissive interpretations of Islam regarding 
women do not seem to be related to family law preferences.  Furthermore, tolerance may 
not be important because the stricter measure of tolerance requires citizens to grant rights 
not just to other religious individuals that they respect, but to groups they dislike.    
 In short, my findings in Chapter 6 and 7 suggest that when measured by citizens’ 
own coded narratives, or through closed-ended survey questions, measures of religious 
and secular predispositions do shape family law preferences when controlling for other 
variables.  The secular interpretive package offered by opinion leaders in the media does 
shape men’s and women’s family law preferences.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I find evidence that education increases the likelihood that men 
and women will oppose a family law based on Shari’ah.  Women are also more likely to 
say they support a family law based on Shari’ah, and education partially mediates the 
impact of gender.  In general, men and women who are most religiosity engaged are also 
most likely to support a family law based on Shari’ah.  However, the magnitude of 
religiosity is larger for men than women, in part because norms of religious practice 
differ for Muslim men and women.  Gender may not play a significant role on its own 
were measures of religious engagement better able to capture Muslim women’s religious 
participation.  New scholarship on religion and gender has focused on women’s religious 
participation in other important, but less measurable, ways. 
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These ordered logit results provide strong evidence that closed-ended survey 
items measuring religious engagement, support for a secular state, and support for the 
principle of uniformity in laws versus pluralism, each plays a strong role in shaping 
preferences for and against a family law that claims to conform to Shari’ah.  Many 
citizens do view support for laws based on Shari’ah as a question of religious belief and 
commitment.  Moreover, valuing secularism and legal uniformity does push citizens to 
take sides on the issue of Shari’ah as a source of family law and predicts opposition to 
such a law.  The direction of these results supports the dominant framing of the secular 
interpretive package offered by opinion leaders throughout media discourse.  Chapter 6, 
however, suggested that a substantial number of citizens do not view secularism and 
Shari’ah as incompatible preferences.  While secular predispositions are substantively 
and significantly important predictors of family law preferences, I set the stage for my 
analysis in Chapter 8, in which I argue that support for secularism and for Shari’ah as 
state law are not mutually exclusive for many citizens.  Ordinary men and women hold 
divergent views about whether Islamic law should be a source of law in a secular state, 






Chapter 8  
Belief Systems about Religion and State 
 
“The impact of people’s value predispositions always depends on whether citizens 
possess the contextual information needed to translate their values into support for 
particular policies….and the possession of such information can…never be taken for 
granted” 
       (Zaller 1992, 25) 
 
As we saw in Chapter Four, activists on both sides of the family law debate used 
emphatic language and often spoke in absolutes in order to convey the urgency of the 
debate and the potentially dire consequences for families and the country depending on 
the direction family law reform might take.  While media discourse represented both 
sides, the state’s current Family Code and its defenders clearly represent the dominant 
elite consensus surrounding the issue of family law.152
                                                 
152 For example, some critique the law and acknowledge that it may not reflect the values of the people or 
critique its privileging of patriarchy in the family (Camara 2007b), but most defend it as a critical, if 
flawed, balance between “modern” law and certain elements of Islamic law, which serves to “preserve the 
unity of the family and respect the social diversity” in the nation  (Mbaye 2007, 195).    
  The current Family Code and 
uniform system of justice, if flawed, is a critical pillar of the secularism of the state that 
attempts to respect individual rights and treat all citizens equally under the law.   As such, 
some defenders of the current law labeled opponents of an Islamic family law as 
“Islamists” who opposed to the secular state and who sought a greater Islamization of the 
country through a broader application of Shari’ah (Djouf 2003; Bop 2003).  Others saw 
this as a project of “extremists” (Ndiaye 2003).  Advocates for a personal status law that 
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would apply Shari’ah to Muslims and that would reinstate Muslim tribunals attempted to 
contest this dominant interpretive package that linked the secularism of the state and legal 
equality to the family code—this was, instead, an intolerant secularism (Kébé 2003). 153
 So far in this dissertation, I have shown that religious interpretations and 
engagement do appear to explain why some Muslims favor Shari’ah as a source of state 
law.  Many citizens also seem to view family law according to the dominant elite 
consensus found throughout print media discourse—that family law raises questions 
about the secularism of the state as well as the legal equality of all citizens.  However, 
only some citizens seem to view preferences for Shari’ah as a source of state law and for 
the secular state as mutually exclusive preferences.   As Table 8.1 shows, of those who 
oppose the secular state, almost 77% support an Islamic family law.  However, citizens 
 
   Similarly, broader scholarship and punditry about politics in the Muslim world 
tends to describe competition between secular and Islamic political ideologies—between 
secularists and Islamists.  In the course of such heated public debates, individual Muslims 
are often labeled as “secular” or “Islamist,” or as “moderate,” “extremist,” or even 
“liberal” in their interpretations of Islam.  Labeling someone a “secularist” implies that 
they hold a broader set of consistently secular preferences; an “Islamist” or even an 
“extremist” that they have a consistent set of interpretations of Islam, politics, and in 
many cases, that they want Shari’ah as state law.  Labeling Muslims in ideological 
terms—as a moderate, conservative, extremist, or liberal—for example, also implies that 
individuals who are moderate on one interpretation of Islam will be moderate across a 
broader range of interpretations.   
                                                 
153 “ …On prétend que ces statuts varies ne militant pas en faveur de l’unité nationale, n’assure pas l’égalité 
juridique des citoyens, constitue une entrave à l’intégration dans la modernité et une menace à la laïcité de 
la constitution et de l’état ”   
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who support a secular state are almost equally divided on the question of Islamic family 
law.   There is broad support for the principle of secularism in Senegal and there is broad 
support for the principle of uniform laws and rights for all citizens.  Why do some 
citizens connect their views about secularism and legal uniformity to their views on 
family law and others do not?  Why do some citizens view a state family law based on 
Shari’ah as a threat to the secularism and legal equality, while others do not?   
Table 8.1 Support and opposition to an Islamic family law, by preferences for a secular state 
 Support Islamic family law Oppose Islamic family law  
Oppose Secular State 76.6% 23.5% 145 
Support Secular State 51.5% 48.5% 610 
N=755.  The results are similar when excluding Christians from the sample.  Of those who oppose a secular 
state, 22.1% oppose an Islamic family law and 77.9% support it.  Of those who support the secular state, 
58.3% support an Islamic family law and 41.7% oppose it.  This relationship is significant at the p<.001 
level. 
 
 This chapter addresses this final question and analyzes the existence and structure 
of ordinary Muslims’ belief systems about religion, law, and state.  By addressing these 
questions, I also ask whether it makes sense to label citizens themselves as “secular” or 
“Islamist” based on their support for a state family law based on Shari’ah.  Finally, in a 
related analysis, I take up the question of the existence and measurement of broader 
liberal or conservative Islamic belief system.  More specifically, to what extent we can 
identify individuals who hold consistently liberal versus conservative interpretations of 
Islam?  My analysis adds to large body of research on belief systems and opinion 
consistency in public opinion, which Converse (1964) described as attitude constraint.  
By investigating rather than assuming the extent to which individuals make connections 
between their attitudes concerning secularism and Shari’ah, I argue that we cannot 
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assume that the majority of ordinary Muslims view support for a secular state and for 
Shari’ah as state law as necessarily mutually exclusive.  Many citizens’ views are likely 
to be malleable and will depend on how each issue—secularism and Shari’ah—is framed 
through popular and elite discourse. 
 
Consistency and Belief Systems 
As noted in Chapter 3, contemporary models of public opinion posit that 
individuals highlight the important role of predispositions and information as citizens 
form preferences and respond to public opinion surveys (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 
1992; Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Tourangeau et al. 2000).  Zaller and Feldman (1992) 
show that individuals who are more informed about politics tend to have more 
information at their disposal as they form opinions.  They are also better able to resist 
new information that conflicts with their predispositions.  In contrast, less informed 
individuals internalize more contradictory considerations because they may not recognize 
contradictions between new information and other values and preferences that they may 
hold.  Therefore, more informed citizens tend to respond to survey items in ways that 
mirror the packages of preferences that are said to “go together” in elite discourse; their 
responses appear more consistent.   
Research on opinion consistency has uncovered an important relationship 
between increasing information, or political awareness, and increasing attitude 
consistency.  Using Converse’s (1964) terminology, more informed men and women 
should hold more “constrained” attitudes compared to the less informed.  Converse 
(1964, 229) hypothesized that constraint was a general construct that should structure any 
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belief system: “A set of questions on matters of religious controversy should show the 
same pattern between an elite population like the clergy and the church members who 
form their mass ‘public.’”  However, Zaller (1992, 68) argued that less aware citizens 
respond to surveys in seemingly inconsistent ways because most political issues are 
removed from their daily lives and experiences.  Information is thought to play an 
especially large role in structuring opinions and belief systems when the issues are not 
“close to home”  Similarly, Sniderman and Theriault (2004) write: “The world of public 
affairs is…remote, complex, recondite, and of secondary interest compared to the real 
and pressing concerns of family, work, and religion.”   We might expect, therefore, that 
questions about Shari’ah as a source of state law are more relevant to citizens’ everyday 
lives compared to other abstract questions about state policy.  As a result, information 
may not play such a large role in connecting values and preferences on issues that entail 
religious predispositions or that are extremely important to men and women.   
As the intensity of responses from this sample shows—as well as the 
overwhelming number of supporters who report feeling “pride” or “hopeful” when they 
think about Senegal enacting a state law based on Shari’ah—most Senegalese citizens 
care deeply about the role of Shari’ah as a source of law.  Because so many ordinary men 
and women offered detailed religious arguments explaining why they wanted a law based 
on Shari’ah, and because many interpreted this question as a matter of religious identity 
and obligation as much as a question of state policy, we might expect individuals with 
higher levels of religiosity to draw stronger connections between survey items that are 
related to the issue of family law.  A highly religious engaged individual might feel 
strongly that Shari’ah should be a source of state law and might strongly oppose a secular 
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state, believing this to be contrary to his or her beliefs.  In this sense, religiosity could 
structure such attitudes in a similar way to information or awareness.      
 Others have suggested a similar expectation.  An-Na’im (2002, xi), for example,  
posits that most Muslims view family law as akin to religious identity.   
Islamic family law has become for most Muslims the symbol of their Islamic 
identity, the hard irreducible core of what it means to be a Muslim today.  This is 
precisely because [it] is the main aspect of Shari’ah that is believed to have 
successfully resisted displacement by European codes during the colonial period, 
and survived various degrees or forms of secularization of the state and its 
institutions in many Islamic countries. 
 
My analysis has also reinforced the empirical reality that Senegalese Muslims do not 
speak with one voice, however.  I find substantial evidence that many ordinary citizens 
also view family law as inherently political.  For these citizens, an Islamic family law 
violates the secularism of the Senegalese state, and family law is the first space where 
equal citizenship rights are enforced in society.  Some critique the content of Shari’ah as 
too difficult to enforce or too harsh, while others are not opposed to the Shari’ah per se, 
but simply believe that the state should not enforce it.  Either way, the issue of family law 
and Shari’ah as a source of law appears to be extremely relevant and “close to home” for 
most citizens.  
In this chapter, I undertake an empirical investigation of the interconnectedness of 
opinions about the family law debate—namely, support for Islamic family law, support 
for a secular state, and support for the principle of uniformity in law for citizens of all 
religions.  I evaluate if individuals with higher levels of information appear to make 
stronger connections between these preferences.  I also evaluate if individuals with higher 
levels of religious engagement are as likely, if not more likely, to do so than individuals 
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which higher levels of information.  In so doing, I discuss the plausibility that citizens 
hold broad secular and Islamic belief systems.  I also address the question of who it is 
that responds in a consistently pro- versus anti-secular direction.   
Recent studies of opinion consistently continue to measure inter-item correlations 
to evaluate if individuals who are more politically aware hold more consistent sets of 
foreign policy preferences (Sinnott 2000), political ideology (Bartle 2000), and 
preferences for economic policy, immigration, and crime (Sturgis et al. 2005).  According 
to Converse (2000), item inter-correlations indicate “how tightly structured or 
‘constrained’” a set of potentially related items are.  Individuals who exhibit higher inter-
item correlations between items that are thought to “go together” have more constrained 
opinions or belief systems. 
I continue this tradition of comparing reliability coefficients across 
subpopulations using my cross-sectional data in order to evaluate if Senegalese men and 
women hold interconnected attitudes about the family law debate.  I also evaluate if 
constraint varies in predictable ways as either education or religious engagement 
increases.  I am primarily interested in the relationship between education—as my main 
measure of information and awareness of elite discourse—and citizens’ preferences for 
family law.  However, I compare education to other measures of media exposure and 
political knowledge because they are available for use.154
                                                 
154 I have suggested that education is the best measure of overall information and exposure to public 
discourse and is best able to capture gradients in constraint as information increases.  Education has the 
most variation compared to my measures of media exposure and political knowledge.  Many studies that 
prefer political knowledge as a measure have taken place in the US, where there are fewer differences 
between most citizens in levels of education, and where education levels are skewed toward the upper 
levels (Zaller 1992, 1990).  As discussed in Chapter 5, education has a very high correlation with political 
knowledge (r=.59) and a moderately high correlation with media exposure (r=.46).  Media exposure and 
political knowledge are also correlated (.50).  My measure of political knowledge is skewed toward higher 
levels of knowledge (the mean is 3.6 out of a total of 6), suggesting that these questions may have lacked 
   Following Sturgis et al. 
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(2005), I use standardized Cronbach’s alpha as my measure of reliably/constraint across 
these items.   
 Because many debates about the application of Islamic law often center on 
“correct” or authoritative interpretations using complicated legal methodologies, it would 
in theory be useful to compare constraint across general measures of education and 
information and across measures of religious education and information.  However, given 
the vast variations in the norms and content of religious beliefs and practices between 
individuals within religious traditions, across countries, and as others have noted, within 
and between the different Sufi orders in Senegal, it seems particularly implausible to 
create measures of religious knowledge or awareness.155
The dominant interpretive package in Senegal’s family law debate discussed 
preferences for a state family law based on Shari’ah as a question of support for the 
secular state, as well for the principle of uniformity in laws and rights versus pluralism.  
To what extent do men and women themselves see these attitudes as part of an 
  Furthermore, Senegal has 
historically placed great value on respecting religious difference in its public discourse, 
so measuring religious knowledge is problematic for insisting that some knowledge is 
may be more valid.  Therefore, I continue to use my measure of religious engagement, 
which I use interchangeably with religiosity, to differentiate between individuals who 
connect their preferences for Shari’ah as state family law and for the secular state.    
 
Religion, Law and State 
                                                                                                                                                 
sufficient difficulty in order to distinguish between individuals at moderate and high levels of information.  
Others have speculated that media exposure may overstate an individual’s true level of exposure.  
Nevertheless, I compare all measures simply because they are available. 
155 Even within Islamic jurisprudence, different schools offer diverse but equally authoritative 
interpretations, and schools differ in the extent to which they take local customs into account. 
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interconnected package of attitudes and respond in direction of the dominant discourse?  
Moreover, are citizens as likely to make these connections across different levels of 
education, religiosity, media consumption, and political information?  Table 8.2 shows 
standardized Cronbach’s alpha scores for this package of preferences.   
Table 8.2 Consistency toward Islamic family law, a secular state, and legal uniformity for all citizens 











.421 Low .505 Low .552 Low .560 
Primary .481 2 .513 Medium- 
Low 
 




.533 3 .573 Medium- 
High 




.564 4 .566 High .504 4 .571 
College 
Diploma + 
.764 High .653   High .563 
N=751, Cells show standardized Cronbach’s alpha scores across preferences for Islamic family law, a 
secular state, and uniformity in laws and rights for citizens or all religion versus different laws and rights, 
across various levels of education, political knowledge, media exposure, and religious engagement.156
The results in Table 8.2 suggest that individuals do vary in the extent to which they view 
connections between an Islamic family law, a secular state, and the principle of 
uniformity and equality in law.  For those with no formal education, alpha scores are a 
low .421.  However, men and women with the highest levels of education respond more 
consistently across these items and have an alpha score of .764.   Constraint increases 
     
 
                                                 
156 All measures are discussed in the Appendix and in Chapter 5.  Each variable has been recoded here for 
presentation purposes.  Education is recoded from its original 13 category variable into this 5 category 
measure.  The sample size for education categories is as follows: None (146), Primary (254), Middle (155), 
High School (124), College (72).  Media exposure has been recoded into 5 quintiles.  The Sample size is as 
follows:  Lowest (163), 2 (156), 3 (126), 4 (164), Highest (141).  Political knowledge has been recoded 
from 7 categories into four categories.  The sample size is as follows: Low (112), Low-Medium (207), 
Medium-High (270), High (162).  Religious Engagement is the same quintile variable discussed earlier.  




linearly as individuals have increasingly higher levels of formal education; specifically, 
alpha increases almost 82% moving from no formal education and to those with a college 
degree or higher.  A similar pattern emerges when we compare constraint across media 
exposure, but the percentage increase from the lowest to the highest level is a more 
moderate 29%, still a substantial increase.  This measure of political knowledge, on the 
other hand, does not show a linearly increasing relationship.  However, other studies 
suggest that we should not always expect constraint to increase linearly across all 
information groups over all issue groupings (Sturgis et al. 2005).157
 Table 8.3 repeats this analysis but focuses exclusively on Senegalese Muslims in 
the event that these trends in constraint are driven in part by the strength of the Christian 
  In short, individuals 
who respond in the same direction and make the strongest connection between these 
issues seem to have the highest levels of information, measured most precisely by 
education, followed by media exposure.   
 An equally important finding is that there is no relationship between increasing 
levels of religiosity and consistency.  Constraint remains nearly constant as we move 
from lowest to highest religiosity.  This lack of relationship suggests that information, 
and not religiosity, differentiates between individuals who make broader consistent 
connections between items tapping the relationship between religion, law, and state.  
Individuals who believe that the issue of a state family law based on Shari’ah, a secular 
state, and having one set of laws for citizens of all religions are part of an interrelated 
package tend have the highest levels of formal education and exposure to the media.     
                                                 
157 As noted, I suspect that this measure of political knowledge may not adequately capture variations 
between citizens in terms of broad knowledge and awareness, especially between moderate and high levels 
of information.  The mean number of correct responses is relatively high (3.6 out of 6).  Citizens seem to 
vary more by education, as I have argued, which may result in a more precise measurement of differences 
in information and awareness. 
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population’s opposition to a personal status law for Muslims.  The trend of increasing 
alpha scores as education increases is even more dramatic when we look only at Muslim 
citizens.  In fact, alpha increases 107% when moving from the lowest to the highest 
education group.  Constraint also increases 49% moving from low to high media 
exposure, as compared to almost no change moving from low to high political 
knowledge.    












None .364 Low .465 Low .493 Low .556 
 
Primary .420 2 .466 Medium- 
Low 
 




.558 3 .526 Medium- 
High 





.540 4 .524 High .507 4 .485 
College 
Diploma + 
.753 High .678   High .531 
N=657, Cells show standardized Cronbach’s alpha for Senegalese Muslims across preferences for Islamic 
family law, a secular state, and uniformity in laws and rights for citizens or all religion versus different 
laws and rights, across various levels of education, political knowledge, media exposure, and religious 
engagement. 158
The survey question measuring citizen support for and opposition to reforming 
the current Family Code and instead enacting an Islamic family law did not mention 
anything about secularism or the secular state, but did mention that the law would apply 
only to Muslims and would be based on Shari’ah.  As mentioned, the survey question 
 
 
                                                 
158 The sample size for education categories is as follows: None (138), Primary (222), Middle (129), High 
School (109), College (59).  The sample size for media exposure is as follows:  Lowest (146), 2 (139), 3 
(108), 4 (140), Highest (123).  The sample size for political knowledge is: Low (98), Low-Medium (179), 
Medium-High (237), High (143).  Religious Engagement is the same quintile variable discussed earlier.  




intended to provide enough detail to respondents to ground the debate in context, but 
avoided a specific question framing so that we could gather the range of considerations 
that were most salient to respondents as they thought about the principle of a state law 
that conformed to Shari’ah.  As a result, citizens who connected the issue of Shari’ah and 
family law to the issue of secularism had to make this connection on their own and had to 
know something about the elite debate surrounding the issue.  Moreover, citizens who 
were aware of and made connections between the issues of family law reform, one’s 
support for the secular state, and the issue of legal equality of citizens and the principle of 
one law for all citizens appear more likely to be educated/informed, rather than 
necessarily more or less religiously engaged than those who did not make these 
connections.  To illustrate this point, Table 8.4 shows the results of coded narrative 
responses for men and women who actually mentioned “secularism” or a “secular state” 
as they discussed their reasons for opposing a personal status law that would conform to 
Shari’ah.  Citizens who opposed the law already have a higher mean level of formal 
education compared to those who supported the law.159
                                                 
159 Citizens who opposed an Islamic family law have a mean education level of 3.1—or completed middle 
school—on this recoded scale of education from 1 (no formal education) to 5 (college and above).  This 
compares to a mean education of 2.3, or complete primary school, on this recoded scale.  This mean 
difference is significant (p=.000). 
  Moreover, looking within this 
group of more educated citizens who opposed the law, citizens’ own narratives show that 
those for whom secularism is a salient consideration are disproportionately from the 
highest education levels.  No individuals without formal schooling mentioned the 
concept, while about 22% of individuals who only had a primary school education 
spontaneously thought of secularism or the secular state when they were asked to think 
about Shari’ah.  At the other extreme, 51% of those with a college education mentioned 
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secularism when explaining why they opposed a state family law based on Shari’ah.  This 
clear linear relationship offers additional evidence that more educated individuals were 
simply more aware that the issue of family law reform was framed as a question of 
secularism.  These more educated individuals also show higher constraint across the three 
attitude items in Tables 8.2 and 8.3.   
 
Table 8.4 Education levels for respondents who mention secularism 
















100% 78% 73% 58% 49% 
Mentions 
secularism 
0% 22% 27% 42% 51% 
N=332, Cells show the percentage of men and women within each education category who mention laïcité 
or état laïc in their open-ended narratives as among the reasons they oppose a personal status law based on 
Shari’ah.  The relationship is significant at the p<.001 level.  When excluding Christians in the sample, 
which results in a sample size of 250, the results are roughly similar: No respondents mention secularism 
who have no formal education, 21% mention secularism with a primary school education, 29% with middle 
school level, 47% with a high school diploma, and 53% of those with at least a college degree.   
 
Over 20% of those with a primary school education mentioned secularism, which 
does show that one does not need to be highly educated to be aware of and deeply 
attached to the concept, or even to connect the issue of family law reform and the secular 
state.  This suggests that secularism is a broadly diffused cultural concept that is not 
exclusively the product of socialization through university or high school education.  
However, the disproportionately high numbers of more educated individuals who do 
mention this principle in an open-ended response supports the argument that these 
individuals may simply be more aware of elite discourse on the issue.  As such, they are 
better able to connect their preference for a secular state with their views on family law 
reform.   
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Drawing connections between secularism and Islamic family law seems more 
likely when individuals are aware that these issues have been packaged together as part of 
a larger whole—either through media or education or both.   The results in Table 8.5 
show the percentage of individuals in each level of media exposure who mention 
secularism as a reason to oppose the law.  Eleven percent of respondents with the lowest 
level of media exposure do not do so, while 40% of those with the highest levels of 
exposure do mention the concept.   











89% 73% 72% 62% 60% 
Mentions 
secularism 
11% 27% 28% 38% 40% 
N=331, Cells show the percentage of men and women for each quintile of media exposure who mention 
laïcité or état laic in their open-ended narratives as among the reasons they oppose a personal status law 
based on Shari’ah.  The relationship is significant at the p<.01 level.  When excluding Christians in the 
sample, which results in a sample size of 249, the results are roughly similar: Of those with the least media 
exposure, 13% mention secularism, followed by increasing percentages for each category of higher media 
exposure: 26%, 29%, 41% and 41%.   
 
Importantly, within this group of individuals who oppose the law, there is no clear 
relationship between religiosity and mentioning the construct of secularism.  Thirty two 
percent of those oppose the law and have the highest level of religiosity mention 
secularism as a reason to oppose the law.   This is slightly higher than the 26% who fall 
in the lowest category of religiosity and oppose an Islamic family law because of their 
attachments to secularism.  There is also no significant mean difference in religiosity for 
individuals who do and do not mention secularism as a salient consideration.    
While the issue of family law and Shari’ah may be issues that are “close to home” 
for most people, an attachment to secularism and the secular state seems relatively 
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abstract and seems to require a level of contextual knowledge and awareness of elite 
discourse that framed family law as an issue of secularism.  This does not mean that those 
who do not mention secularism therefore oppose it; rather, it means that they may not be 
aware that the issue of the secularism of the state is even at issue regarding family law.  
For example, Table 8.6 shows education levels by a binary variable of support and 
opposition to a minimally defined secular state for the entire sample population.  There is 
a strong relationship between supporting the secular state and being highly educated—
90% of college educated individuals say they support a secular state compared to 67% of 
those with no education at all.  However, what is also clear is that when directly asked 
about a secular state, support is widespread across each level of education.   
Table 8.6 Education for Muslims, by opposition to and support for a secular state 















32.4% 24.6% 14.9% 12.4% 9.7% 
Support Secular 
State  
67.6% 75.4% 85.1% 87.6% 90.3% 
N=682.  Cells show the percentage of individuals within each category of education who express support 
and opposition to a secular state.  The bivariate relationship is significant at the p<0.001 level (p=.000). 
 
However, when asked directly about family law and Shari’ah, fewer citizens connect 
their professed support for the idea of secular state to the issue of family law.  I suggest 
here that information and awareness of elite discourse is the key reason why many 
individuals view secularism and state laws based on Shari’ah as mutually exclusive 
preferences and others do not.  Those who support both may simply lack the contextual 
information to connect these issues; they are also less likely to be exposed to the media 
debate that framed the issues as in conflict.  
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 There is also, I argue, a strong relationship between awareness of elite discourse 
and connecting the key issue of legal equality and support for the principle of one 
nation/one law to one’s views on family law.  Table 8.7 also shows that among 
individuals who oppose the law, men and women who mention Senegal’s legal system 
and are concerned about having one law for all citizens are also more likely to be from 
among the highest educated citizens.  Support for the broad principle of having one set of 
laws for all citizens is widespread in the population.  However, individuals who recall 
their commitment to this principle as they discuss their opposition to family law tend to 
have more education.  This suggests, again, that individuals who connect their 
commitment to the principle of legal equality to their preferences for family law have 
broader contextual knowledge about the issues at stake in elite discourse about family 
law. 
Table 8.7 Education levels for respondents who mention legal uniformity 
















88% 85% 81% 77% 58% 
Mentions legal 
uniformity 
12% 16% 19% 23% 42% 
N=250, Cells show the percentage of Muslim men and women within each education category who 
mention concerns about legal uniformity for all citizens in their open-ended narratives as among the 
reasons they oppose a personal status law based on Shari’ah.  The results are nearly identical when 
Christians are included.  The relationship is significant at the p<.05 level. 
 
 I have shown evidence that education and awareness of dominant elite discourse 
plays a key role in how individuals structure their beliefs and form connections between 
their beliefs and the major issues in the family law debate.  The increasing alpha scores 
across these three items showed that individuals with higher levels of education respond 
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in a more consistent direction—either for or against.  There is no clear trend toward 
responding in one consistent direction for individuals with higher levels of religiosity.  
Education, then, rather than religiosity, seems to shape the connections individuals form 
between their attitudes and preferences about Shari’ah, family law, secularism, and legal 
equality.   
 Showing that education plays a key role in shaping beliefs does not tell us which 
direction citizens tend to respond if they respond in consistently one direction.  Finally, I 
address the key question of who views a state family law that conforms to Shari’ah and a 
secular state as mutually exclusive preferences.  Who responds in a consistently “secular” 
direction versus a consistently “anti-secular” direction, and who responds in a mixed 
way?  Citizens who respond in a mixed direction may not view these issues as in conflict 
at all, but as I have argued, it is more likely that they support each issue separately but are 
unaware that elite discourse has framed them as intersecting and competing issues.  Table 
8.8 and 8.9 shows the results of two multinomial logit models that categorizes citizens 
based on their responses.  In Table 8.8, I evaluate how citizens who are “secular”—
meaning they oppose an Islamic family law and support a secular state—differ from 
citizens who are “mixed”—meaning they support an Islamic family law and support a 
secular state.  I also evaluate how citizens who are “anti-secular”—meaning they support 
an Islamic family law and oppose a secular state—differ from “mixed” citizens who 
support both.  Finally, I compare citizens who “oppose both”—meaning they oppose an 
Islamic family law and oppose the secular state to those who are “mixed” or support both.  




Table 8.8 Multinomial logit results predicting who views Islamic family law and a secular state as mutually 
exclusive preferences 
Multinomial Logit Results: Views on Shari’ah and Secular State 



















Age .000 -.006 .018 - 
 (.010) (.011) (.020)  
Household wealth  -.007 .025 .052 - 
 (.046) (.049) (.086)  
Education .210*** -.021 -.012 - 
 (.033) (.050) (.073)  
Polygamous marriage -.746* -.295 -.444 - 
 (.339) (.351) (.628)  
Number of children .069 .088 .005 - 
 (.065) (.064) (.111)  
Female (1=female) -.907* .795 .522 - 
 (.354) (.577) (1.068)  
Female X Religious 
Engagement .109 -.347 -.118 - 
 (.160) (.192) (.367)  
Religious Engagement  -.381*** .489** .271 - 
 (.109) (.157) (.324)  
Media exposure .231* -.266 -.600* - 
 (.111) (.138) (.247)  
Christian 2.781*** -1.002 1.241 - 
 (.431) (1.105) (.731)  
Constant -1.235 -1.395 -2.196 - 
 (.537) (.803) (1.142)  
N=691 N=273 N=105 N=29 N=284 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.    
 
 
The two columns on the left show estimated coefficients for the consistently pro- versus 
anti-secular respondents compared to those who offered mixed responses of support for 
both the secular state and an Islamic family law.  Respondents who viewed these issues 
as mutually exclusive preferences and responded in terms of dominant elite discourse are 
significantly more likely to have higher levels of education and media exposure 
compared to those who supported the secular state but also supported an Islamic family 
law.  Christians are also substantially more likely to view these as opposing preferences.  
Holding other factors constant, individuals who view these preferences as inconsistent 
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differ in their level of religious engagement as well.  Women are also less likely to 
respond in a consistently secular direction.   
 Religious engagement is the only variable that differentiates individuals who view 
these responses as mutually exclusive but who oppose the secular state.  Those who 
support an Islamic family law and oppose Senegalese secularism have higher religious 
engagement than those mixed respondents who support both an Islamic family law and 
support secularism.   
 In short, there is clear evidence that education and exposure to media discourse 
differentiates between individuals who agree that the state should be secular but disagree 
about the role of Shari’ah in state family law.  Those who view these as inconsistent 
preferences are more likely to be educated and more exposed to media.  As I have argued, 
they more aware of elite discourse on this issue that framed a Muslim personal law as a 
threat to the secularism of the state.  Religious predispositions play a role here as well.  
Holding other variables constant, these individuals who oppose an Islamic family law 
also report significantly lower levels of religious engagement compared to individuals 
who support secularism and Shari’ah as state law.  Finally, individuals who support 
Islamic family law and oppose the secular state are significantly more likely to report 
higher levels of religious engagement than individuals support a secular state.   
 Table 8.9 shows an additional model that includes the related preference for the 
principle of treating all equally under the law by having the same law for all citizens 
regardless of religion.  Again, education differentiates between individuals who respond 
in a consistently secular direction compared to the majority who give mixed responses.  
Individuals who respond consistently in an anti-secular direction—opposing a secular 
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state, preferring a state law based on Shari’ah, and preferring different laws for different 
religions—tend to have higher levels of religious engagement compared to those with 
mixed responses. 
Table 8.9 Multinomial logit results predicting who responds consistently to Islamic family law, a 
secular state, and legal uniformity 
Multinomial Logit Results: Views on Shari’ah, Secular State, Legal Uniformity 
    
 
Response Categories: 
All favor secular 
direction (N=256) 





Age .000 -.015 - 
 (.010) (.013)  
Household wealth  .030 .047 - 
 (.045) (.057)  
Education .205*** -.059 - 
 (.032) (.067)  
Polygamous marriage -.545 -.370 - 
 (.338) (.429)  
Number of children .032 .118 - 
 (.063) (.075)  
Female (1=female) -1.141** .866 - 
 (.353) (.723)  
Female X Religious 
Engagement .228 -.345 - 
 (.160) (.234)  
Religious Engagement  -.528*** .429* - 
 (.112) (.190)  
Media exposure .272* -.140 - 
 (.106) (.162)  
Christian 2.565*** -12.934*** - 
 (.379) (.344)  
Constant -1.580 -2.187 - 
 (.520) (1.093) - 
N=691 N=256 N=64 N=371 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.    
  
 Collectively, I argue that these results support Feldman and Zaller’s (1992) notion 
that less aware citizens do not always connect their values and attitudes in a way that 
reflects elite discourse.  Moreover, these results support Alvarez and Brehm’s (Alvarez 
and Brehm 2002) argument that multiple predispositions are at play in most issues.  
When asked if Senegal should enact a state family law based on Shari’ah that would 
apply only to Muslims, religious predispositions are activated and many citizens agree in 
principle.  When asked about the principle of uniformity in laws and rights for all citizens 
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versus difference in laws and rights for all citizens, predispositions toward equality are 
activated, and they prefer one set of laws for all citizens.  When asked about the secular 
state, Senegal’s secular discourse of religious respect and tolerance is activated, and they 
support this too.  Individuals who are less exposed to media discourse about family law 
may be unaware that there may be potential conflicts between supporting the idea of a 
uniform law for all citizens and the idea of law that would apply only to Muslims.  Their 
sincere religious commitments push them to support the principle of a state family law 
based on Shari’ah, even as they also favor one set of laws for all citizens and a secular 
state.   
 I have argued that information, as measured by education, plays a critical role in 
shaping how citizens connect their opinions, values, and preferences into a broader 
package of beliefs about issues that are as important such as Shari’ah as a source of law 
and the relationship between religion, law, and state.  Religiosity alone does not play the 
key role in structuring connections between beliefs.  However, this does not mean that 
religiosity plays no role in shaping citizens’ preferences.  As the results of citizens own 
narratives in Chapter 6 showed, as well as the ordered and multinomial logit results in 
Chapters 7 and this chapter, religious engagement does shape the direction of citizens’ 
preferences for family law and Shari’ah as a source of law.  Thus, though religiosity may 
not constrain preferences for religion, law, and state as compared to education, it does 
shape the direction of citizens’ preferences. 
 The role of information, or awareness of elite discourse, is critical because for the 
majority of ordinary men and women in this study, citizens hold many values and 
preferences at the same time that might be framed as incompatible in elite discourse.  
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Citizens in urban Senegal are likely to be supportive of the secular state and the principle 
of one law for all citizens because these frames are so ubiquitous in elite and popular 
discourse.  If Shari’ah had been framed in the survey question in terms of other strongly 
held principles—for uniformity and equality in law, or for religious diversity, peace, or 
secularism—many men and women with mixed views would be forced to grapple with 
how their beliefs fit together and which beliefs take precedence.  At a minimum, if they 
did not change their opinions on any one of these survey items, they may at least be 
consciously conflicted about how their preferences fit together (Zaller and Feldman 1992; 
Hochschild 1993, 1981).   
 
Liberal and Conservative Interpretations of Islamic Law 
The previous discussion focused explicitly on three interconnected attitudes in 
Senegal’s debate over family law.  To underscore the argument that information rather 
than religiosity structures the connections between beliefs and differentiates between 
citizens who respond in more consistent directions,  this final section evaluates if we can 
identify individuals who respond in a consistently “liberal” versus “conservative” 
direction on questions of religious interpretation.  Within this debate over family law, 
some journalists and advocates labeled their opponents in ideological terms.  Advocates 
for a state law based on Shari’ah were called “extremists” and “Islamists,” for example.  
Pundits and scholars also tend to describe a type of left-to-right scale of Islamic 
interpretations.  For example, “liberal Islamists accept many of the goals of establishing 
Islamic law but advocate more liberal interpretations of the Shari’ah than do mainstream 
Islamists” (Feldman 2008, see Note 2 on 155-156).  Other studies have shown that 
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ordinary Muslims with more liberal interpretations of Islam may hold more democratic 
political orientations (Tessler 2005).  This study did not find any connection between 
liberal interpretations of Islam toward women and views on family law, but did find that 
those who interpreted Islam as granting non-Muslims inferior political rights were more 
likely to support the law.   
The prior analysis identified a subset of more educated and informed ordinary 
men and women who seem to respond according to the secular interpretive package 
offered by elites.  However, many citizens do not respond in one consistent direction on 
issues of religion, law, and the state.  Can we also identify Muslims who hold more 
consistently liberal or conservative interpretations of Islamic principles?  To evaluate this 
question, I use a subset of questions of interpretations of Islam from my survey in 
Senegal that has previously been used in the World Values Survey and Arab 
Barometers.160
                                                 
160  Today as in the past, Muslim scholars and jurists around the world sometimes disagree about the proper 
interpretation of Islam in response to present-day issues.  For each of the statements listed below, please 
indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the interpretation of Islam 
that is presented?  
  Items have been ordered so that the more “permissive” or “liberal” 
direction is the same across questions.  Table 8.10 compares alpha scores across 
measures of information and religiosity in order to identify if individuals with higher 
religiosity also seem to respond more consistently on these interpretations.  As before, 
1) Islam requires that a women dress modestly but does not require that she cover her head with a veil 
2) It is a violation of Islam for male and female university students to attend classes together 
3) By requiring that a man treat all of his wives equally, the true intent of Islam is to discourage a man 
from having more than one wife  
4) Nationalism is incompatible with Islam because Islam requires Muslims be united in a single political 
community (l’ummah) rather than be citizens of different states and loyal to different governments 
5) Democracy is a Western form of government that is incompatible with Islam 
6) Islam requires that in a Muslim country the political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those 
of Muslims 
7) If a country pursues policies that are harmful to Muslims, Islam permits the killing of civilians of that 




alpha scores increase substantially as we move from low to high education, with an 
increase of 234%.  For this set of items, constraint also increases substantially on the 
other measures of information as well.  However, there is no consistent trend moving 
from lowest to highest religiosity.   
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The evidence from this sample of Senegalese citizens does not support the idea 
individuals who are more or less religiously engaged will necessarily respond in a 
consistent direction across these questions of religious interpretation.  Rather, those 
individuals with a university education are more likely to respond in a more consistent 
direction.  The higher reliability scores for more educated and informed citizens suggests 
stronger connections between these items.  These results suggest that ideological lables 
may describe the views of the most educated and informed.  However, they call into 
question the use of ideological labels to describe broader Muslim publics.  For example, 
how useful are descriptive terms calling Muslims “moderate,” “liberal,” or “extremist” if 
it does not necessarily indicate something about a broader Islamic belief system or 
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interpretations of Islam?  The alpha levels at the lower and moderate levels of education, 
media exposure, and political knowledge suggest that most men and women make little 
connection between these interpretations.   
 
Conclusion 
Religious matters are often thought to be more important to individuals that 
political matters because they are “close to home.”  As such, scholars have questioned 
whether general theories of public opinion that give a large role to information in shaping 
preferences are relevant when the issues at hand entail religious values and judgments.  In 
this chapter, I find evidence that information continues to play the critical role in shaping 
beliefs into consistent packages as framed in elite discourse, even on issues that entail 
clear religious judgments and interpretations.  Moreover, though religiosity may push 
individuals to take one side over another on any one issue—including support for 
Shari’ah as a source of state family law—it does not appear to structure broadly 
connected, consistent packages of preferences, even on religious interpretations.   
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that men and women who are 
more informed and aware of elite discourse, measured principally by education but also 
by media exposure, tend to connect their views on questions of religion, law, and state 
according to the dominant secular interpretive package offered through Senegalese print 
media.  They also respond to questions of religious interpretation in more consistent, 
unidirectional ways.  I also find that a substantial number of citizens do not view 
preferences for a secular state and Shari’ah as a source of state law as mutually exclusive 
preferences, nor do they necessarily view these debates as a competition between 
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Islamists and secularists.  Applying these ideological terms to a broader public seems 
empirically unjustifiable unless we are speaking mainly about the subpopulation of the 
most educated and aware individuals.  Because elite discourse produced a broad secular 
interpretive package in Senegal that connected the Family Code, the principle of legal 
equality, and the secular state, those with more education—who are more exposed to 
mass media discourse—were more likely to adopt this particular configuration of 
preferences.  They were most likely to connect their secular predispositions to their 
family law preferences.  This chapter offers strong support that predispositions as well as 
awareness of elite discourse, including the interpretive packages offered in media, play a 
key role in shaping citizens’ preferences on family law and Shari’ah as a source of state 




Chapter 9  
Conclusion 
 
 The relationship between Islam and democracy has captured the attention of 
scholars, journalists, citizens around the world.  In response to these debates, political 
scientists have highlighted the importance of studying variations in the institutional 
relationship between religion and state (Stepan 2007, 272; 2001), as well as differences 
between individuals who prefer secular versus Islamic democracy (Jamal and Tessler 
2008).  My research makes an important contribution to these debates by taking a citizen-
centered approach and asking why citizens disagree about the appropriate and legitimate 
sources of state law in a secular democracy.  In a quality democracy, “citizens themselves 
have the sovereign power to evaluate whether the government provides liberty and 
equality according to the rule of law. … They monitor the efficiency and fairness of the 
application of the laws” (Diamond and Morlino 2005, xii).  I have focused on citizens’ 
views on family law reform for its historical and contemporary importance in 
comparative perspective.161
                                                 
161 Though claims for official and legal recognition of “personal status” have occurred in multiple colonial 
contexts, my study suggests that the meanings of these claims may shift over time (Newbigin 2009; Diouf 
1998).   
  For some citizens, family law is so closely tied to cultural 
and religious identity that it is akin to private religious practice—family law is the “heart 
of the Shari’ah and the basis for a strong, Islamically-oriented family structure and 
society” (Esposito and Mogahed 2007, 23).  If viewed in this way, religious communities 
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should be free to determine and apply laws as they see fit.  For others, though, family law 
is the critical space where citizens are demanding that states live up to their constitutional 
guarantees of equality in the law for all citizens, regardless of religion and gender  
(Widner 2001 31, 334-362; Sow 2003).   
 To explain why ordinary men and women form preferences for or against a state  
family law that would conform to Islamic law and would apply to Muslim citizens, I have 
turned to public opinion research on framing (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson 
1992; Gamson and Modigliani 1987).  I have argued that how elites frame debates over 
family law reform and Shari’ah as a source of state law will shape citizens’ preferences.  
I have also turned to theories of public opinion formation that highlight the important role 
of predispositions (especially values) as well as awareness of elite discourse in shaping 
citizens’ preferences.  Predispositions and awareness of elite discourse shape what 
citizens come to see as important as they form preferences for family law, as well as the 
direction of their preferences (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Alvarez and Brehm 
2002).  I find key differences between more and less educated citizens in how they 
connect their values and preferences into broader belief systems.  My research suggests, 
therefore, that analysts of politics in the Muslim world should use caution when using the 
terminology of elite political ideology (both secular and Islamist, or liberal and 
conservative) to describe the views of ordinary Muslims. 
 I have offered evidence of the complex ways that values and the frames of elite 
discourse entered into citizens’ own narratives.  Citizens with higher average levels of 
education were more likely to discuss family law in the terms found in these print media 
debates.  Individuals with lower levels of education still had much to say, and with equal 
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conviction, but were less likely to mention ideas such as majority rule, secularism, 
religious diversity, or to discuss specific legal issues such as treating all citizens equally 
under the law versus applying different laws to different religions.162
 There is also broad support in the general public for the principles of secularism 
and legal equality, conceptualized as applying one law to each citizen regardless of his or 
her religion.  These points of view were represented often in print media debates by 
representatives of major civil society organizations, public intellectuals and lawyers, 
scholars of Islamic law, journalists, and the President himself.  In the case of Senegal, 
there is a well-documented historical discourse on secularism, which does not inhere the 
exclusion of religion from the public sphere (Stepan 2008).  Moreover, mainstream 
religious leaders in the Sufi orders have a long history of working with the secular state 
(Villalón 1995).  It should not be surprising, then, that citizens broadly favor secularism 
and ideas of legal equality for all citizens and religions.  Although some scholars have 
made broad claims that Muslims, in general, are opposed to secularism (An-Na'im 2008), 
evidence from this dissertation suggests that it is probably more accurate to say that 
  In Chapter 7, I 
demonstrated that citizens’ predispositions do strongly shape family law preferences.  
Holding other factors constant, favoring secularism and one law for all citizens pushed 
individuals toward opposing a Muslim personal law, while participating more frequently 
in religious activities pushed them to support such a law. 
                                                 
162  For example, many who supported the law discussed more general desires to apply divine law, to 
protect Islamic values, encourage moral behaviors, strengthen Islamic education in the country, and to 
provide greater security for individuals.  These types of religious reasons for supporting a role for Shari’ah 
as state law have also been central to debates about the extent to which Islamic law should be applied in 
other contexts such as Nigeria (Weimann 2009), and therefore are not necessarily unique to the Senegalese 
case.  Writing about Egypt, Brown (1997b) noted that it is quite common for laws to be criticized for being 
immoral and illegitimate when not explicitly based on Shari’ah, given its contemporary meaning as a set of 
legal rules.  One need not pay great attention to elite discourses on rights to feel that societal problems 
could be alleviated under the governance of divine law. 
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popular support for secularism depends to a large extent on how it has been framed in 
each local context. 
 While print media tended to frame the issue as one of secularism versus Shari’ah, 
only some citizens in Senegal see these preferences as mutually exclusive.  Many citizens 
support the values of equality in law and secularism and a state law based on Shari’ah.  I 
have argued that this is where Zaller’s (1992) important emphasis on awareness to elite 
discourse comes into play, especially when key values and commitments have been 
framed as competing or incompatible in public discourse.  Education and greater media 
exposure—two indicators of awareness of elite discourse—differentiated men and 
women who adopt this oppositional framing from those who do not.   Those who view 
secularism and a Muslim personal law as incompatible preferences do so, in part, because 
of their predispositions, and in part because they pay the most attention to elite discourse 
that frames them as conflicting, oppositional preferences.  Using Alvarez and Brehm’s 
(2002) terminology, information about elite discourse “activates” their secular 
predispositions as they contemplate family law. 163
 A key finding, then, is that citizens who support a state law that conforms to 
Shari’ah are not necessarily opposed to secularism.  When asked a survey question that 
uses the term Shari’ah and asks whether a state law should conform to it, their religious 
predispositions are immediately activated as they describe many the positive benefits of 
being governed by divine law.  But, in other questions, they may strongly favor a secular 
 
                                                 
163Moreover, those who opposed a Muslim personal law but stated mixed feelings in their narrative 
responses in Chapter 6 tended to state that as a Muslim they believed Shari’ah had ultimate religious 
authority, but they deferred to the principle of secularism and its benefits in Senegal and therefore opposed 
the law.  Likewise, those who supported the law but offered mixed feelings tended to be aware that 
secularism was at issue, but opted for a family law based on Shari’ah.  Awareness of potential conflicts 




state, which appeals to notions of mutual respect for all religions in Senegal, as well as 
the principle of legal equality for all citizens.  While one could make the case that a 
Shari’ah-based family law would not necessarily threaten secularism, it is more difficult 
to reconcile how citizens could at once favor one law for all citizens and a law that would 
apply only to Muslim citizens, unless these citizens were unaware of the potential 
contradictions.  I suggest that it is more likely that a question emphasizing Shari’ah 
activated religious predispositions in one question, while a question about legal 
uniformity versus pluralism activated predispositions toward equality in another, and a 
question about the secular state activated secular predispositions elsewhere in the 
interview.  Each response is sincere, but the low inter-item correlations between these 
items for individuals at lower levels of education in Chapter 8 suggest that they form 
fewer connections between them.  The low inter-item correlations across a range of 
interpretations of Islam offer additional evidence that education, rather than religiosity, 
plays a critical role in connecting preferences into a broader belief system.   
 My aim in this dissertation has been to analyze why ordinary citizens disagree 
over the direction family law reform should take and why some view secularism and 
Shari’ah as mutually exclusive preferences while others do not.  I have relied on 
scholarship on value conflict and the structure and consistently of public opinion 
(Feldman and Zaller 1992; Hochschild 1981; Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Zaller 1992) to 
address these questions.  Predispositions help us to choose sides on most issues, but 
individual differences in awareness of elite discourse plays a key role in explaining 
whether or not we form connections between our values and preferences (Zaller 1992).   
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 I conclude that, as Zaller (1992, 38) noted, “individuals do not typically possess 
just one opinion toward issues, but multiple potential opinions.”164
 To highlight this point about the accessibility of certain frames, I turn back to 
Chapter 6, which showed that mentioning secularism in one’s narrative response tended 
to occur most often among the most educated and media-exposed.  Among those who 
  I have not focused on 
how frames in survey questions themselves may shape individual’s responses on 
questions about Shari’ah as a source of law.  However, one implication of my findings is 
that alternative frames within surveys themselves may shape preferences.  So far, most 
survey items measuring citizen support for Shari’ah rely on general questions that 
provide neither local context nor any framing of the potential pros and cons related to 
such laws (Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Davis and Robinson 2007).  As such, these 
questions tend to activate religious predispositions for many citizens.  We cannot tell 
from these responses how ordinary citizens might deliberate about other strongly held 
values, if forced to think specifically about values such as equality in rights, or notions of 
inter-religious peace, or intra-religious diversity in Islamic interpretations and practices.  
Thus, these questions have been used by some as an indicator of Islamic orthodoxy 
(Davis and Robinson 2007), but it is entirely possible that views on such questions are 
more malleable and that at least some citizens’ responses to such questions do not 
indicate the existence of a broader Islamic orthodoxy.   
                                                 
164 Moreover, “survey questions do not simply measure public opinion.  They also shape and channel it by 
the manner in which they frame issues, order the alternatives, and otherwise set the context of the question” 
(Zaller and Feldman 1992, 582).  To support their contention that attitudes are not “true” entities that are 
simply measured in public opinion surveys, Zaller relied on research in psychology such as Wilson and 
Hodges (1992), who write that attitudes are “temporary constructs” that are constructed from ideas in our 
own internally conflicted “data base.”  Similarly, Tesser (1978, 297-298) writes: “an attitude at a particular 
point in time is the result of a constructive process…And there is not a single attitude toward an object but, 




also opposed the law, concerns over religious diversity were voiced as frequently among 
those with no education as among those with post-graduate education.  I argued that 
secularism may be a more abstract, less accessible concept compared to religious 
diversity or mutual respect between all religions.  At a minimum, I suspect that if a 
survey question highlighted other popular and accessible values—such as the idea of 
equality for all citizens, or values that tapped into this discourse of mutual respect, such 
as peace between religions or religious diversity—some citizens may become consciously 
conflicted about how their values and preferences fit together.  Alternatively, making 
issues like women’s rights more salient might activate individual’s predispositions about 
women’s rights in a more direct way.  Even if individuals’ preferences remained the 
same, the underlying reasons they respond as they do should change with alternative 
framing.  
 My evidence offers support, then, that on this issue that has been described as the 
“heart of the Shari’ah” and the foundation of religious identity, citizens hold multiple 
values that may, in different ways and in different contexts, lead them to think about the 
question of family law in diverse ways.  It is likely that citizens are constantly in a state 
of holding, and at times consciously reconciling, “multiple values, beliefs, and principles 
simultaneously present in the political culture” (Feldman and Zaller 1992).  
 It is important to note several obvious limitations in my analyses.  By focusing on 
how elite discourse shapes opinions on family law, I do not claim to have exhaustively 
accounted for family law preferences.  Moreover, I focus on specific ways that the debate 
was framed in Senegalese print media, but there are other areas where these issues are 
debated.  The print media is a space for visible elite discourse that leaves a public record.  
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Radio and television, though, are other important spaces for elite framing, and it is more 
difficult to capture and analyze this content.  Citizens in my sample do report getting 
more of their news from TV and radio than print media, and my index variable for media 
exposure averages exposure to radio, TV, and print news.  I also relied on education as an 
indicator of awareness of elite discourse.  However, it would be helpful to include other 
sources of elite discourse, such as radio, to my analysis of interpretive packages in 
Chapter 4.  It would also be helpful to have additional data on the diverse messages 
citizens receive from their religious leaders on this issue.   
I also argued that an elite consensus existed on the Family Code, and that a 
dominant interpretive package emerged that framed the Family Code in terms of 
secularism and its packages of values.  Those proposing the alternative law were 
attempting to contest the status quo by turning to another widely held principle, the 
religious authority of the Shari’ah.  Therefore, consensus need not mean there is no 
disagreement.  I suggest that on many issues, including debates over family law, there 
can exist both a mainstream elite discourse that defends the status quo, as well a 
conflictual and contested public debate in which critics of the status quo receive media 
coverage.165
                                                 
165 Zaller (1992) hints at this when he briefly mentions “autonomous elites” who exist outside of the 
mainstream and use the media to “generate public pressure,” such as “upwardly mobile politicians.” 
  In Senegal, many diverse factions have participated in constructing a 
national discourse of unity, individual rights, secularism, democracy, and citizenship in 
the postcolonial period, including some state officials, opposition political activists, 
religious leaders, public intellectuals, and civil society activists.  The Family Code was 
enacted by the state with a goal of consolidating the nation and creating a unified, 
centralized judicial system, as well as strengthening individual rights in the secular state, 
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according to many accounts.  The Family Code has been criticized within elite and 
intellectual circles for failing to go far enough in ensuring equality in rights for all 
citizens, especially women.  Though this criticism of the Family Code has been public, 
this kind of criticism still reflects a consensus that the Family Code was the best available 
option, even if flawed (Mbaye 2007).  However, there has also been much contentious 
debate and discussion about its merits from those who opposed it for religious reasons.166  
I suggest, then, that elite consensus and contestation can coexist.  Thinking of consensus 
and contestation in less binary terms helps to explain why those who are more aware of 
elite discourse, as measured by education and media exposure, tend to prefer a state law 
and status quo which has been argued to be necessary for Senegal’s legal and political 
development.  The finding that Senegal’s more educated and media-exposed citizens 
overwhelmingly adopt the mainstream secular interpretive package about the Family 
Code indicates something about the legitimacy and popularity of Senegal’s multi-value 
secularism.  It suggests that these educated and aware citizens support the principles of 
equality for all citizens, peace and mutual respect between all religions, and the idea of 
national unity amidst diversity.  If the Senegalese secularism were deemed illegitimate by 
Senegal’s most aware and engaged citizens, then awareness of elite discourse would not 
push these same individuals to oppose a Muslim personal law.167
How might these results translate to other comparative contexts?  I show evidence 
that in urban Senegal, citizens with higher levels of education are more likely to be aware 
of how elites discuss family law and the major issues at stake.  I expect this to be similar 
 
                                                 
166 Villalon wrote about the original objections of the major Sufi leaders in 1972 (Villalón 1995).  Others 
have written about objections from small, relatively marginal Islamist groups (Loimeier 1996).     
167 Indeed, some have written of the small but visible Islamic reformist movements that actively critique the 
secular family law and this dominant interpretive package.  These groups represent educated and aware 
intellectuals with Islamic predispositions, rather than secular ones, but are small in number (Augis 2002). 
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across contexts.  Debates about Islamic law and family law tend to focus on discourses of 
rights.  Those citizens who are more aware of elite discourses of rights will be more 
likely to take these discourses into consideration as they contemplate family law.  Even if 
they ultimately support a Shari’ah-based family law, as many educated Islamic feminists 
do, they are aware of these discourses and provide arguments about why Islamic law does 
not violate individual equality and human rights (Moghadam 2002; Archer 2007).   
Most debates about family law, then, center on the constitutional guarantees of 
equality in the law for all citizens, regardless of religion or gender.  Legal equality may 
be debated in terms of equal rights for women, equal rights for a minority group, or as 
equal rights for a religious community to practice its religion freely and autonomously 
(Wing 2009; Baird 2001; Sow 2003; Rudolph and Rudolph 2001; Bhargava 2006a).  In 
multireligious secular states such as Senegal and India, secularism is an important 
component of these debates because the secular state is said to guarantee the legal 
equality of all citizens, while also guaranteeing their right to practice their religion freely.  
The issues of majority/minority rights and legal uniformity versus pluralism are critical in 
multireligious states.  In Nigeria, debates also focus on the dynamic of rights for religious 
majorities versus minorities, as well as women’s rights (Harnischfeger 2008).  In states 
where religious minorities are minuscule or non-existent, as in Algeria, the Family Code 
does claim to conform to Shari’ah.  Critics of the state law still focus on legal equality 
and rights in this case as well, but primarily highlight the contradictions between the 
inferiority of women’s rights in the state’s family law compared to the equal rights 




Another similarity across contexts is that elite framing should highlight multiple 
values, which should shape how citizens come to form connections between their 
preferences.  In a discussion of the enactment of the Algerian Family Code in 1984, for 
example, Boutheina Cheriet (1992, 172) discusses the conflict between competing 
constitutional principles—national unity, equality of individuals, individual freedoms, 
and Islam as the religion of the state—which allowed conservatives and secularists to 
emphasize different core values for opposite political ends.  Depending on the coherence 
of these interpretive packages and who is advancing them, as well as the broad popularity 
of the values invoked in each one, I would expect citizens’ preferences to be shaped, in 
part, by the content of elite discourses and by their own awareness of these discourses.  In 
each case, I would expect the most educated and aware citizens to be most aware of elite 
discourses on rights and the alternative interpretive packages offered in media debates.  
However, I would not always expect an elite consensus to exist.  If one existed, it would 
not necessarily have the same levels of popular support as in Senegal.  Cross-national 
differences should occur, then, in the popularity of discourses on rights, and whether the 
current state law is seen as conforming to or violating popular sets of rights and values.   
Though discourses on rights should be prevalent in each case, the interpretive 
packages found in elite discourse should differ between national contexts depending on a 
variety of state-level factors as well.  How each state family law was crafted (e.g., a 
unified law versus a system of personal laws, the original content of the law, and which 
groups were included and excluded in original processes of codification and subsequent 
reforms), each state’s respective institutional relationship between religion and state (e.g., 
if the state is secular or declares Islam to be the official religion), and the presence of 
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multiple religions in the country will all shape how debates over family law will differ, 
how discourses of rights will be articulated, as well as the content of the packages of 
values offered in alternative interpretive discourses.   
  In closing, I note that scholars have discussed the multivocality of religious 
traditions (Stepan 2001).  My evidence shows that individuals, as well, are multi-vocal.  
Many ordinary citizens’ views cannot be easily categorized into the oppositional and 
mutually exclusive categories often used in elite debates.  The broader implications of my 
analyses suggest that the general survey questions currently used to measure popular 
support for Shari’ah as a source of state law should result in very strong public support, 
as recent evidence across the Muslim world suggests (Esposito and Mogahed 2007).  
However, the survey questions employed in current studies tend to activate religious 
predispositions for many citizens at the expense of other important values and 
considerations.  Elite discourse about Shari’ah as a source of law is likely to emphasize 
many broadly held values and interpretations.  Moreover, elite frames are likely to 
change over time, which should influence how citizens make sense of these debates.  
Men and women who pay attention to these debates are most likely to be aware of and to 
reconcile their multiple values as they respond to the question.  However, men and 
women who pay less attention to these debates may not easily recall their other strongly 
held values.  They might weigh different factors if surveys framed these questions in a 
way that invoked other strongly held values.  Most citizens hold complex and diverse sets 
values and preferences, even regarding such important issues as family law and the role 











Does anyone in your household own: a farm, animals, bicycle, motorcycle or scooter, car, a boat or fishing 
boat, telephone, watch or clock, refrigerator, radio, television, house or dwelling, stove or oven, air 
conditioner, computer, satellite.   
 




What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 
 
1. No formal education, illiterate 
2. Quranic school/Daara 
3. Incomplete primary school 
4. Complete primary school 
5. Incomplete middle school  
6. Complete middle school 
7. Incomplete secondary: technical/vocational type 
8. Incomplete secondary school: university/preparatory type 
9. Complete secondary: technical/vocational type 
10. Complete secondary school: university/preparatory type 
11. Some university-level education, without degree 
12. University-level education, with degree 
13. Post-university graduate level education, with or without degree 
 
The mean educational attainment is a complete middle school.  The mean for men is incomplete secondary 
school, and for women is incomplete middle school. 
 
For presentation purposes, education has been recoded into a five category variable: 
No Formal Education or Quranic School (20.3%) / Some Primary School to some middle school (33.4%) / 
Complete Middle School and some secondary (20.3%) / High School Diploma (16.3%) / University 




People find out about foreign and local events from many sources: from talking to other people, from radio, 
from television, and from newspapers.  Thinking about this past week, how often did you learn about 
foreign and local events from (1) television; (2) foreign radio stations; (3) local radio stations; (4) 
newspapers?  Never / Once / Several Times / Almost Every Day / Everyday. 
 







Political knowledge is measured as the total number of correct responses out of a total of six questions.  
Individuals had to correctly identify three political figures (the UN Secretary General, the president of the 
Assemblée Nationale, and the Prime Minister).  They also had to provide the correct answer to the 
following three questions: how many terms the President of the Republic may be elected, the length of the 
term of a deputy in Assemblée Nationale, and whether an ethnic or religious group can legally create a 
political party and run candidates for political office.   
 
The alpha for this index is .73.  The mean number of correct answers is 3.7 out of six, with men answering 
4.3 correct and women 3.1 correct answers.    
 
Religious Engagement 
Religious engagement averages seven items and creates a 5 category variable of quintiles: 
 
Now I’m going to ask you how often you socialize with people in various settings. For each setting, would 
you say you socialize: every week or nearly every week / once or twice a month / only a few times a year / 
not at all? 
(1) Socialize with people at your mosque or church 
(2) Socialize with people at a Dahira or another religious association  
 
Please tell me if you participate in any of the activities of any of these organizations or associations.  
Never participate / I’m an inactive participant member / A few times a year / Once or twice a month / Every 
week 
(3) A Church or Mosque 
(4) A Sufi Order (tariqa) 
(5) A Religious Association, such as a Dahira or Choral Group 
  
(6) In general, how often do you pray in the mosque (at church)? Five times a day / Once or twice a 
week / Every week or almost / A few times a year, Only on religious holidays / Rarely or never  
(7) How often do you read the Quran (or Bible)?  Everyday / Often / Occasionally / Rarely or Never 
 
The alpha on this index is .73. 
 
Support for and Opposition to an Islamic Family Law 
Now I’d like to ask you some questions about a debate taking place in Senegal.  Recently, some people and 
certain religious leaders have said that we should reform the Family Code (le Code de la Famille) so that 
some laws would apply only to Muslim and their families.  The Islamic Committee to Reform the Family 
Code in Senegal (CIRCOFS) has proposed an Islamic personal status law (projet de code de statut 
personnel islamique) that would enforce parts of the Shari’ah for Muslims.  The President of the Republic 
and certain other groups have opposed this.  
 
Can you tell me if you support the proposal by some Muslim religious leaders to enforce Shari’ah or if you 
oppose the proposal to enforce Shari’ah in the Family Code?   
                
Support / Oppose 
 
Why do you think this?  
 
How strongly do you feel about your position? Strongly Support/Support/Neutral/Oppose/Strongly Oppose 
Only 17 individuals (2.2% of those who responded), offered a response of neutral.  These 17 individuals 
were recoded as weak support or opposition depending on their binary responses, due to the small sample 




Support for a Secular State 
Do you believe that Senegal should be a secular country, where there is no legal or official relationship 
between religion and the state?  Strongly Agree / Agree / Disagree / Strongly Disagree 
 
Support for Uniformity in Laws and Rights versus Pluralism in Laws and Rights 
Now, I’m going to read you two opposing statements, and imagine a series of numbers from 1 to 8. 
Position 1 says that Senegal should have the same laws and rights for all its citizens no matter what their 
religious beliefs and practices.  Position 8 says that Senegal should have different laws and rights for 
citizens of different religions, so that some laws would apply only to Muslims and other laws would apply 
only to Christians.   
 
On a scale from 1 to 8, please tell me your view on this question, or you can pick a position in between. 
 
Levels of Corruption 
A lot of people also talk about corruption today in Senegal.  When you think about society today compared 
to five years ago, do you think there is much more corruption today, a little more corruption, about the 
same amount of corruption, a little less corruption, or much less corruption? A lot more / A little more / 
About the same / A lot less / A little less 
 
Interpretations of Islam 
 
Today as in the past, Muslim scholars and jurists sometimes disagree about the proper interpretation of 
Islam in response to present-day issues. For each of the statements listed below, would you please indicate 
whether you agree strongly, agree, are neutral, disagree, or disagree strongly with the interpretation of 
Islam that is presented? 
 
Inferior Political Rights for Non-Muslims 
(1) Islam requires that in a Muslim country, the political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to 
those of Muslims. 
 
Views on Women 
(2) Islam requires that a woman dress modestly but does not require that she cover her head with a 
veil 
(3) It is a violation of Islam for male and female university students to attend classes together 
(4) By requiring that a man treat all of his wives equally, the true intent of Islam is to discourage a 
man from taking more than one wife 
 
Other views 
(5) Nationalism is incompatible with Islam because Islam requires that Muslims be united in a single 
political community (the ummah) rather than be citizens of different states and loyal to different 
governments 
(6) Democracy is a Western form of government that is not compatible with Islam 
(7) If a country pursues policies that harm Muslims, Islam permits killing civilians of that country, 
including women and children 
(8) Banks in Muslim countries must be forbidden from charging interest on loans because this is 
forbidden by Islam 
 







The Democratic Legitimacy of Laws 
 
Now I would like to know your views about the legitimacy of laws.  In your opinion, do you strongly agree, 
agree, are neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following principles as a guide for making the 
legitimate laws of our country?    Only laws that are written by representatives elected by the people, and 
that represent the will of the people, are legitimate and should be obeyed. 
 




I’m going to read you a list of groups in our society.  From this list, please tell me which group you like the 
least, or you can tell me if there is some other group that you like less than any of these groups.  Now, 
which of these groups do you like least:  (1) Ibadous, (2) Evangelical Christians, (3) Murids, (4) Tijanis, (5) 
atheists, (6) communists, (7) socialists, (8) fascists, (9) capitalists, (10) immigrants, (11) those who support 
legalized abortion, (12) those who oppose legalized abortion, or (13) another group. 
 
Now I’m going to read some statements about the group and tell me if you agree or not. 
 
Members of [     ] should be banned from being President of the Republic 
Members of [     ] should be allowed to teach our children in the public schools 
Members of [     ] should be allowed to hold public rallies 
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